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This thesis aims to trace one feature — interpersonal suspicious thought — in order to 
better understand jealousy, and its relationship to other kinds of suspicious thought in 
non-clinical populations. Chapter 1 offers an overview of jealousy and its clinical and 
forensic importance. Chapters 2 and 3  review the jealousy literature and theory, and offer 
critiques and areas to examine further, such as, the role of abnormal cognitive processes, 
negative affect, and in particular, psychosis-like thought. Chapter 4 explores jealousy’s 
structure and its relationship to paranoid ideation and finds indications of a shared, 
cumulative, latent, psychosis-like structure. Chapter 5 further examines the structure of 
jealousy found in Chapter 4 and confirms the cumulative structure and jealousy’s overlap 
with paranoia. Chapter 6 investigates how irrational processes, including jealousy, arise, 
evolve and impact couple relationships in real time. The study found that interpersonal 
socio-cognitive processes, such as intuition, appear to play a role in irrational thought 
formation and maintenance and may have a role in both functional and dysfunctional 
relationship processes. Chapter 7 summarises the thesis and integrates theory to build a 
new model of the jealousy process. The results of the thesis are discussed in terms of both 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis concerns jealousy. More specifically, it explores the complex set of 
dynamic processes involved in jealousy. Furthermore, it will explore consistency in 
findings between methods used in different fields in order to establish whether jealousy 
and paranoia could be indicative of an underlying psychotic process. This thesis will 
also explore transferability, looking at the data in relation to established processes found 
in other areas of psychosis research.  
There are a number of qualifying terms which are often associated with jealousy 
in the literature. These are: romantic, marital, spousal, and emotional. This suggest that 
there are different kinds of jealousy, or different contexts in which jealousy might be 
meaningful. ‘Romantic jealousy’ may be the most widely used form of the term. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines romantic jealousy as, “feeling or showing a resentful 
suspicion that one's partner is attracted to or involved with someone else”. It is 
etymologically derived from the Greek and Latin words for zeal, in the sense of great 
energy or enthusiasm in pursuit of an objective. This became the Old French word 
‘gelos’, related to “keen, or zealous” but then took on connotations of romantic 
possessiveness and suspiciousness.  
Definitional inconsistency centres on whether jealousy is seen as an emotion, 
thought, behaviour, or process. Mullen (1991) suggested that these may be viewed as 
components of a syndrome. Further definitional inconsistency arises from the frequent 
use of envy and romantic jealousy as synonymous terms when they refer to discrete 
phenomena1; (for an extended discussion see Salovey, 1991 pp. 23-27), and that the 
 
1 For example, envy refers to something one lacks oneself, whereas jealousy refers to the loss of a relationship one 




term jealousy is also used in relation to other (i.e., non-romantic) relationships (e.g., 
sibling relationships) where it is often viewed as the same construct but without 
sufficient evidence to support this (Stearns, 1989).  
This thesis views irrational jealousy as unfounded suspicions of a romantic 
partner’s fidelity that are unsubstantiated by any reliable evidence, or as an excessive 
response to minor jealousy-provoking situations that modify thoughts, feelings and 
behaviours (Bringle, 1991). A caveat is that the irrationality (or not) of jealousy is not 
always clear, and to assume seemingly unevidenced claims as irrational may be 
problematic as infidelity is likely to be concealed, unless there is mutual consent (e.g., 
in polyamorous relationships) (Mullen & White, 1991). 
Jealousy is interesting both clinically and from a forensic perspective as it is 
frequently involved in general aggression (Archer & Webb, 2006), intimate stalking 
(Roberts, 2005) and partner violence and homicide (Dobash et al., 2009). Jealousy and 
paranoia co-occur in people who are generally aggressive, or partner aggressive. These 
are psychological risk factors with the highest effect size in partner aggressive 
populations (Capaldi, Knoble, Shortt, & Kim, 2012; Stith, Smith, Penn, Ward, & Tritt, 
2004). Furthermore, paranoia and jealousy frequently co-occur with other forms of 
psychosis (Soyka, 1995). What is notable is that the exact relationship between jealousy 
and paranoia has not been more frequently or fully explored.  
Previous explorations of how jealousy and paranoia might be related, focus on 
jealousy as a symptom of a number of discrete mental illnesses (e.g., Borderline 
personality disorder, Kingham & Gordon, 2004). However, both jealousy and paranoia 
appear to share a common symptom of irrational, social suspiciousness – which may 




paranoia is generally understood to be delusional, problematic jealousy is not. It is not 
certain why this should be, as a main characteristic of irrational jealousy is the focus on 
false beliefs concerning a partner (Maggini et al., 2006).  
Jealousy and paranoia also share similar characteristics in terms of 
phenomenology (e.g., the presence of interpersonal suspicious thoughts, intrapersonal 
ruminative thoughts, false accusations and interrogative and aggressive interpersonal 
behaviours, see Chapter 2). Furthermore, according to DSM IV delusions or irrational 
thinking in both jealousy and paranoia is focussed on aspects of social relationships or 
social function (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). It is therefore interesting that 
jealousy and paranoia have only been associated in relation to unusual psychiatric 
syndromes (e.g., Othello Syndrome, Cipriani et al., 2012) and have not been studied in 
relation to their potential for common underlying social cognitive pathology in less 
severe clinical, forensic or normal populations.  
Many psychotic syndromes such as schizophrenia, paranoid and schizoaffective 
disorders share similar characteristics, with some central features, generally referred to 
as positive and negative symptoms (Watson & Tellegen, 1985). The aim of this thesis is 
to trace one particular feature of psychotic syndromes - interpersonal suspicious 
thinking - in order to explore the potential links with jealousy. In particular, I will 
explore links to the type of jealousy that has been termed in the literature as suspicious, 
irrational or pathological jealousy. The principal assumption tested in this thesis is that 
paranoia and jealousy are genuinely co-morbid, i.e., the co-occurrence of these two 
discrete syndromes, rather than just being co-existent, is indicative of some underlying 
latent mechanism (causal factor). 




that results in behaviour that might be reasonably considered destructive to either the 
partner or the relationship. The term pathological jealousy, which is often used to refer 
to problematic jealousy, is not wholly compatible with this notion. Pathological jealousy 
is referred to frequently in theory however, most empirical studies of pathological 
jealousy refer to rare case studies (e.g., Bhandari, 2012), which tells us little about what 
might cause unhelpful jealousy in most clinical cases, or in the normal population.  
Paranoid ideas are present on a continuum of severity in the general population, 
and for some people these ideas appear to become more exaggerated and persistent 
resulting in what appears to be sub-clinical paranoia, and in turn, may manifest as a 
clinical syndrome (van Os et al., 2009). What is also evident is that all types of 
pathological or suspicious jealousy, briefly mentioned above and discussed in more 
detail in subsequent chapters, also share the characteristic of unwarranted, exaggerated, 
persistent negative assumptions about the intentions or actions of another person 
(Maggini et al., 2006); these ideas relate predominately to social cognition.  
Whilst the aim of this thesis is not to suggest that all jealousy, nor all paranoid 
thought, is clinical or pathological, it is proposed that suspicious jealousy is distinct 
from normal jealousy in cause and form, but that it shares a common cause and form 
(marked by irrational thinking), with other forms of delusion/ideation and differs only in 
terms of theme (content). It is hypothesised that problematic interpersonal outcomes, 
such as aggression (Dobash et al., 2009) and poorly managed conflict escalation in 
couples (Teismann & Mosher, 1978), which have been related to jealousy as a whole, 
are explained by and result from this single form of jealousy with its latent psychosis-
like process.  




empirical basis for suggesting that paranoia and suspicious jealousy arise from a 
common latent psychosis-like process that occurs on a continuum of severity, frequency 
and intensity, and leads to disorganised and bizarre thinking. By first exploring the 
shared features (e.g., age of onset, comorbidity), presumed aetiology, physiopathology, 
clinical course, familial history, and response to pharmacological and behavioural 
treatments, in Chapter 2. Then exploring whether the traditional view of paranoia and 
suspicious jealousy as two discrete entities with different aetiologies or whether an 
alternative is responsible for both syndromes. Then evaluating alternative explanations 
to determine whether evidence and theory are consistent with a psychotic continuum 
model. Finally, within Chapters 6 and 7 it explores whether irrational beliefs of this kind 
should be understood with reference to social cognitive processes. If this is so, social 
cognitive processes should be included in any model of jealousy and also in those that 
explore paranoid delusions or irrational beliefs.  
Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 2. Systematic Review. Chapter 2 will provide an overview of prior 
empirical research into suspicious forms of jealousy. It will then explore the concepts 
and facets related to both paranoia and jealousy to determine if parallels can be drawn 
between jealousy and paranoia in support of the idea of a suspicious form of jealousy 
characterised by a combination of behaviour, cognition and emotion, using a systematic 
search of the literature. It will then map the extent and type of variables and 
characteristics that have been related to jealousy, and finally it will explore the 
relationship between jealousy and paranoia in order to understand whether these 
concepts are describing a similar phenomenon. Three key questions were examined: 1. 
What evidence is there that suspicious jealousy may be a focal theme of paranoid 




similarities and differences between the characteristics, phenomenology of paranoia and 
suspicious or excessive jealousy? 3. What are the cognitive, affective and behavioural 
consequences and mental health correlates and how might these result from paranoia or 
jealous?  
Results suggest that jealousy is a syndrome with a combination of emotional, 
cognitive and behavioural characteristics that, in its suspicious form, shares many 
features with other forms of irrational social cognition, such as paranoia and persecutory 
thinking. This chapter informs the theory chapter and provides the basis for the rest of 
this thesis, as subsequent chapters will explore the elements that form jealousy, the 
underlying structure of jealousy and test the relationships between elements that form 
jealousy and paranoid processes. 
Chapter 3. Jealousy Theory. Chapter 3 begins with an examination of jealousy 
definitions and then goes on to critically evaluate descriptive and explanatory theories 
of jealousy and explores the potential links with psychosis. 
This chapter will review and evaluate influential theories of jealousy. The sub-
questions to be answered by this theoretical review are: 1. What is jealousy comprised 
of and how might it be organised? 2. What do the most influential theories of jealousy 
suggest causes jealousy, by which mechanisms and how they are sequentially organised 
in order to cause the onset and maintenance of jealousy? 3. How do the suggested 
causes result in the differing affective, cognitive and behavioural outcomes proposed by 
theory and research? 4. How is irrational thinking explained by jealousy theory, what 
causes it and how does this interact with other risk factors to produce behavioural 
outcomes? This chapter will conclude by exploring the adequacy and gaps in existing 




avenues for empirical work that provide the theoretical basis for the rest of the thesis, 
informing the questions asked in the subsequent empirical research.  
Chapter 4. The Structure of Jealousy. Chapter 4 will apply Multidimensional 
Scaling (MDS) to explore the structure of both jealousy and paranoia and compare this 
to the structures suggested by existent jealousy theories reviewed in the previous two 
chapters; determine if jealousy is structured in a similar way to psychosis; and explore 
how items are distributed within four of the most frequently used and robust measures 
of jealousy and paranoia, in a population of non-clinical adults. This chapter asks 1. 
What are the facets/dimensions of jealousy? 2. What are the facets/dimensions of 
paranoia? 3. Is there an overlap or consistency between both of these that could indicate 
an underlying psychotic dimension? 
Analysis of the individual jealousy scales indicated that jealousy is cumulative 
with an escalation process comprising of six facets that relate to aspects of negative 
affect and personality traits. The individual paranoia scales replicate the cumulative 
structure suggested by Johns and Van Os (2001), and the relationship of escalation to 
anxiety (Freeman & Fowler, 2009) is also confirmed by the structure. The radex pattern 
(Guttman, 1954) in the dimensions of jealousy indicates that jealousy may be 
cumulative and processual, evolving from responses to well-evidenced threats to a 
romantic relationship, to irritation/anger, fear/neurosis, suspiciousness, followed by 
intrusiveness and then invasiveness accompanied by strong conviction to a jealous or 
paranoid idea. The structure is theoretically similar to other models of psychosis 
(Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002). This suggests that the 
construal of jealousy as a discrete dimension is unlikely and gives some support that 




processual theory of jealousy would be appropriate. The next chapter will further 
explore the cumulative properties of both jealousy and paranoia scales that were 
indicated in this chapter and determine which items and facets are related to more and 
less severe forms of jealousy and paranoia.  
Chapter 5. Rasch Analysis of Jealousy and Paranoia. Chapter 5 builds on 
Chapter 4 and explores the cumulative nature of both paranoia and jealousy as indicated 
by the MDS. It will delineate which items in this data set are related to relatively less 
and more jealousy and the relationship to paranoia. It will also explore whether there is 
evidence to support an underlying latent dimension for both irrational jealousy and 
paranoid thought.  
The aim of this chapter is to explore the cumulative nature of both paranoia and 
jealousy by using a Rasch analysis and to gain a greater understanding of affect, 
cognition and behaviours that are related to the severity and nature of jealousy 
experience and behaviour. Five questions will be examined: 1. Is jealousy cumulative in 
nature? 2. Which items indicate more and less jealousy? 3. Is paranoia also cumulative 
in nature? 4. Which items indicate more and less paranoia? 5. What is the cumulative 
structure of the suggested psychotic process in the combined jealousy and paranoia 
items, and is this indicative of an underlying psychotic dimension, or dimensions?  
The findings suggest that severe suspicious jealousy is indicated by its 
relationship to persecutory ideation, belief certainty and invasive and detective 
behaviours; that suspiciousness escalates due to increasing anxiety; and that this process 
is linked to a bias toward ambiguous or minor evidence of infidelity. Also, that 
behavioural markers of increasing jealousy are interrogative behaviours related to 




substantiated evidence of infidelity or relationship threat and the absence of anxiety. 
The chapter then discusses omissions from the scales and areas for development.  
This chapter will explore the cumulative structure of jealousy and paranoia. The 
following chapter will explore whether the processes established in the structural and 
cumulative analysis in Chapters 3 and 4, are found in the conflict resolution strategies of 
people who are in functional romantic relationships. It also explores how suspicious 
thoughts might be managed during conflict in order to limit any adverse impact upon 
the couple relationship. 
Chapter 6. Cued Recall Chapter 5 looked at the cumulative nature of jealousy 
within romantic relationships and evidence for a latent psychotic process. Chapter 6 
uses a pluralist analysis to explore how functioning romantic couples manage 
relationship conflict.  
The aim of this chapter was to explore, in real time, conflict resolution processes 
and transactions related to suspicious and irrational thinking within a dyadic framework 
from a number of different perspectives in order to determine: 1. Do irrational thought 
processes occur during conflict in functional couples and how do they evolve over time? 
2. Can specific processes be identified that relate to the escalation or dismissal of 
suspicious thoughts? 3.How do these processes affect the discussion and the couple’s 
relationship?  
A novel qualitative methodology - cued recall – will be employed in order to 
explore how couples reflect upon their capacity to resolve conflicts in their 
relationships. This method will allow us to gain a greater understanding of typical 




strategies people use to manage interpersonal conflict well; evaluate the theoretical 
models discussed in Chapters 3 and 4; and determine if the strategies used could be 
taught.  
Firstly, are suspicious, unwarranted interpersonal cognitions 
phenomenologically similar to those found in psychosis, also found in conflict 
resolution experiences of functioning couples? In order to explore this idea, both 
irrational and experiential/intuitive thinking and rational reasoning styles will be 
identified in couple conflict discussions. How do personal beliefs change and evolve (or 
remain rigid) during the couple’s conflict interaction and what contextual and 
interpersonal factors influence their evolution? Also, what do seemingly irrational 
beliefs mean for the individual from a phenomenological perspective? From a critical 
perspective, issues of power, voice and credibility within the dialogue will also be 
identified, to develop an alternative account of challenges and rationality within the 
couple relationship, using the principles of hermeneutic and epistemic injustice (Fricker, 
2007). It will conclude by examining the contribution and sometimes-competing nature 
of each perspective and examine how processes hypothesised to be useful from one 
perspective (e.g., empathic processes) may be viewed as less functional from another 
perspective. 
Paranoid and irrational thoughts were found to exist in functioning couple 
relationships. Findings show six distinct processes related to how partners understand 
intentions and the formation, modification and maintenance of irrational thinking within 
normal (non-abusive) couple relationships: 1. The use of emotional and intuitive 
reasoning rather than contextual and historical information; 2. Reflection and empathic 




responsibility-taking; 5. Deferent incorporation; 6. An acquired inability to reason due 
to not being believed. Findings also show that cued recall was a useful and novel 
method for exploring couple processes related to suspicious and irrational interpersonal 
thought and has potential for enabling empathic effort.  
Chapter 7. General Discussion and Conclusions. The overall aim of this thesis was to 
examine the relationship between irrational thinking in jealousy and paranoia, determine 
whether there is sufficient evidence to indicate a single, latent psychotic dimension 
underlying both phenomena. Chapter 7 will discuss how the thesis has answered the 
questions originally posed by assessing the contribution of each study and evaluating 
the overall findings in relation to the theory developed. It explores alternative theories 
related to irrational thinking that might better explain and account for the apparent latent 
psychotic dimension established in the previous empirical chapters, and builds on 
jealousy theory to suggest potential mechanisms for how affective, cognitive and 
situational factors may interact and produce situational couple outcomes, such as 
aggression and also prior psychological vulnerability to psychotic states. This chapter 
uses two techniques: the theory knitting perspective proposed by Kalmar and Sternberg 
(1988); and facet theory proposed by Guttman (1971), to extend and guide the 
development and refinement of existing jealousy theory. More specifically, it proposes 
explanations of irrational jealousy, i.e., its form, how it might arise, escalate and its role 
in partner conflict; integrating prior theoretical understanding (Chapter 3) and ensuring 
comprehensive coverage of empirically established (Chapter 2) or theoretically 
plausible risk factors to some of the core assumptions proposed by this theory. 
It proposes a new integrated model to encompass both the strengths of prior 




was to create a multifactorial model that both matches the empirically derived risk 
factors and findings from the systematic review of prior jealousy research. The model 
suggests specific mechanisms and processes related to empirically derived distal risk 
markers and proximal triggering events and provides an explanation as to how these 
interact to produce the observed outcomes of suspicious jealousy.  
This final chapter will then discuss the implications of these findings and how 
they might be practically applied to support couples and individuals. This will be 





CHAPTER 2: PARANOID PROCESSES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL MECHANISMS IN 
IRRATIONAL JEALOUSY: AN INTEGRATIVE REVIEW 
Jealousy is not always problematic and can sometimes enhance a relationship 
and contribute to its longevity. For example, jealousy can motivate behaviours such as: 
increasing the provision of material resources; increasing verbal and physical affection 
shown towards partners (Buss, 1988); add romance to a dull relationship, or increase a 
person’s recognition of their level of commitment to a relationship (Guerrero & 
Andersen, 1998, p. 66). However, heightened levels are linked to problematic outcomes, 
such as relationship difficulty and failure, personal distress, (Mullen & Martin, 1994), 
partner aggression (Capaldi et al., 2012; Langhinrichsen-Rohling, McCullars, & Misra, 
2012; Stith et al., 2004) and partner homicide (Buteau et al., 1993; Morton, Runyan, 
Moracco, & Butts, 1998). Jealousy is generally understood to be heterogeneous, ranging 
from normal responses to relationship threats, to severe pathological forms (Parker & 
Barrett, 1997). However, the causes of jealousy are not well understood. This is 
indicated by the continued difficulty in distinguishing normal from pathological 
jealousy (Mullen & Martin, 1984); jealousy typologies (e.g., Buunk, 1991, 1997; 
Marazziti et al., 2010b) that do not appear to identify natural kinds (Boyd, 1991), as 
demonstrated by each type’s lack of statistical independence, conceptual overlap; and 
the unreliable prediction of proposed outcomes. It has also resulted in a limited 
understanding of the mechanisms that create and maintain jealousy and how these result 
in adverse outcomes. Understanding the full scope of factors linked to pathological 
jealousy and new ways to understand what distinguishes pathological from normal 
forms would be useful for both researchers and clinicians. In this chapter, I will begin 
by outlining the scope, aims and approach taken in this review, followed by presentation 




The integrative pluralist approach (Kendler, 2005) suggests research should 
focus on single symptoms and the system that surrounds them. By mapping conditions 
onto their subprocesses and linking these to underlying mechanisms (Zachar & Kendler, 
2007), this approach has proved useful in clarifying causes and developing research in 
other areas of pathology (e.g., Kendler, Gardner, & Prescott, 2006; Ward, 2014). Single 
symptom research may be useful in understanding irrational suspiciousness in jealousy. 
Jealousy that is based on observed threats to the relationship appears to be quite 
normative but where it is based on imagined infidelity with no sound evidence of a 
partner's actual or intended infidelity, (i.e., irrational, suspicious jealousy) it is a feature 
of all pathological partner jealousy (Bringle, 1991). This makes irrational 
suspiciousness a potentially useful focus of theory and research. Furthermore, 
suspiciousness, whilst an identifying feature of problematic jealousy, is not exclusive to 
jealousy, it is also a central characteristic of paranoia (DSM IV; APA, 1994).  
Paranoia has three qualities in common with jealousy: it is interpersonal, it 
concerns the perception of others' intentions towards the self, and it concerns threat 
perception. Therefore, an analogy of jealousy with paranoia, with which has apparent 
similarity but where there has been notable progress in understanding (reviewed in the 
following sections) might help us to understand the processes underlying jealousy. 
Social cognition and non-social cognition are found to be neurobiologically and 
empirically separable (Fett et al., 2011; Green et al., 2008). Furthermore, social 
cognition is found to contribute more to outcomes in psychotic illness (Fett et al., 2011) 
with the belief that another person intends to harm, distinguishing paranoia from social 
anxiety (Freeman & Garety, 2000). It is one way of dealing with threats to the self in 




social situations due to misinterpreting other’s motives (Hewstone & Jaspars, 1987) 
with increasing severity indicated by the unlikelihood of the belief being true (Hanssen, 
Krabbendam, Vollema, Delespaul, & Van Os, 2006).  
Paranoia involves misperceptions or misinterpretations2 of circumstances or 
events that the person believes to be the truth and is a symptom of psychosis (Harvey & 
Walker, 1987). Paranoid, erroneous beliefs are held with a high degree of conviction, 
are inflexible and very resistant to change (Freeman, 2007). Paranoia is a characteristic 
of multiple psychiatric diagnoses (Bentall et al.,1988), includes multiple themes, e.g., 
fears that one is being threatened, and jealousy (DSM IV; APA, 1994). However, whilst 
the way that psychiatrists categorise paranoia might suggest it has different forms, 
clinical reports and research (e.g., Musalek et al., 1989) suggest that the form and 
process of paranoia remains the same regardless of theme or content.  
Until recently, paranoia was not thought to exist in the general population and 
therefore it was researched only where it was the primary theme of severe psychiatric 
delusion. A growing body of research now suggests that both paranoid delusions and 
ideation exist sub-clinically in the general population (Claridge, 1972, 1987; Johns & 
Van Os, 2001) on a continuum of severity (Hanssen et al., 2006). Conservative 
estimates suggest paranoid thinking is present at varying levels of severity in at least 10-
20% of the general population (Freeman, 2007; Johns et al., 2004). Findings show sub-
clinical paranoia creates vulnerabilities to delusional beliefs, biased appraisals of 
interpersonal situations and interpersonal problems in many of the general population 
(Freeman et al., 2005). If irrational jealousy is a form of paranoia or a latent psychotic 
 
2 Misperception and misinterpretation are used here to refer to different processes. There is an established tradition in 
cognitive psychology where perception is thought to be a passive process and interpretation an active process. 





process, it may also form a continuum in the population, have a similar hierarchical 
structure of escalating severity, be present across diagnoses and populations, and have 
shared characteristics and outcomes. In order to decide if this analogy between jealousy 
and paranoia is useful, further research is essential. 
People with psychosis or paranoia appear to think in a markedly different way 
from those who do not, and these differences are thought to contribute to distorted 
beliefs (Freeman et al., 2002; Garety et al., 2001). Different theories about what causes 
these differences have been suggested. For example, theory of mind (ToM) deficits (the 
ability to predict and understand others’ intentions) have frequently been suggested to 
cause distorted thinking, (Maher, 1974; Williams, 1964). However, most people in the 
general population with delusions have intact ToM and have no evidence of other 
substantiative cognitive or reasoning deficiency (Garety & Freeman, 1999; McCabe, 
Heath, Burns, & Priebe, 2002). Explanations that better fit current evidence suggest 
delusions arise due to multiple factors: including cognitive biases, reasoning errors, and 
erroneous attempts to make sense of internal arousal and anomalous experiences (Frith, 
1992; Hemsley, 1994). 
Safety behaviours, adaptations to thoughts and behaviours that help coping but 
also maintain negative emotional states, (see Clark, 1999), such as the desire to 
withdraw, or hostility and violence are frequent in people with paranoia (Freeman et al., 
2007). People suffering from either delusions or ideation display similar processes in 
the onset and maintenance of unfounded beliefs (seeing others as persecutors, having 
little perceived control over the situation, and feeling deserving of harm (Freeman & 
Garety, 2004). Reasoning processes and safety-behaviours are critical contributors to 




ruminative thoughts in less-severe forms of paranoia ( e.g., persecutory thinking) 
suggests irrational thoughts arise from mechanisms related to suspiciousness (e.g., 
Broome et al., 2007). People with paranoia also appear to have difficulty in weighing 
evidence when decision-making (Hemsley & Garety, 1986), which is most likely due to: 
reasoning biases in data gathering (especially a ‘jumping to conclusions’ bias – the 
tendency to use a small amount of information to make a firm decision), a failure to 
consider alternative explanations (Freeman et al., 2004), a lack of disconfirmatory 
evidence seeking (Allen et al., 2005), and negatively-biased interpretations (Savulich et 
al., 2015).  
Paranoia has both cognitive and affective elements, with irrational thinking 
appearing to result from a combination of ambiguous information, anomalous 
experience and heightened affect (Freeman & Garety, 2004). This often happens directly 
after distressing events (e.g., bullying, or interpersonal conflict) (Freeman, 2007), and is 
linked with low self-esteem (for a review see Freeman, 2007). In particular, fluctuations 
in self-esteem (Thewissen et al., 2007) and dysfunctional strategies to manage self-
esteem (Thewissen et al., 2008), both precede increases in the level of paranoia  
(Thewissen et al., 2011). This effect has been observed transdiagnostically with 
delusional symptoms (Bentall et al., 2008). Those vulnerable to suspicious thoughts are 
thought to externalise internal events by using negative or ambiguous information as 
evidence when trying to make sense of unusual or distressing internal experiences 
(Freeman & Garety, 2004). The most likely explanation is people with paranoid 
thinking are making an inference that misattributes emotional experiences and feelings 
to the external situation (Grèzes, Frith, & Passingham, 2004). In summary, research 
finds cognitive biases, affective processes, poor emotional regulation and low self-




No previous integrative review of irrational jealousy has been undertaken, 
therefore, a review of existing research on reasoning in irrational, suspicious jealousy 
focussed on reasoning and cognitive biases in general, psychiatric, or forensic 
populations, is timely. A better understanding of suspicious jealousy could have a vital 
role in understanding any mechanisms involved that generate and maintain jealousy and 
are involved in distorted thinking, which in turn may offer insights that integrate the 
situational and dynamic factors found to influence jealousy. Moreover, by drawing an 
analogy between paranoid thinking and suspicious jealousy, while ensuring the careful 
consideration of any differences, research into less severe forms of pathological 
jealousy might be developed, which may give additional insight into clinical forms of 
the condition. Furthermore, a better understanding of jealousy’s relationship to paranoia 
could help to better delineate jealousy's role in adverse outcomes, such as aggression. 
This review examines the research on characteristics, features, mechanisms and 
processes related to suspiciousness in jealousy, using a framework derived from 
prominent research on paranoid ideation (reviewed above) to guide the analysis. The 
overarching review question was:  
Is there evidence that irrational, suspicious jealousy and paranoia are different forms 
of the same syndrome or share a common latent process? 
In order to address this, the sub-questions were: 
1. What is the similarity between the phenomenology of paranoia and 
irrational, suspicious jealousy? 
2. What are the shared cognitive, affective and behavioural outcomes and 
mental health correlates and what aetiological mechanisms are proposed to 
link these to jealousy? 






A systematic review and an integrative approach was used to search and analyse 
data which meets the aim to evaluate the evidence for alternative theories, identify gaps 
in the literature, and create a basis for building further theory (Kastner, Antony, 
Soobiah, Straus, & Tricco, 2016; Kastner et al., 2012). It summarises a broad base of 
literature utilising diverse study designs and methods, and facilitates a more 
comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon (Whittemore & Knafl, 2005). 
Search Strategy.  
A systematic review following the PRISMA (2009) guidelines of the databases: 
CINARL, DARE, EMBASE, The Cochrane Database, The Campbell Collection, 
Medline, Patient-Reported Health Instruments (up to Feb 2016), ProQuest ASSIA, 
PsychInfo, PubMed, from the inception of the databases until 30 April 2019 and the first 
100 retrieved studies on Google Scholar, between 1 January 1981 and 30 April 2019 (in 
order to limit the number of retrieved studies) was used to identify all published studies 
reporting a link between jealousy and cognition. Databases were selected for their 
quality and extensive coverage of the psychological and psychiatric literature. Search 
terms were identified in consultation with a subject librarian, and included: irrational 
thinking (‘cogniti*’, or ‘persec*’, or ‘psychosis’ or ‘psychotic’ or ‘suspicio*’, 
‘irrational*’ ‘suspicious th*’,‘paranoi*’, ‘delusi*’, ‘patholog*’, ‘trust’) combined with 
jealousy (‘jealous*’, ‘Othello’, ‘conjugal paranoia’). Search terms included indexed 
items unique to each database (e.g., MeSh terms, PsycINFO index). Reference lists of 
the full-text articles (58) were also hand-searched to ensure comprehensive coverage of 




Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria  
Articles were inspected for the inclusion or exclusion using predetermined 
criteria, which are reported in Appendix A. 
 
 
Figure 1. PRISMA diagram showing a systematic search for cognitive and paranoid processes in jealousy. 
The author screened the 642 titles retrieved and the resulting 58 full-texts. Exclusions 
are summarised in Figure 1, with two articles excluded at abstract due to absent sample 
characteristic reporting . Screening resulted in 25 texts that were subject to a quality 
assessment based on the NICE criteria for quality assessment of correlational and quantitative 




and generalisability and received a grade of poor, adequate or good overall3. Detailed 
comments were recorded for transparency and reviewed with an academic supervisor. Due to 
the small number of papers that addressed the research question it was decided to retain all 
studies but to carefully report quality; all studies obtaining at least an adequate score for one 
summary criterion. This resulted in the 25 papers finally included. The author extracted the 
data (as detailed below), and the extraction grids were reviewed by both supervisors to ensure 
consistency. Data from the remaining studies were then extracted, and the final analysis 
double-checked by a supervisor. 
Data management, analysis and synthesis. Papers were read, re-read and discussed 
and a matrix constructed (e.g., Greenhalgh, Kristjansson, & Robinson, 2007; Wong, 
Greenhalgh, & Pawson, 2010) within an Excel spreadsheet (Tables 1, 2, & 34) to collate 
information for each research paper on: 
• Sample size, population, study design, participant gender, and study aims. 
• Research method, any intervention and control groups (to aid the specification of factors 
that discriminate between those who did or did not display irrational jealousy). 
• Any aspect of the study's history and context the study's authors thought important. 
Extracted sections were indexed and linked to an emerging analytic framework as 
each article was read, and re-read, data was extracted to answer the review questions (Tables 
4–6). 
 
3 The paper was given ++ if all or most of the checklist criteria were fulfilled, or where they were not fulfilled the 
conclusions are very unlikely to alter; + where some of the checklist criteria were fulfilled, and where not fulfilled, or not 
adequately described, the conclusions are unlikely to alter and; —few or no checklist criteria were fulfilled, and any 
conclusions are likely or very likely to alter. 





Characteristics of Studies 
A total of twenty-five papers met the inclusion criteria (Figure 1). Selected studies 
employed various methods as follows: cross-sectional questionnaire studies (20) (including 
papers with more than one reported study); multi-patient record reviews and case histories 
(5); experimental studies (1); interview (2); neuroimaging (1) and clinical assessment (1). 
Studies spanned multiple populations, including general population samples: (14), student (9) 
and community (5); clinical (10); and forensic (2). The majority of samples included both 
male and female respondents (22), but three were male only (3). The number of papers 
retrieved that informed each research question was unequal: Question 1 (11), Question 2 (4), 
and Question 3 (18). The vast majority of research retrieved considered organic neurological 
degenerative conditions, such as Parkinsonism, traumatic brain injury or toxins, e.g., alcohol, 
that result in delusional jealousy, (for examples see Byrne & Yatham, 1989; Chae & Kang, 
2006; Hodgson, Murray & Woods, 1992) with very little research on normal or sub-threshold 
clinical jealousy or jealousy related to mental health difficulties. Relevant papers were 
included to determine any commonality between brain structure and biochemical pathways to 
those of paranoia.  
In order to capture and integrate the full spectrum of psychiatric pathology and 
intensity in jealousy, papers were included for general, clinical and forensic populations. Of 
the 25 papers included, the total combined number of participants from separate samples of 
different populations was 30,487: 6,264 general population, 23,923 clinical and 300 forensic 
participants.  
Delusional jealousy spans multiple psychiatric classifications but is currently only 




ICD-10 (WHO, 1992); it is also referred to as jealousy related to alcoholism by ICD-10 
(WHO, 1992). Previous ways in which it has been referred to in the psychological and 
psychiatric literature are: Othello syndrome, morbid jealousy, conjugal jealousy and 
pathological jealousy.  
Conceptualisation and Measurement of Jealousy. Eight studies conceptualised 
jealousy as a delusional theme (Studies 4, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, & 22). The remaining 
studies used a number of different tools in order to measure jealousy. The measures 
comprised: DSM IV delusional jealousy criteria (Studies 16, 17, & 24); DSM III paranoid 
jealousy criteria (Study 16); diagnosis of delusional jealousy; or other psychiatric diagnosis 
using ICD 9 criteria and where jealousy was mentioned in the case notes (Study 22); 
Association for Methodology and Documentation in Psychiatry System, (ADMP; Guy & 
Ban, 1982) (Study 21); SAPS criteria for assessment of delusional jealousy (Andreasen, 
1984) (Study. 17); Jasperian measures (Study 15); psychiatric case notes where jealousy is 
mentioned, or where case notes included a clinical diagnosis of jealousy (undefined criteria) 
or where they met a set of criteria based on Shrestha et al., (1985) (Study 4 ); and the Sexual 
Jealousy Questionnaire (Study 13). 
Most studies (n = 17) used questionnaire measures (Studies 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
11, 12, 14, 18,19, 23, 24, & 25). Each of these studies included varied conceptualisations of 
jealousy which included jealousy as a heterogenous construct (Studies 10, 11, 12, & 14), as a 
multidimensional threat response) with related emotional, cognitive and behavioural 
components (Studies 1, 10, 11, & 12), or as related to the anticipated loss of a sexual object 
(Studies 6, 7, & 17).  
Studies apply different measurement instruments and techniques to the measurement 




scales used included the: Chronic Jealousy and Relationship Scales (White, 1981) (Study 14); 
Anticipated Sexual Jealousy Scale (Buunk, 1997) (Studies 5 & 23); Interpersonal 
Relationship Scale, (Hupka & Rusch, 1979, 1989) (Study 5), Multidimensional Jealousy 
Scale; (MJS; Pfeiffer & Wong, 1989) (Studies 18 & 19); and the Interpersonal Jealousy Scale 
(IJS; Mathes & Severa, 1981; Mathes, Philips, Skowran & Dick, 1982) (Studies 6 & 7).  
Each of these scales differs in its conceptualisation of jealousy. The Chronic Jealousy 
and Relationship Scales, Interpersonal Relationship Scales and the Interpersonal Jealousy 
Scale conceptualise jealousy as a trait. The Interpersonal Relationship Scale and The Chronic 
Jealousy and Relationship Scales include items that measure additional relationship variables 
proposed to relate to jealousy. The IJS conceptualises jealousy as a singular construct, 
whereas the MJS suggests that jealousy is multidimensional. 
An important part of how jealousy is conceptualised is likely to be the author’s 
underlying assumptions regarding the causes of jealousy. These assumptions which might 
also be expected to shape how jealousy measurements were operationalised. Most studies did 
not give details about what the author’s assume causes jealousy. However, two studies 
(Studies 10 & 12) measured jealousy using the Questionario de Gelosia (QUEGE; Marazitti, 
2010b), and its predecessor the Questionnaire of Adjustment to Relationships (QAR, 
Marazitti, 2003) this approach assumes that jealousy is related to underlying psychopathy. 
Furthermore, Studies 3 and 11, which used the Communicative Responses to Threat Scale, 
Guerrero et al, 2011) (Study 2) viewed jealousy as a communicative response to threat. 
Prevalence of Jealousy. Whilst most people report normal (reactive) jealousy at 
some point in their lives (Mullen & Martin, 1984), it is more difficult to determine the 
prevalence rate of irrational jealousy in the general population as there is no current research 




diagnostic psychiatric samples, which suggest prevalence rates of delusional jealousy of 
between 0.51.1% of all clinical admissions. These are highest in those admitted with 

































n/a Community. Reactive, preventative and 
anxious jealousy (Anticipated 
Sexual Jealousy Scale; Buunk, 
1988 ; Other 2 constructed 
for the study), Dutch 
personality Questionnaire 
(Neuroticism, Social Anxiety, 
Egotism, Dominance, Self-
Esteem); Attachment (Hazan 
& Shaver's vignettes); Birth 
order; Father's occupational 
level; Relational satisfaction; 
Interest in sex outside 
current relationship, (2 
questions) 
All three types of jealousy (reactive, 
possessive and anxious) are not related to 
egoism and dominance, but significantly 
correlated with neuroticism 
(.32***;.45***;.47***), social anxiety(.31***; 
.27***; .22***), rigidity (.22***; .25***;.24***), 
self-esteem (-.21***, -.28***,-.28***) and 
possessive and anxious jealousy with hostility 
(.23**; .28***). 
2. Carson & 
Cupach 
(2000) 
Explore factors that 
may account for 
individual variations 


















communicative responses to 
jealousy, 
surveillance/restriction (No 
standard scales/some were 
developed for other 
research, others specifically 
for this study) 
Relationship‐specific rumination was 
negatively associated with trust(-.676**), 
positively associated with 
possessiveness(.672**), 
surveillance/restriction (.466**), manipulation 
(.357**), relationship threat(.372**), rival 
contact (.141*), compensatory restoration 
(.318**), negative affect expression (.366**), 
signs of possession (.187**), derogation of 
competitors (.303**), distributive 
communication (.323**), violent 
communication (.181**), violence toward 
objects (.190**), active distancing (.307**), 













Population Measured variables Main findings 
3. Costa et 
al. (2015) 


























Questionnaire of Affective 
Relationships (QAR); 
Jealousy, Attachment Style 
AAQ; Hazan and Shaver, 
1987, Love Style, Relationship 
Style (Dom/Sub/Helping), 
Aggression (Measured items 
are not measures of 
aggression the scale is 
designed for measuring 
sedation), Relationship 
Quality, Depression, Anxiety, 
Temperament, Character 
(They were not validated 
measures, but developed for 
this study), Impulsiveness, 
Social Adjustment. 
A forward logistic regression model found 
jealousy intensity (U=151***) and trait anxiety 
(U=25***) best distinguished participants with 
Pathological jealousy from the healthy control 
group. 
4. Crowe et 
al. (1988) 
Compare patients 





















Clinical Demographics: Age at onset, 
age, occupational Status, 
Years Education, Marital 
Status, Sex. Clinical diagnosis 
comparison, (delusional 
theme and classification). 
Chart review by social 
worker, then psychiatrist. A 
total of 1,483 records with 
discharge diagnoses including 
the terms paranoid or 
paranoia were reviewed. 
Compared with non-jealous patients, jealous 
ones were more likely to have had a single 
delusion and experienced a more benign 
course – indicated by a lower rate of 
hospitalization (Jealous n=4, Non-Jealous n=21) 
and outpatient treatment (Jealous n=3, Non-
Jealous n=21 (Follow up n=Jealous, n=37, Non-
jealous n=51). The original delusion tended to 
remain. Illness did not develop into another 
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5. DiBello et 
al. (2014) 
To evaluate 


















n/a Student Jealousy: Interpersonal 
relationship scale (Hupka & 
Rusch, 1989); Drinking to 
cope: 5 item subscale of 
Drinking Motives 
Questionnaire Revised; 
Alcohol Consumption: Daily 
Drinking Questionnaire; 
Drinking Problems: Rutgers 
Alcohol Problem index 
Modified with two items 
Drinking to cope mediated some aspects of 
jealousy and alcohol use problems. In 
particular, the more negative or maladaptive 
aspects of jealousy were related to drinking 
to cope and drinking problems(vindictiveness: 
b =.218, t(637)= 4.57, p<.001), distrust: b = 
.218,t(637) =2.65,p <.01 ), whilst the more 
adaptive aspects were not, suggesting a more 








of wife assault such 
as use of violence, 










n/a Forensic Assultativeness: CTS; BPO; 
Self report instrument for 
BPO, subscales: identity 
diffusion, primitive defences, 
reality testing MMCI C 




magnitude, mode of 
expression, hostile outlook, 
and range of anger-eliciting 
situations; Jealousy: 
Interpersonal Jealousy Scale 
(Mathes & Severa,1992); 
Alcohol Use: Michigan 
Alcohol Screening Test; Drug 
Use: Drug Abuse Screening 
Test; Chronic Trauma 
Symptoms: Trauma 
Symptoms Checklist (TSC-
33), subscales: dissociation, 
anxiety, depression, post-
sexual abuse trauma 
BPO has transient psychotic episodes. Higher 
BPO scorers have significantly higher levels of 
jealousy (t=3.03, df=118, p =.004). In a 
canonical correlation analysis, three variables 
(trauma symptoms, anger, and jealousy) 
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hypothesized, 
and sleep disturbance. 











men and 76 
partners ( 







MAge =35, Age 
range: 19–45) 
Forensic Age, Income Group, Years at 
school, Attachment: 
Relationship Scales 




Inventory (MAI, Siegel, 1986); 
Jealousy: Interpersonal 
Jealousy Scale (Mathes and 
Severa, 1981; Mathes et al., 
1982)), Current trauma 
symptoms: Trauma Symptom 
Checklist (TSC-33, Briere 
and Runtz, 1989), Borderline 
Personality Organization: 
Self-Report Instrument for 
Borderline Personality 
Organization (Oldham et al., 
1985); (MCMI-II) (Millon, 
1992); Partner Abuse 
Tolman’s (1989) 
Psychological Maltreatment of 
Women Inventory (PMWI), 
CTS (Straus et al., 1979); 
Severity of Violence Against 
Women Scales (SVAWS; 
Marshall, 1992; Intrusiveness: 
Intrusiveness Scale is an 
ordinal scale of 15 items 
derived from the Canadian 
Jealousy was related to BPD (r=0.41***), and 
PTSD(r=0.42***). It is related to reality 
testing (r= 0.30***) and identity (r=.43***) 
subscales of BPO, Aggression (CTS total 
abuse score r=0.19*; SVAWS total r=0.29**), 
Anxiety (r=0.31**), Trauma Symptoms (see 
above), Depression (r=0.36***), Self-Defeating 
(r=0.32***) (highest subscale correlation), 
avoidant(r=0.30***) and passive aggressive 
(r=0.29**) subscales of the MCMI, and RSQ 
fearful attachment (r=0.34***). Trauma 
Symptoms was the highest correlation. 
Extremely strong correlations between 
jealousy scores and wives’ reports of 
intrusiveness (r=0.43**), emotional 
abuse(r=0.80***), control/domination 
(r=0.57***). Jealousy, BPO, fearful attachment, 
and trauma symptoms explained 32% of the 
variance for control/domination and 62% of 
the variance for emotional abuse accounted 
for 65% of Intrusiveness. Results suggest 
individuals with high rejection sensitivity 
experience higher levels of jealousy, and 
subsequently greater propensity for 
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Criminal Code; Social 
Desirability: The Marlowe-
Crowne Social Desirability 
Scale (Crowne and Marlowe, 
1960) 









Questionnaire 281 Adults, 
U.S. university 
students, (185 
female, MAge = 
19.16 yrs.) 
n/a Community  Revised Family 
Communication Pattern 
Instrument (RFCP; Richie & 
Fitzpatrick, 1990); Revised 
Communicative Responses to 
Jealousy scale (CRJ; Guerrero 
et al., 2011); Toronto 
Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; 
Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 
1994). Age, gender, duration 
of relationship, ethnicity. 
Being female (t(272) =-2.17) and relationship 
length (r (275) =.19) is correlated with 
negative communication. Being male is 
associated with rival contact (t(272) =2.51**). 
Positive family communication style is 
associated with positive forms of jealousy 
expression (b=.20*). Negative family 
communication style is not associated with 
negative jealousy expression styles . 
Alexithymia moderates jealousy expression. It 
is positively associated with negative 
expressions of jealousy and negatively 
associated with positive forms of jealousy 
expression.  
9. Lima et 
al. (2017) 
Replicate the factor 
structure of the 
QUEGE in a 
Brazilian sample and 
to explore the 
relationship of 
jealousy sub-type to 
mental health 
pathology. 





n/a Community Questionario della gelosia 
QUEGE (Marazziti et al., 
2010a) subscales described in 
the original, Temperament 
Evaluation Memphis, Pisa and 
San Diego (TEMPS; Woodruff 
et al., 2011); Symptom 
Revised Checklist (SCL-90R; 
Carissimi, 2011; Derogatis & 




depression, anxiety, hostility, 
phobic anxiety, paranoid 
ideation, and psychoticism. 
The results can be reinterpreted as: Model fit 
statistics (RMSEA =0.062, AIC=104,351.6) 
indicate that the adjusted model is only 
adequate (Holbert & Stephenson, 2008). 
Factor structure (item loading) not same as 
previous studies indicating sub-scales (factors) 
are unstable. Obsessional and Paranoid 
subscales are stable- Paranoia only correlates 
with anticipated pathology i.e., psychosis and 
paranoia subscales of SCL-90R, obsessional 
jealousy does not correlate with any 
pathology, as measured by SCL-90R, 
(indicating normal jealousy). The further three 
subscales appear to represent only two 
factors: negative anxious affect, and 













Population Measured variables Main findings 
All adapted for Brazilian 
samples.  
2010a) the items within the interpersonal 
sensitivity factor may be better represented as 
partner controlling behaviour than 
interpersonal sensitivity.  
10. 
Marazziti et 


















34.12 , SD= 
7.99) 
n/a Community. Experiences in Close 
Relationships questionnaire 
(ECR); “Questionario della 




esteem, and separation 
anxiety-related jealousy/fear 




sensitivity. Gender, age, 
marital status, work status 
and duration of the 
relationship. 
The results showed that the ECR anxiety scale 
was significantly and positively related to all 
QUEGE dimensions (self-esteem, 
suspiciousness, obsessionality, interpersonal 
sensitivity, fear of loss: respectively r=.437***, 
r=.309**, r=.583***, r=.633***, r=.577***) 
whilst the ECR avoidance scale was related 
only to the self-esteem, fear of loss and 
suspiciousness dimensions (respectively 





















Obsessive Compulsive Scale 
and QAR (Questionnaire of 
Adjustment to Relationships). 
Age, gender, and screened 
for physical health and other 
pathology. 
Patients with OCD had higher total jealousy 
scores than healthy subjects (respectively 
Mean = 64.9, SD =16.2; Mean 49.9, SD = 14); 
an intermediate group of subjects, 
corresponding to 10% of the total, were 
concerned by partner jealous thoughts, but at 
a lower degree than patients, and “healthy 
jealous subjects” with no other 
psychopathological trait . Significant 
differences were observed for single items – 
Ability to put the concerns out of the mind, 
the impairment of relationship, the limitation 
of a partner’s freedom and the checking up on 













Population Measured variables Main findings 
attributed to OCD, family history of OCD, or 
sub-clinical OCD because they had already 
been screened for this. Ability to put 
concerns out of mind, relationship 
impairment, checking on partner and 
controlling behaviours distinguished between 
healthy jealous, healthy non-jealous and OCD 
clinical patients on an increasing continuum. 
Frequency of the concern, suspiciousness, 
interference with daily activities, strategies to 
avoid concerns and checking for traces of 
sexual intercourse distinguished jealous-










and paranoid), by 













living in Pisa, 
Italy (MAge= 






The participants were 
screened for Axis 1 and 2 
disorders by clinical interview 
with the lead author (a senior 
psychiatrist). This is a 
development of the QUEGE 
instrument. 
Factor analysis identified five rather than four 
clear-cut factors: self-esteem, paranoia, 
interpersonal sensitivity, fear of being 
abandoned, and obsessionality(respectively 
11.9%, 11.4%, 11.1%, 9.6%, 8.8% of the 
variance). Women showed statistically 
significant lower levels of self-esteem. (p=.01) 
and higher levels of obsessionality than men 
(p=. 04). Younger age (<25 years) was 
associated with lower self-esteem and higher 
levels of paranoia and 
obsessionality(significance unreported); being 
single was associated with lower self-esteem 
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13. Michael 
et al. (1995) 
Examine nature and 
prevalence of 
morbid jealousy in 
male patients with 
alcohol dependence 
and its association 
with clinical and 
demographic 
variables. 
Questionnaire 207 Alcoholic 
patients. (All 
Male; MAge= 
40, SD= 8.4) 
 Clinical Clinical interview x 2, Sexual 
Jealousy Questionnaire – 
relevant demographic data, 
drinking history, psychiatric 
history, history of violence, 
pre-morbid personality 
mental state examination and 
a detailed assessment of 
jealousy. 
Thirty-four per cent (71 out of 207) suffered 
from morbid jealousy. Morbid jealousy had 
different manifestations. Some patients 
expressed it only when intoxicated (28%), 
others even when sober (72%) and in some 
the jealousy took the form of a delusional 
disorder (22%). Delusional disorder would 
not have categorised the majority of the 
patients suffering delusional jealousy and the 









jealousy and the 
demographic and 
mental health 
correlates of those 
who expressed high 









 Community. Demographic information, 
including marital, educational 
and socio-economic status, 
birth order and parents' 
educational and socio-
economic status, Rosenberg 
Self-esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 
1965; lngham et al, 1986) (c) 
General Health 
Questionnaire (GHQ28; 
Goldberg & Williams, 1988) 
which had been standardised 
and validated in the local 
community (Romans-
Clarkson et al, 1989), the 
WHO alcohol consumption 
scale (Saunders et al., 1987) 
Spielberger Anger Expression 
Scale (Spielberger et al, 
1988), which measures both 
overt anger and suppressed 
anger, social support data in 
which subjects were asked 
about their degrees of 
satisfaction with their current 
relationship and overall level 
Searching the partner's belongings (reported 
by 7% females, 1% males**)or inspecting their 
clothes for signs of sexual activity (1 male, 6 
women) correlated with unusually intense 
jealousy (and reported exclusively by the 
more jealous group). Men tended to cope 
with jealousy by using denial and 
avoidance(21% v 13%*). Women were more 
likely to express their distress (32% v11%***) 
and to try to make themselves more 
attractive to their erring partner (20.2% v 
9.8%**). Greater jealousy concerns were 
expressed by heavy drinkers (24.2% v 
8.2%***)and those reporting more psychiatric 
symptoms (ORR 2.78 [1.6–4.9]). A clear 
correlation emerged between lowered self-
esteem and increased jealousy, which was 
particularly marked in women (ORR male 2.32 













Population Measured variables Main findings 
of social support (g) a 50–
item jealousy scale which was 
developed from White's 
(l981a) Chronic Jealousy and 
Relationship Scales which 
explored the subjects' 
experience of amorous 
jealousy. 
15. Musalek 







jealousy, love or 
illness) and the age 
of first 
manifestation. 








 Clinical Routine documentation 
system, those presenting with 
hypochondriacal delusions, 
persecutory delusions, love 
or jealousy delusions. 
The distribution of delusional theme differed 
between genders (62.5% of women presented 
with a persecutory theme, jealousy was more 
likely in men (69.2%) than women (30.8%). 
The difference between persecutory and 
jealous delusions was found to be significant 
(c2 =35.68**). Persecutory delusions had an 
earlier onset in males (73% after age 30 yrs.) 
when compared to jealous delusions (2/3 of 
cases after age 40 yrs.***). No significant 
differences could be found in age of onset 







individuals with a 
stroke, who had 




part of the brain is 
mostly involved in 
jealousy; and to try 


















DSM-IV criteria. Right hemispheric stroke was the most 
frequently reported neurological disorder in 
these patients (45%), although there was a 
wide range of more diffuse neurological 
disorders that may be reported to be 
associated with different types of jealousy. 
This is in line with recent neuroimaging data 
on false beliefs, moral judgments, and 













Population Measured variables Main findings 
may be categorized 
as a pattern. 
17. Paolini 











Between theme and 
childhood adversity 
type. Between 
theme and cannabis 





















Scale for the Assessment of 
Positive Symptoms (SAPS; 
Andreasen, 1984), Scale for 
the Assessment of Negative 
Symptoms (SANS; 
Andreasen, 1983), Positive 
and Negative Syndrome Scale 
(PANSS), Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV Axis I 
Disorders (SCID; First et al., 
1998); Childhood Trauma 
Questionnaire-Short Form 
(CTQ-SF; Bernstein et al., 
2003), Trauma Experiences 
Checklist (TEC; Cristofaro et 
al., 2013), Parental 
Nurturance (Barnes & 
Windle, 1987), Parental 
Harsh Discipline (Ge et 
al.,1994, Mrug et al., 2008), 
Friends’ Delinquent 
Behaviour (Mrug et al., 2012), 
School Connectedness Scale 
The most prevalent type of delusion is 
paranoia (11.6%), associated with older age 
and later onset (Median Age. 21.6 yrs. 
SD=5.2)/20.4 SD= 4.0**). Delusions of 
influence are correlated with hallucinations 
and severity of negative symptoms 
(respectively r=0.485**, r=0.214**). General 
relationship between all types of delusional 
theme (Delusions of: Influence, 
Grandiose/Religious, Paranoid, Negative 
Affect, Somatic) and childhood adversity 
(respectively 0.234**, 0.196*, 0.200**, 
0.284**, 0.164*). Environmental violence and 
Interpersonal abuse correlate significantly 
with all delusional themes. Delusions of 
influence (F2,228=8.505***) and delusions of 
negative affect (inc. jealousy) (F2,228 =3.333*) 
higher among users of cannabis and 
stimulants. Indicates jealousy to be a type 
separate to persecutory, delusions of 
reference, etc and related to other types of 
negative affect delusion (i.e., sin or guilt). 













Population Measured variables Main findings 
(Sieving et al., 2001). Age, 
gender, ethnicity, yrs. of 
school, Parental Status, 
Relationship Status, substance 
abuse, employment status, 
brought up by, religious 
affiliation.  
rare as primary diagnostic categorisation, and 
there were only two in the sample. Co-
morbidity and co-occurrence of other 
delusions was not reported and would have 




et al. (2015) 
Determine if 
distrust in one’s 
partner is 
associated with 
higher levels of both 
cognitive and 
behavioural jealousy 
and if this 
association is 
particularly strong 
for individuals who 
are higher in 
anxious attachment. 
Also, if distrust is 
associated with 
















18 to 52 years 





Trust Scale (Rempel & 
Holmes, 1986); Romantic 
jealousy: MJS (Pfeiffer & 
Wong, 1989): Attachment 
Anxiety: Experiences in Close 
Relationship Scale (Wei, 
Russell, Mallinckrodt, & 
Vogel, 2007);IPV Revised 
Conflict Tactics Scale 
(CTS2R; Straus & Douglas, 
2004). Non-Physical Abuse of 
Partner Scale (Garner & 
Hudson, 1992). 
Attachment anxiety moderated the 
association between trust and jealousy, 
anxious individuals experienced much higher 
levels of cognitive (b = -.095, t(254=-2.36*) 
and behavioural (b=-.070, t(254) =-2.04*) 
jealousy when reporting lower levels of trust. 
Attachment anxiety moderated the 
association between trust and non-physical 
violence (b=-.071, t(254) =-2.05*). Anxiously 
attached individuals are more likely to 
become jealous, snoop through a partner’s 
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both anxious and 
avoidant 
attachment. 




Study 2: 351 
(236 Female; 
MAge =18.72) 
 Student Study1: Multidimensional 
Jealousy, Relationship 
dependency, insecurity, Adult 
Attachment Style 
(Experiences in Close 
Relationships Scale).  
Study2: Multidimensional 
Jealousy, Chronic Jealousy 
(White, 1981), Relationship 
dependency and insecurity, 
Relationship trust. Global 
Self-Esteem. 
Reactive jealousy was associated with greater 
dependency (.40, p<.001), chronic 
jealousy(.15, p<.05), trust (.19, p<.05), being 
younger(-.17, p<.001), being female (.13, 
p<.05). Suspicious jealousy was associated 
with (43% variance): insecurity (Study 1 .50, 
p<.001; Study. 2 .21,p<.001), anxious-
attachment (Study. 1 .16, p<.01)), chronic 
jealousy (Study 2 .42, p<.001), trust (-.25, 
p<.001), self-esteem (Study 2 -.10,p<.01). 
Suspicious jealousy is unrelated to 
dependency, avoidant attachment, gender or 
age. (Results for study 2 only include figures 
for unique variance) 





characteristics in a 
sample of 20 cases 
of delusional 
jealousy; and to 
explore the degree 
of dangerousness 
posed by these 
subjects; and to 
initiate the 



















Demographic (marital status, 
age, ethnicity, age at onset of 
psychosis, age at onset of 
delusional jealousy). Clinical 
and Forensic data from case 
notes, DSM-IV criteria 
diagnosis. Brain scan – fMRI 
and PT data. 
Delusional jealousy usually co-exists with 
other delusional forms and is related to 
aggression against partners (60% as opposed 
to 10% in other delusional types). Delusional 
jealousy may be one component of a more 
complex delusional system. In 95% of cases a 
paranoid component was found closely 
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21. Soyka & 
Schmidt 
(2011) 
















 Clinical AMDP assessment system – 
semi-structured rating scale 
each symptom. Delusional 
jealousy is a single item: 
'conviction of being deceived 
or betrayed by a loved one. 
An unfounded conviction'. 
Jealousy prevalence was 1.1%. Delusions of 
jealousy were most frequent in organic 
psychoses (7.0%), paranoid disorders (6.7%), 
alcohol psychosis (5.6%) and schizophrenia 
(2.5%), whereas in affective disorder delusions 
of jealousy could be found in only 0.1 %. 







disorders and the 
possible influence of 
















 Clinical Retrospective clinical 
notes/charts and case 
histories: clinical diagnosis, 
age, gender, number of years 
with psychosis etc., and 
diagnosis. Patients with 
schizophrenia, delusional 
disorder and alcoholism are 
most likely to suffer 
delusional jealousy. 
Prevalence of delusional jealousy in 8134 
psychiatric in-patients was 1.1%. Delusions of 
jealousy were most frequent in organic 
psychoses (7.0%), paranoid disorders (6.7%), 
alcohol psychosis (5.6%) and schizophrenia 
(2.5%), whereas in affective disorder delusions 
of jealousy could be found in only 0.1%. 
Schizophrenia and affective disorder were the 
most common diagnoses, most patients with 
delusions of jealousy were schizophrenics. In 
schizophrenia, women were more likely to 
suffer from delusional jealousy(72.4%, 
compared to 52.2%), and also as a result of 













Population Measured variables Main findings 
23. Swami 
et al. (2012) 
Determine if the 
love-is-blind bias 
would predict the 
experience of both 
possessive and 
anxious jealousy 
















SD = 10.01) 
 Community Demographics: age, sex, 
ethnicity, marital status, 
sexual orientation, length of 
relationship in months. 
Ratings of partner and self 
physical attractiveness: 
Estimating physical 
attractiveness scale (Swami et 
al., 2007); Jealousy 
experience: Revised 
anticipated Jealousy scale 
(1997); Love-styles: Revised 
Love-Style Perception Survey 
(Grote & Frieze, 1994); 
Relationship Satisfaction: 9 
item measure created for the 
study. 
The love-is-blind bias positively predicted the 
experience of anxious jealousy (B =.49, SE 
=.15 b =.32, t=3.72, p<.001). Furthermore, 
the love-is-blind bias was significantly and 
positively correlated with possessive jealousy 
but did not emerge as a significant predictor 
once the effects of love-styles had been taken 
into account (B =.01, SE =.01 b =.05, t=0.69, 
p=.246). The love-is-blind bias was not 
significantly correlated with reactive jealousy. 
24. Tarrier 
et al. (1989) 
To determine if 
irrational jealous 
cognitions vary with 
subjective feelings 
of insecurity and 
low self-confidence 
and to examine if 
there were any 
other differences in 
personality 
dimensions of the 
EPQ-R 




MAge = 27) 
 Community, 





EPQ-R (Eysenck, Eysenck and 
Barrett, 1985) and morbid 
jealousy. Demographics: 
gender, age. 
Females with morbid jealousy are significantly 
more introverted, neurotic and psychotic 
(F1,316 =7.43, p<.01; F1,316 =162.3, p<.01;F1,413 
=10.58, p<.002) (as a personality trait rather 


















To test a causal 
model of jealousy. 
Questionnaire 150 Couples, 
(MAgemale = 
22.3, Age 
range = 18 to 
47), MAgefemale 
= 21.1, Age 
range= 16.5 
to 40 years) 
 Community & 
students 
Jealousy, Comparison level, 
Self Esteem, Relationship 
Questionnaire created for 
this study. Relative 
attractiveness – 2 items, 
relative availability of 
opposite sex friends – 1 item; 
belief in partners attractive to 
another – 1 item; relative 
involvement – 1 item; 
Partners dissatisfaction with 
relationship – 2 items. Self 
Esteem: Rosenberg’s 10-item 
scale. Perceived inadequacy: 
inadequacy scales – 7 items; 
Notice – 4 items; Worry – 2 
9-point items; Jealousy 6 item 
self-report; Social 
Desirability: Crowne-
Marlowe Social Desirability 
scale, 1964). 
Greater relative involvement in the 
relationship and perceived inadequacy as a 
partner independently directly cause jealousy. 
These two primary appraisal variables also 
indirectly affect jealousy through the 
operation of two global secondary appraisal 
variables: noticing and worrying . Threat 
based on comparison and threat based on 
partner's evaluation of oneself are distinct and 
both types of threat may be either acute or 
chronic (Model fit for males – c2 (66)=51.70; 
and females c2(66) = 6.7) The model accounts 
for 48.2% variance in Jealousy. 
Note. Standard statistical notation is used, in addition, MAge refers to the Mean Age of respondents, Statistical significance is abbreviated in the text to refer to p=0.5*, 
p=0.01**, and p< 0.001***.. Additional abbreviations used in the text are as follows: AMDP assessment refers to the Manual for the Assessment and Documentation of 
Psychopathology, (Guy & Ban, 1982); BPO refers to Borderline personality organisation; BPD refers to Borderline personality disorder; CTS refers to the Conflict Tactics 
Scale Revised (Straus, Hamby, Boney-McCoy, & Sugarman, 1996); DSM IV refers to the Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders	(American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994); EPQR refers to the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised (Eysenck & Eysenck (1993); MMCI refers to the Multimodal Coping Inventory (Craig, 
2005). Other abbreviations in the text refer to: WHO this is the World Health Organisation; fMRI that is frequency magnetic resonance imaging; PT which is Positron 




The Quality of Included Studies.  
In addition to selecting only peer-reviewed papers, a quality assessment was 
conducted using the NICE criteria (2012; see Methods section and Appendix B). Eight 
studies had both good internal and external validity (Studies 1, 5, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21 & 
22). Ten studies were of adequate quality, with either good or adequate internal or 
external validity (Studies 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11,13, 19, 20 & 25) and seven had major 
methodological weaknesses (but were included as they directly addressed the research 
questions). Seven, on closer inspection of methodology, (Studies 3, 9, 10, 12, 18, 23 & 
24) had elevated potential for contamination, lack of control for confounding variables, 
biased sampling, or the use of inappropriate or low-quality measures. The quality 
assessment for the included papers is summarised in Table 2.  
Cross-sectional designs were the most common (80 % of studies). They were 
included despite limitations in control for extraneous variables and their ability to infer 
causation. Six cross-sectional studies (Studies 3, 4, 7, 11, 12 & 16) used matched 
controls, and therefore have greater control for confounding variables. Four studies used 
multiple methods (Studies 5, 16, 17 & 18), but the predominant method was again 
correlational, which means causal direction cannot be inferred. However, several studies 
used analyses of detailed case-notes extending over a patient's lifetime, which can give 
some indication of temporal precedence (4, 20, 21 & 22). One study (Study 1) using an 
experimental design, may also give some indication of causality. There are no reported 
longitudinal studies.  
Four studies (Studies 1, 9, 21 & 22) had large sample numbers (n=964, n=1,970, 
n=14,309, n=8,134 respectively), contributing to higher statistical power. The majority 




were therefore likely to find any existing effect. The sampling methods used for many 
studies may have introduced error or bias due to the use of convenience samples or an 
inadequate sample for the analysis (Cochran, 1977). Furthermore, participants in 
clinical studies were often those who were already help-seeking, and therefore those 
who are more reluctant to seek help but important to include, may have been excluded. 
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N.B. Studies were graded as good where both internal validity and generalisability received a good grade, fair where only one of these received a good or 





 1. Distinctions between Psychiatric Illness v Biological Neuropathology  
Clinical jealousy cases have been traced to a range of neurological 
complications including right cerebrovascular disorders (45%), cerebellar infarctions 
(10%), mesencephalothalamic cerebral ischaemia (10%), Parkinson’s disease (15%), 
rhinoencephalic lesions (10%) and drug treatment (10%) (Ortigue & Bianchi-
Demicheli, 2011). Most reported clinical cases of jealousy occurring after a stroke, are 
typically to the right-hemisphere (Ortigue & Bianchi-Demicheli, 2011), an area 
increasingly associated with emotion, moral judgement, mental state reasoning, false 
beliefs and delusions (Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010; 
Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007). Right brain lesions and damage are 
associated with negative emotional states and false beliefs, delusions and the misreading 
of other people’s intentions. Ortigue and Bianchi-Demicheli (2011) suggest damage to 
the right side of the brain leads to a lack of regulation of the left side of the brain, which 
allows verbalisation of misperceptions and an escalation of jealous emotional states. 
They suggest delusional jealousy is due to flaws in false-belief psychological systems. 
Ortigue and Bianchi-Demicheli (2011) suggest the brain areas involved in jealousy are 
also those involved in mentalising, behaviour interpretation and prediction, the 
understanding of other's intentions, and false beliefs. These are the temporo-parietal 
junction, posterior temporal sulcus, angular gyrus and inula, and are involved in both 
the formation of false-beliefs and jealousy. Although other areas of the brain are 
involved in social cognition, specifically emotion processing, executive functioning 
(action monitoring, attention, dual task monitoring, episodic memory retrieval) these did 
not overlap with the regions activated during jealousy. Both reported studies find similar 
brain areas are involved in suspicious jealousy to those involved with mentalisation, and 




consistent with those involved with other types of false belief, self-reference, delusions, 
the prediction of other’s actions and intentions, and emotional processing 
Only one study reported a neural basis for normal jealousy: Takahashi et al. 
(2006) used qualified gender-blind raters to confirm fMRI image reports. Raters 
reported the brain areas involved in jealousy are also those involved in other types of 
false belief. They found whereas jealousy involves similar emotions, fear, anxiety and 
anger in both genders, jealousy in men involves activation of the visual cortex, the 
limbic system and those areas related to this (hypothalamus, amygdala, hippocampal 
regions) and also the inula. The relationship to activation of the inula in this study was 
confirmed by a regression analysis that showed a positive correlation between inula 
activation and the level of males’ subjective jealousy. Different areas more associated 
with the interpretation of others’ intentions, self-representation, and theory of mind, 
including the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and angular gyrus were 
activated in women. Additional areas involved were the visual cortex, frontal regions 
(middle frontal gyrus), thalamus and cerebellum. In females, self-ratings of jealousy 
were associated with activation of the pSTS. Although the research finds sexual and 
emotional jealousy are differently salient for each gender, the first part of the study 
indicates both genders had identical results in ratings of both sexual and emotional 
jealousy, for the fMRI part of the study only sexual jealousy was induced. A further 
limitation is participants were aware the scenarios were hypothetical. This study is the 
only one of its kind, and therefore, further studies are needed to confirm the neural 
correlates of normal jealousy. 
2. Characteristics of Jealous Cognition  





2.1 Continuum/Spectrum. Thirteen studies (Studies 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 21, 22 & 24) indicate that jealousy, like paranoia, may occur on a continuum within 
the population. In clinical populations when symptom-specific rather than diagnosis-
specific sampling is used, the prevalence of jealousy is much higher than primary 
diagnoses would indicate (Studies 21 & 22). In the general population, jealousy was 
found to range from normal to pathological with escalating degrees of intensity, severity 
and frequency (see Study 10: Parker & Barrett, 1997). Furthermore, jealous thinking 
ranged from infrequent thoughts based on good evidence of a threat to a valued 
relationship (i.e., reactive (normal) jealousy, see Theory Chapter) to persistent, intense 
and invasive delusions that the partner is unfaithful or considering infidelity, as seen in 
cases of Othello syndrome (Studies 16 & 24).  
There is a notable gap between the number of papers retrieved that study 
irrational jealousy in normal populations and those that study pathological jealousy in 
clinical populations. Only four papers (Studies 9, 10, 12 & 24) explore excessive or 
irrational jealousy in the general population, where increasing levels of ideation might 
be anticipated. Three of these studies found psychopathological dimensions of jealousy 
within the normal population's experience of jealousy (Studies 9, 11 & 12), which is 
indicative of a population continuum. The dimensions found show a high degree of 
collinearity, which may indicate an underlying second-order factor (Studies 9 & 12). 
There are few studies of problematic jealous cognition in the normal population, and 
none identify the content, frequency or reasons for persistence of jealous ideations. 
2.2 Delusional theme malleability. Large-scale reviews of patient records 




occurs with other delusional themes (Studies 16, 17, 20, 21 & 22). There are very high 
rates of thematic overlap, 78.3% (Study 21) and 95% (Study 20) for delusions and 
hallucinations. No studies explored ideational themes, so it was not possible to 
determine whether different ideational themes were similarly malleable, although 
psychosis was frequently a pre-cursor to delusional states (Study 20). The co-
occurrence suggests a mechanism underlying delusion as opposed to differing 
aetiologies for various delusions. However, contradictory evidence using principal 
components analysis (PCA) suggests clinical delusions form groups with separate 
aetiologies, and furthermore that paranoid and jealous delusions form distinct groupings 
that include negative affect (jealousy, sin and guilt) and paranoia (persecutory delusions 
and delusions of reference) (Study 17).  
2.3 Interpersonal conflict/distress. Two papers explored interpersonal conflict 
or distress as trigger events for the onset of jealous ideation or delusion. One of these 
found that 15% of partners became irrationally jealous due to distress concerning 
general life stressors unrelated to their partner (Study 14). One further study found a 
link between the onset of jealousy delusions (first episode psychosis including jealousy) 
and interpersonal abuse and environmental violence (e.g., Living in an unsafe and 
violent neighbourhood, and violence exposure at school) (Study 17). 
2.4 Otherwise normal cognitive performance. Four studies involved screening 
participants who were suspiciously jealous for additional psychiatric symptoms and 
illegal drug use. One study found delusional patients (a subsection of the full study with 
jealous themes, n=25) had otherwise normal cognitive performance (Study 17). 
Participants were found to have normal cognition except for the delusions. Overall the 








Table 3. Summary of jealousy features related to the general characteristics of paranoia. 
 
Study # Authors (Year) 
Spectrum Delusional/ideational theme 
malleability 
Interpersonal conflict/distress Otherwise normal cognitive 
performance 
Study 1 Buunk (1997) X    
Study 2 Carson & Cupach (2000) X    
Study 3 Crowe et al. (1988) X X   
Study 5 DiBello et al. (2014)   X  
Study 7 Dutton et al. (1996) X    
Study 9 Lima et al. (2017) X    
Study 10 Marazziti et al. (2010b) X   X 
Study 11 Marazziti et al. (2003a) X   X 
Study 12 Marazziti et al. (2010a) X   X 
Study 13 Michael et al. (1995) X X   
Study 14 Mullen & Martin (1994) X  X  
Study 16 Ortigue & Bianchi-Demicheli (2011)  X   
Study 17 Paolini et al. (2016)  X  X 
Study 20 Silva et al. (1998)  X   
Study 21 Soyka & Schmidt (2011)  X   
Study 22 Soyka et al. (1991) X X   




3. Features related to Cognition 
Like paranoia, jealousy frequently involves beliefs with little basis in consensual 
reality, misreading of others’ intentions, and in more severe cases, delusional beliefs 
(Iacoboni et al., 2005). The next section reviews dimensions of erroneous social 
cognition, and cognitive bias found in both jealousy and paranoia.   
 3.1 False Belief. Although the notion of irrational or excessive jealousy 
implicitly suggests false understandings, eight studies explicitly explored the false 
beliefs of jealous people. In community samples, jealousy without just cause was 
admitted by 40% of participants (Study 16). In some cases, people believed their 
partners were unfaithful when they were not; some only had these beliefs when drunk, 
but others also when sober (Study 13). Those with higher levels of reality-testing 
problems were more likely to be jealous (Study 7) and to have significantly higher 
verbal and physical assultativeness (Study 6). Four papers suggest irrational jealousy, 
delusion or morbidly jealous thoughts are based in false or unfounded beliefs about the 
partner’s relationship commitment (Studies 1, 19, 23 & 24).  
3.2 Social cognition: Interpersonal suspicion & misperception of others’ 
intentions toward the self. Analysis of both the results and item content of the eight 
studies included in this section provide suggestions about how interpersonal suspicion 
and jealousy may be related. Findings indicate jealousy (Studies 10, 13, 17, 23 & 24), 
its severity and frequency (Studies 11, 12 & 14), mental pathology (Study 12), and in 
particular, increased interpersonal suspicion, is correctly predicted by both cognitive 
and behavioural items in jealousy scales. Therefore, these two types of jealousy may be 
a single irrational jealousy form indicated by suspicious thinking and escalating 
aggression, partner surveillance and controlling behaviour. Those with diagnoses of 




& 22). Increased interpersonal suspicion is linked to measured anxiety, more 
specifically anxious insecure attachment (Studies 1 & 19) (see section 4.4.1), greater 
insecurity (Study 19), neuroticism, and social anxiety (Study 1). Decreased partner trust 
was related to increased rumination, people with lowered levels of partner trust are less 
able to control suspicious thoughts (Study 2). Interpersonal suspicion was related 
behaviourally with drinking problems (Study 5) and hostility (Studies 1 & 17). 
Misperception of others’ intentions was related to increased rumination (Study 2). One 
clinical study (Study 16) found patients frequently misread others’ intentions toward 
them.  
3.3 Thinking biases. Surprisingly, only one paper explored cognitive bias in 
irrational or excessive jealousy, given their importance in the generating of other 
delusions and ideation. Rather than exploring general reasoning biases that have a 
known association with other forms of ideation, the research explored a little-known 
bias (the ‘love-is-blind’ bias). This is the tendency of people who are romantically 
involved to perceive their partner as attractive (Swami et al., 2012), finding that this 
predicts anxious jealousy (Study 23).  
3.3.1 Bias associated with paranoid thinking (strong confirmation bias). No 
retrieved papers explored any attentional, or reasoning biases usually associated with 
paranoid or psychotic belief formation and maintenance, (e.g., the jumping-to-
conclusions bias, heightened attention to threat, negative attentional bias, elevated recall 
of threatening situations, Fear, Sharp, & Healy, 1996; Garety & Freeman, 1999, 2003; 
Kaney & Bentall, 1989), self-serving and externalising biases (Garety & Freeman, 
1999; Kinderman & Bentall, 2000) in jealousy populations. Therefore, it is difficult to 




3.3 Lack of reality/evidence testing. Definitionally, irrational jealousy suggests 
a lack of evidence for judgements of partner infidelity (Study 20). Where studies or case 
histories attempted to check, any spousal infidelity was unsubstantiated (Studies 22 & 
23). Borderline personality organisation has been linked to increased levels of jealousy 
and intimate partner violence. One research paper that indirectly explored reality 
testing, as part of an exploration of jealousy and Borderline Personality Organisation 
(BPO), demonstrated a link between increased BPO Symptoms, increasing levels of 
jealousy, and lowered reality testing. High and Low BPO showed clear differences on 
subscale scores for reality-testing, those with higher levels of BPO demonstrated lower 
levels of reality testing (Studies 6 & 11); variability in levels of awareness of this lack 
was predicted by increasing pathology (Study 11). Therefore, there is a potential for a 
link between increasing jealousy and reduced reality-testing. Although it is not a formal 
test of confirmation bias such as the ‘jumping to conclusions' bias, patients appear to 
put together minor evidence from different sources and draw major conclusions from it 
(Study 16) also irrelevant trivial events are seen as evidence of infidelity (Study 20). 
These findings show a strong confirmation bias, consistent with the presence of a 
paranoid dimension (|according to paranoia models, reviewed above).  
3.4 Belief inflexibility/rigidity. Sufferers of all jealousy types showed moderate 
correlations with belief rigidity as a personality variable (Study 1). One study (Study 
11) proposed jealousy has certainty/uncertainty dimensions, with greater levels of belief 
certainty (measured by the Y-BOCS) linked to less flexible thinking. Belief certainty 
has much similarity with the concept of belief inflexibility known to play a role in the 
maintenance of paranoid beliefs. 




(Study 2). Jealousy as the focus of obsession is related to reported jealousy and 
checking on the partner (Study 10). The time spent in jealous thought establishes both a 
continuum and also distinguishes between healthy people (checking 1 – 4 hrs per day) 
and those who had obsessional jealous ideation (clinical patients with Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder (OCD), checking between 4 – 8 hrs per day) (Study 11). 
However, subscale measures of obsessional jealousy using a scale developed in Study 
12 suggest this subscale is measuring normal, not obsessive jealousy, because cross-
validation with a clinical measure of psychopathology (including obsession) with 
established psychometric properties showed no correlation with obsession or any other 




Table 4. How the cognitive aspects of jealousy map onto paranoia characteristics. 
 









bias Belief inflexibility/rigidity Obsessiveness 
Study 1. Buunk (1997) 
X X    X  
Study 2. Carson & Cupach (2000) 
 X X    X 
Study 5. DiBello et al. (2014) 
 X      
Study 6. Dutton (1994) 
X   X    
Study 7. Dutton et al. (1996) 
X       
Study 9. Lima et al. (2017) 
 X     X 
Study 10. Marazziti et al. (2010b) 
 X     X 
Study 11. Marazziti et al. (2003a) 
 X  X  X X 
Study 12. Marazziti et al. (2010a) 
 X X     
Study 13. Michael et al. (1995) 
X X      
Study 14. Mullen & Martin (1994) 
X X      
Study 16. Ortigue & Bianchi-Demicheli (2011) 
X  X X    
Study 18. Rodriguez et al. (2015) 
 X      
Study 19. Rydell & Bringle (2004) 
X X.  X    
Study 20. Silva et al. (1998) 
 X X. X.    
Study 21. Soyka et al. (1991) 
X X  X   X 
Study 23. Swami et al. (2012) 
X X  X X   
Study 24. Tarrier et al. (1989) 
X       
Study 25. White (1981) 




 4. Features Related to Affect 
4.1 Affect regulation difficulties. Two studies (Studies 6 & 14) suggest people 
with higher levels of jealousy also struggle to regulate emotion. Those higher in 
measured jealousy had significantly more difficulty regulating both anxiety and anger 
(Study 6), and greater distress (Study 14). Alexithymia is the inability to identify and 
name experienced emotions. It has a well-established link with affect regulation 
(Connelly & Denney, 2007; Kauhanen, Kaplan, Cohen, Julkunen, & Salonen, 1996). 
One further study in the review found that participants with high scores for alexithymia 
were likely to express jealousy in pathological and suspicious ways (Study 8).  
4.2 Depression. Those with higher levels of jealousy were more depressed 
(Studies 6 & 7). In normal samples, a tendency to depression was linked with a paranoid 
jealousy subscale (Study 17). High aggression was also related to depression and high 
BPO (Study 7). Depression and delusional jealousy also overlap in clinical patients with 
a proportion suffering both (Study 16).  
4.3 Anger. Participants with high levels of jealousy also expressed more anger 
(Study 13). A high percentage (60%) of patients in one study of people receiving in-
patient psychiatric care, patients had homicidal ideation towards their spouse (Study 20) 
and for people referred or self-referred for partner abuse, increasing BPO is correlated 
with increasing anger frequency, duration, and intensity (Study 6). Anger related to 
jealousy links with various thought processes including rumination and hostility toward 
the romantic partner (Study 2). Although they relate jealousy to aggression, the anger 
measures used in one study (Study 3) appear unreliable, with the study measuring 
passivity and not aggression.  




jealous ideation, like paranoid ideation, is linked with higher levels of anxiety, (Studies 
1, 3, 6, 7, 10, 13, 18, 19, 23), and related affect such as stress (Study 14), worry (Study 
25), insecurity (Study 19), and is moderately correlated with neuroticism (Study 1), 
anxiety disorders and especially social anxiety (Study 1). This link persists in more 
extreme forms of morbid jealousy (Studies 13 & 24). Those higher in anxiety or related 
affect also suffered from increased rumination (Study 2). Men who assaulted their wives 
were increasingly assultative with increasing anxiety (Study 6). However, one study 
found no link for a paranoid jealousy subscale with a clinical measure of anxiety (Study 
17). Most of the research is consistent with current models of psychosis and paranoia 
reviewed above and is therefore suggestive of a link between anxiety and 
suspiciousness.  
4.4.1 Attachment anxiety. Two studies, mentioned in section 3.2., found links 
between jealousy and anxious insecure attachment (Studies 1 & 19. Insecure attachment 
due to disruptions in early caregiver relationships has been applied to adult close 
relationships (e.g., Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Senchak & Leonard, 1992) where 
individuals with insecure attachment styles report more jealousy (Hazan & Shaver, 
1987). Anxious attachment, where inadequate care and security in formative 
relationships results in anxiety and fear of abandonment in adult relationships, has 
frequently been theorised to relate to both jealousy (Buunk, 1997) and paranoia (Berry 
et al., 2008; MacBeth et al., 2008) and may therefore constitute a distal influence upon 
increased levels of suspiciousness. However, whilst many studies infer a theoretical link 
between current levels of participant attachment anxiety and jealousy (or paranoia), due 
to methodological weaknesses in the studies it is not clear that the anxiety measured 
originates in attachment problems or whether it is general anxiety with a different cause. 




measures used are discretely measuring attachment anxiety rather than general anxiety. 
Furthermore, studies do not include longitudinal measurement of attachment anxiety in 
both childhood and subsequent adult romantic relationships, which would enable 
conclusions about attachment style or anxiety to be able to be drawn with greater 
confidence. It is generally understood that measures which rely on recall, in this case of 
early childhood memories may suffer from a lack of fidelity due to the problems with 
accurate recall over time. Many measures designed to measure anxious attachment, use 
items that are analogous to those which might be expected to measure more general 
anxiety.  
Although there is research that suggests jealousy is related to attachment within 
a particular romantic relationship (Knobloch et al., 2001). There are a number of 
problems with the way that anxious attachment is operationalised in much research, i.e., 
as a measure of attachment that is hypothesised to originate in childhood caregiver 
relationships. There are two main methodological weaknesses with most studies of 
attachment anxiety. Firstly, attachment anxiety is not operationalised in a way that 
would establish that an individual displays anxious attachment across their adult 
romantic relationships, as one might expect if attachment anxiety originates in 
childhood. Secondly, there are no cohort studies of jealousy development where 
attachment is measured in infancy with subsequent measurement of the same participant 
in adulthood. Rather, studies tend to measure childhood caregiver attachment and 
current adult romantic attachment concurrently. Furthermore, where anxiety, attachment 
and attachment anxiety have been measured and the contribution of each to jealousy has 
been determined, the findings suggest that attachment anxiety makes no additional 
contribution to current levels of jealousy above that which can be accounted for by 




anxiety as a distal cause of jealousy is a plausible explanation, and therefore is retained 
in the model in Chapter 7. A general lack of rigour when measuring attachment anxiety 
means that the extent to which anxious attachment is a true influence on the current 






Study # Authors (Year) Affect regulation difficulties Depression Anger High anxiety 
Study 1. Buunk (1997)    X 
Study 2. Carson  & Cupach (2000)   X X 
Study 3. Costa et al. (2015)   X X 
Study 6. Dutton (1994) X X. X X 
Study 7. Dutton et al. (1996)  X  X 
Study 8. Hesse et al. (2016) X    
Study 9. Lima et al. (2017)  X X X 
Study 10. Marazziti et al. (2010b)    X 
Study 13. Michael et al. (1995)   X. X 
Study 14. Mullen & Martin (1994) X  X X 
Study 16. Ortigue & Bianchi-Demicheli (2011)  X   
Study 17. Rodreguez et al. (2015)    X 
Study 19. Rydell & Bringle (2004)    X 
Study 20. Silva et al. (1998)   X  
Study 23. Swami et al. (2012)    X 
Study 24. Tarrier et al. (1989)    X 





5. Mental Health Difficulties 
5.1 General. A study of jealous and non-jealous delusions in psychiatric patients 
admitted for alcohol problems found that secondary psychiatric morbidity was 
significantly higher in the jealous group, who continued to be jealous when sober, 37 of 
50 patients, compared to 5 of 20 who had no secondary morbidity (Study 13).  
5.2 Substance abuse. Substance abuse disorder is the predominant diagnosis in 
6.9% of cases of delusional jealousy (Study 21), although partner assaulters whose 
jealousy increased with increasing levels of BPO showed no relationship between high 
and low BPO and substance use (Study 6). 
5.2.1 Illicit drug use. Four studies (Studies 6, 17, 20 & 21) explore the impact of 
drug use on jealousy and suggest drug use has little impact or influence on the 
experience of jealousy. In four case studies, the person who had delusional jealousy also 
used illicit drugs, in one case, amphetamine and in three cases, cannabis (Study 20). 
Study 17, which segmented drug-use types, found only cannabis or stimulant-use (not 
cocaine, alcohol or other substance use) were associated with jealousy rather than other 
delusion-types, which may explain the findings of more comprehensive studies with 
larger samples that suggest substance abuse is a factor in only 6.9% of cases of 
delusional jealousy (Study 21).  
5.2.2 Excess alcohol consumption. Five studies show a relationship between 
alcohol problems and jealousy (Studies 5, 6, 13,14 & 20); however, two clinical studies 
(Studies 17 & 21) find no association. Drinking problems (Studies 5 & 6) are related to 
jealousy and suspicious, hostile aspects of jealousy (Study 5). In one study, 37% of 
participants with alcohol problems were also likely to be jealous (Study 13). Those 




consumption, high jealousy 24.2% v low 8.2% (using Royal College of Physician's 
criteria, Study 14) and where they were delusional or hallucinatory, 11 of 20 patients 
also had alcohol abuse history (Study 20). The findings for a link between alcohol 
consumption and jealousy are mostly in favour of a link but show inconsistencies.  
5.3 Depression and anxiety disorders. These are reported on p.56.  
5.4 Psychosis. Two studies (12 & 17) found psychotic traits related to irrational 
jealousy in the general population. Study 12 used the Eysenck Personality Inventory: 
EPI, (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968) which is not a clinical measure of psychosis but may 
indicate some symptoms of paranoia, and a re-interpretation of the data in Lima et al. 
2016 (Study 17) suggests that all sub-scales measuring abnormal jealousy link 
significantly with a clinical measure of paranoid ideation and psychoticism, with 
partner-control items (the inaccurately worded interpersonal sensitivity subscale) 
differentiating between those with only ideation and those who have significant 
psychoticism scores. Those with paranoid ideation were significantly more likely to 
endorse partner-control items. Psychosis, schizophrenia (Studies 4, 21 & 22), 
schizotypy and delusional states (Study 21) were related to jealousy in clinical groups. 
Jealousy in these groups showed high levels of comorbidity with psychotic symptoms. 
Psychotic symptoms continued to be present in the clinical samples with increasing 
severity and prevalence of jealousy related to increasing levels of severity and 
prevalence in psychotic symptoms. Despite the tendency for fewer people to be 
diagnosed with delusional jealousy compared to other psychotic groups, there are 
increasing levels of severity and delusional states. Furthermore, psychotic symptoms 
also continue into forensic populations with psychosis, and schizophrenia (Study 20) 




Six clinical studies (Studies 4, 13, 17, 20, 21 & 22) found an overlap between 
psychosis and jealousy at varying degrees of severity and frequency. People who have 
delusional jealousy and also secondary morbidity are far less likely to be diagnosed with 
mood disorders. However, there is an extremely high overlap with other delusional 
disorders (78.3% of the cases) (Study 21). The most common diagnoses for those also 
suffering excessive jealousy in clinical populations are psychosis, schizophrenia, 
paranoid delusions (Study 22), with psychotic processes found to precede the onset of 
jealous delusions (Study 20). One study involving a close re-examination of the case 
notes of all jealous patients admitted to a large psychiatric hospital, indicated psychosis 
was present in the entire sample. Paranoid jealousy was present in 0.17% of all 
psychiatric inpatient admissions over a 61-year period, with older populations likely to 
have a higher incidence. Follow-up data for those admitted with delusions indicated that 
any continuing mental health problems were psychotic: 12/37 jealous patients had 
recovered, 19/51 non-jealous (never mentioned delusion again) at follow-up, 23 jealous 
and 42 non-jealous were still delusional, two jealous, eight non-jealous had developed 
schizophrenia. Interestingly, where the patient continued to be delusional, the dominant 
theme persisted. Only three developed hallucinations: one jealous, three non-jealous; 
schizophrenia accounted for the majority of re-diagnosis in both patient groups. A 
further study (Study 4) found psychosis was the primary diagnosis for those suffering 
excessive or irrational jealousy and admitted for in-patient psychiatric care. Functional 
psychoses account for most cases of delusional jealousy. Delusional jealousy is 
frequently a significant component of schizophrenia, schizoaffective and psychotic 
disorder due to medical conditions and psychotic disorders not otherwise specified. 
Delusional jealousy rarely exists alone; it is typically found alongside other psychotic 




Very few patients admitted to psychiatric hospitals were diagnosed with 
paranoid jealousy (Study 17). This is largely due to severe or delusional jealousy not 
being the primary diagnosis or feature of the psychiatric morbidity, and therefore 
jealousy does not appear as the diagnosis, but only within the patients' case records. So, 
although jealousy may be a significant feature of a person's psychiatric problems and 
also of interest to researchers, the primary classification or diagnostic category 
frequently masks a more complex underlying pattern of symptoms. This feature of 
psychiatric categorisation and diagnosis makes it difficult to identify all those who 
might be suffering from extreme or irrational forms of jealousy. One further study 
(Study 13) reported higher levels of unspecified delusional disorder (those other than 
persecutory), in those who were irrationally jealous.  
6. Other  
6.1 Trauma symptoms. Two studies found evidence of trauma symptoms in 
forensic populations with irrational jealousy (Studies 6 & 7). The studies do not give 
further detail of the type of trauma symptoms suffered. However, Study 17 indicates all 
forms of childhood abuse and environmental violence are linked with all first-episode 
clinical delusions, including jealousy.  
6.2 Low/negative self-esteem. There is strong but inconsistent evidence for a 
relationship between low self-esteem and jealousy. Six studies found a relationship 
between self-esteem and jealousy and one found no relationship. Clinical observations 
suggest jealousy delusions are linked to low self-esteem (Studies 17 & 24) and vary 
with subjective feelings of insecurity and low self-confidence (Study 24), and several 
correlational studies found lower self-esteem is associated with higher levels of jealousy 




those in the subgroup with high jealousy scores, who were also more likely to respond 
with anger (Study 14). However, one study found weak correlations between SE and 
irrational jealousy (Study 19), a further study found no significant correlations between 
jealousy and self-esteem, and one further study found partner's perceived relationship 
dissatisfaction was related to the other partner’s own perceived inadequacy (Study 25). 
These results suggest that the relationship of jealousy to self-esteem is complex and that 
relationship quality might act as a mediating or moderating variable.  
6.3 Hostility/Aggression/Violence. There is substantial evidence that jealousy 
and hostility are linked across all sample groups (Studies 1, 2, 3, 7, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 
20, 21, 24 & 25). In the general population, jealous people are more likely to threaten 
their partner with violence, to strike their partner, use threatening behaviour (7.9% v 
0%), or physical aggression (4.5% v 0.6%). Both genders (15.4% of the total) reported 
having been subjected to physical aggression from a partner due to jealousy (Studies 24 
& 25). Additionally, those higher in jealousy were more likely to be intrusive and 
emotionally abusive to a partner (Study 7). 
There are suggestions that any relationship to partner aggression is indirect and 
due to alcohol use (Study 5) or more likely mental ill-health, as rumination (Study 2), 
distrust, anxiety, and jealousy, predict hostility towards a partner (Study 18) and high, 
compared to low scorers, on the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) (a robust 
indicator of mental health) were more threatening to their partner, (8.6% v 2.2%) and 
were openly aggressive (6.2% v 1.1%) (Study 14). Furthermore, all BPO subscales 
predicted hostility towards a partner (Study 6), and hostility is associated with anxious 





There is tentative support for the idea that aggression is motivated not by 
jealousy but by a mechanism underlying the delusional or psychotic state. High 
numbers of patients with delusional jealousy are also generally aggressive (15 of 72 
patients, 20.8%) (Study 21). In one study of clinical jealousy, 65% had threatened to kill 
their spouse. 60% had harmed their spouses, and 25% were also generally violent 
(Study 20); positive symptoms of schizophrenia (associated with violence) (Study 21), 
delusional jealousy is associated with partner hostility (Study 16), homicide (Study 21), 
and aggression (Studies 16 & 21). One study found a delusional jealous group was more 
often involved in verbal (88%) and physical (45%) violence towards their spouses than 
the non-jealous group (20% and 11% respectively). Importantly, these findings suggest 
that violence towards a spouse is likely to be connected to the presence of delusion and 
not simply to jealousy itself. In the study, alcoholic partners’ violence was seldom 
attributed to jealousy, yet regardless of self-proposed causal theme, partners are violent 
when delusions are present (Study 13). 
6.4 Coping strategies. Participants who are jealous are more likely to have 
maladaptive methods of harm avoidance (Study 3), are higher in impulsivity (Studies 3 
& 14) and are more likely to use tactics such as comfort eating, drinking alcohol, and 
spending sprees (23.3% v 5.5%) as coping strategies.  
6.5 Social behaviours. Jealousy is associated with other types of maladaptive 
coping behaviour and dysfunctional relationship strategy. There is some evidence those 
with irrational and excessive jealousy show signs of poorer social adjustment (except 
for parenting behaviour) (Study 3) and are more likely to use maladaptive relationship 
strategies such as considering ending relationships, ignoring problems, and discussing 




to partners for stronger commitment to the relationship (22% vs 8.3%) (Study 14) and 
are less likely to try more adaptive strategies such as counselling (only 3.4%). 
6.6 Partner-controlling behaviours. Intrusiveness and assault can be thought of 
as methods of maintaining control over a partner (Study 5). Increasing mental pathology 
is associated with increased jealousy (Study 11) and increasing checking and 
monitoring behaviour of the partner (Studies 11 & 12). A re-interpretation of the item 
data from a large sample community study suggests paranoid ideation might distinguish 





Table 5. Other correlates of jealousy that are related to paranoia. 
 
Study # Authors (Year) 




Violence Low self esteem Other Mental Health Difficulty Other 
1. Buunk (1997)   X X   
2. Carson & Cupach (2000)   X    
3. Costa et al. (2015)      X 
4. Crowe et al. (1988)     X  
5. DiBello et al. (2014)  X    X 
6. Dutton (1994) X X X  X  
7. Dutton et al. (1996)   X  X X 
9. Lima et al. (2017)    X X  
10. Marazziti et al. (2010b)    X   
11. Marazziti et al. (2003a)      X 
12. Marazziti et al. (2010a)    X  X 
13. Michael et al. (1995)  X X  X  
14. Mullen & Martin (1994)  X X X X X 
16. Ortigue & Bianchi-Demicheli (2011)   X    
17. Paolini et al. (2016) X X  X X  
18. Rodriguez et al. (2015)   X    
19. Rydell & Bringle (2004)    X   
20. Silva et al. (1998) X X X  X  
21. Soyka & Schmidt (2011) X X X  X  
22. Soyka et al. (1991)     X.  
24. Tarrier et al. (1989)    X   





This chapter reviewed factors associated with irrational jealousy in order to 
establish similarities and differences between paranoia and jealousy, to explore 
cognitive and affective mechanisms common to both. Furthermore, there is evidence for 
shared symptoms and symptom patterns that include both phenomena, evidence for a 
continuum of severity, reality testing problems, cognitive distortions, increased levels of 
anxiety and emotional regulation problems may contribute to irrational jealousy and 
provide a link between them. However, research that explores cognition or affect in 
relation to mild to moderately severe jealousy is very limited, as the majority of 
jealousy research in relation to delusion (like) phenomena relates to psychiatric case-
studies of severe delusion. 
A further aim was to determine if there was sufficient evidence to suggest 
irrational jealousy and paranoid thinking result from a common, latent psychotic 
process. In summary, there appears to be tentative evidence to suggest a latent 
psychosis-like process in jealousy, that indeed may underlie both phenomena. 
Furthermore, both phenomena show considerable overlap in comorbid conditions that 
might suggest a common origin. However, research in this area is limited to two studies 
of psychotic processes in jealousy, as except where they relate to severe psychiatric 
cases this area has received little research attention.  
The final aim of the review was to determine if there was sufficient evidence 
that some jealousy forms might follow similar generative and maintenance processes to 
those of paranoid thinking (e.g., as detailed by Freeman & Garety, 2004; Freeman, Pugh 
& Garety., 2008; Gibbs & David, 2003). In summary, there are tentative suggestions 




two studies that explore processes involved in jealousy thought, including cognitive 
bias, and these are of poor quality, or were not designed as a direct test of cognitive 
dysfunction which suggests the need for further, high-quality research on generative and 
maintenance processes in jealousy. 
There is substantial variation in how jealousy was operationalised and measured. 
However, it has usually been treated as a stable personality trait despite strong 
indications it is a dynamic process. There is an over-reliance on empirical studies rather 
than theory-driven, hypothesis-based research. Therefore, there are likely to be 
significant problems with measurement validity. It seems reasonable to conclude, based 
on the body of evidence, that irrational jealousy has considerable phenomenological and 
theoretical overlap with paranoia, that there do not appear to be different types of 
suspicious jealousy, and to tentatively suggest that it results from a latent psychotic 
process where different but related mechanisms contribute discretely and additively to 
normal jealousy.  
1. Prevalence. There are challenges to establishing the actual prevalence in the 
population due to problems in identifying psychiatric studies of pathological jealousy. 
DSM criteria do not classify someone as pathologically jealous unless jealous delusion 
or ideation is the predominant or only symptom (Silva, Ferrari, Leong, & Penny, 1998), 
and therefore patients with less severe forms of jealousy, but who still have 
substantiative irrational thinking, may not have been captured in this review and 
therefore may be under-reported. However, some indication of the prevalence and 
existence of less severe forms of irrational jealousy in clinical populations can be 
gained, as high rates of irrational jealousy were found in patients with psychotic 
diagnoses, especially schizophrenia (1.3% of all psychosis admissions), 1/5 of whom 




2. Brain Injury/Damage or Toxicity. Consistent with findings for paranoia that 
suggest differences between delusion and ideation are only quantitative (Bentall, 2009), 
in the conviction with which an irrational belief is held. This review finds evidence that 
jealousy differs similarly. As delusional jealousy appears to emerge after several years 
of suffering from psychosis or as a result of alcohol, substance-use or other toxicity 
(e.g., alcohol addiction or Parkinson's anti-dopaminergic drug treatment), mechanical 
trauma or head injury (e.g., stroke). The findings are also consistent with 
neuropsychological models of delusion (Braun & Suffren, 2011) and suggest severe 
jealous delusion has organic causes, e.g., brain damage or toxicity. Processes that may 
account for the apparent increases in severity and transition from ideation to delusions 
in psychotic states appear to result from damage to brain tissue, brain atrophy (brain 
damage) or tardive dyskinesia as a result of antipsychotic medication (Moncrieff, 2015). 
It is possible that in some cases, jealous delusions (but not ideation), are similarly 
related to drug-toxicity due to drug treatments for psychosis or to changes in 
neurochemistry related to chronic severe anxiety states. These findings indicate that 
delusion and ideation have a different and perhaps additive aetiology that results from 
additional pathology, with difference in jealousy intensity and severity between 
delusional and other suspicious forms, either arising from separate processes or due to 
the additional effect of co-morbid conditions. 
3. The Role of Substance Abuse. The findings suggest substance abuse has no 
direct impact upon irrational ideation. The role of alcohol in irrational jealousy suggests 
alcohol abuse is a risk factor linked to the increasing severity of suspicions, but this 
mechanism works indirectly. Although drug abuse has been found to increase levels of 
irrational thinking in cases of paranoia (Freeman, Pugh, & Garety, 2008), the 




4. Mental illness. This review finds that people with excessive or irrational 
jealousy appear to be suffering from general mental ill-health. There is substantial 
evidence corroborated across different methods for two processes or mechanisms 
related to irrational jealousy. Both increased levels of psychosis and heightened levels 
of general anxiety or neurosis have the potential to cause at least some forms of 
irrational jealousy. Although the implicit theory of many studies reviewed is that 
insecure attachment causes jealousy. Measured attachment anxiety may be an artefact, 
as measures of insecure attachment are essentially measuring the same phenomenon as 
measures of anxiety but attributing it to the impact of childhood caregiver relationships 
and the findings better fit an explanation of general neurosis and anxiety. High levels of 
emotionality: anxiety/neurosis, were present in all studies of jealousy in community 
samples, a pattern which continues into both clinical and forensic populations. All 
studies unanimously found a relationship between irrational jealousy and high anxiety. 
Those studies that included control groups showed that the highest levels of jealousy 
were in those with the highest levels of anxiety, who were also more likely to suffer 
other delusional states (Studies 3, 4, 7, 11, 12 & 16). This finding suggests that like 
paranoia, heightened affect and level of psychosis have a reciprocal role, whereby 
increases in either anxiety or psychosis lead to further escalation of both symptoms due 
to what appears to be a negative feedback loop (Freeman & Garety, 2004); this dynamic 
appears to exist in both ideational and delusional forms of jealousy.  
5. Thematic malleability. Although it appears possible to identify distinct 
domains of delusional theme (Paolini et al., 2016), most people presenting with 
delusions have more than one concurrent delusional theme, and themes (e.g., jealous, or 
persecutory) related to irrational cognition appear to be determined by a person’s 




ideation and delusion appear to develop as a focus of psychotic ideation, only within the 
situational context of having a partner, and in the case of forensic populations, in the 
presence of prior adverse experiences and trauma. It is not clear whether the link to 
prior trauma persists in other populations and should be the subject of further study. 
Only one study related to jealousy-specific cognition was found (Study 5). Therefore, 
we cannot draw conclusions about any distinctive features in the content of jealous 
ideation (e.g., rather than other forms of paranoia). Overall, research suggests the 
process underlying the formation and maintenance of irrational beliefs is similar 
(Studies 16, 20, 21, & 22) and that theme malleability is determined by differences in 
social and developmental context (Study 17).  
6. Continuum. This review suggests there is evidence to suggest that like that 
found for paranoia (Claridge, 1972, 1987; Johns & Van Os, 2001), irrational jealousy 
forms a continuum, from normal (reactive) jealousy and occasional irrational thoughts 
about their partner's fidelity that most of the population experience (Mullen & Martin, 
1994), through ideation to delusional states, with increasing severity and frequency of 
experience. Increases in either psychosis or neurosis predict increases in both jealousy 
and ideation across research methods (Studies 4, 11, 12, 14, 24 & 25). Unfortunately, 
the majority of research reviewed was either normative or clinical and therefore reflects 
the extremes of any dimension. Findings do however suggest that psychopathological 
dimensions of jealousy exist within normal populations (Studies 11 & 12) and there is 
strong evidence (see the subsection – mental ill-health) that affective dimensions related 
to paranoia (anxiety and depression) are also present in those with irrational jealousy in 
community populations. Whilst the presence of these phenomena is not sufficient to 
conclude that there is a latent psychotic dimension, it is indicative of a population 




an underlying second-order factor, such as psychosis (Studies 9 &12).  
7. Cognitive biases/thought disorders/reality testing and belief inflexibility. 
Contrary to current aetiological theories of irrational jealousy, which suggest insecure 
attachment, self-esteem problems, a love-is-blind bias, organic brain changes, Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder, Borderline Personality Organisation, or different forms of 
pathology are responsible for pathological jealousy. The evidence appears more 
consistent with a view that irrational jealousy results from processes that contribute to 
the formation of general false beliefs, e.g., cognitive bias, and a lack of reality testing 
and that these are due to an underlying pattern of clinical and sub-clinical mental ill-
health, more specifically, psychosis. The results also indicate that belief inflexibility 
contributes to jealousy in the general population (Studies 1 & 11). Mental rigidity, 
inflexibility, and firm conviction to irrational ideas are also related to psychosis and 
particularly to the maintenance of false belief (Garety et al., 2005). It is possible 
irrational jealousy arises due to abnormal cognition (e.g., cognitive bias, distorted belief 
and ideation) and is maintained by belief inflexibility, during subclinical or transient 
psychotic states. Unfortunately, no studies exist that measures thinking bias, reality 
testing and thought rigidity across populations, and only few studies measure any one 
type of thinking error in any population.  
Applicability of Findings 
There is a knowledge gap concerning more moderate forms of irrational jealousy 
that appear to exist between normal jealousy and more severe, delusional types. The 
majority of research reviewed was conducted on normal (reactive) jealousy in 
community samples, or with severely delusional patients. This review indicates 
symptoms of sub-clinical irrational jealous ideation associated with problematic 




clinical jealousy) and community populations (who are not severe enough to be 
hospitalised or imprisoned due to the consequences). The number of clinical studies that 
have been drawn on in this review are few, including only three studies (11, 21 & 22) on 
populations without brain damage or toxicity. Research focussed on severe delusional 
forms of mental illness, or conversely, normal jealousy may not generalise to those 
suffering from sub-clinical or more moderate forms of irrational jealousy. There are 
further problems with generalisation of clinical studies (e.g., Othello Syndrome or 
Parkinsonism), to sub-clinical or irrational jealousy that is not the primary mental health 
diagnosis, as the findings may not generalise to more moderate forms of jealous 
ideation. Finally, factors contributing to irrational jealousy in one population (i.e., 
community, clinical or forensic) may not be generalisable to other populations, and 
there are likely to be multiple aetiologies and causal routes for sufferers of irrational 
jealousy. 
Limitations of the Included Papers 
To-date, research has focussed on jealousy's extremes, either normal jealousy or 
cases of severe delusional jealousy, leaving a gap in the literature and a scarcity of 
studies of more moderate irrational jealousy across normal, clinical and forensic 
populations. Furthermore, research in clinical populations has been hindered by 
restrictive categorisation of delusional conditions, such as paranoia, psychosis, and 
schizophrenia. The medical profession mostly sees these as discrete disorders, and this 
has impacted the selection of participant groups for study. Categorisation appears to be 
far less useful to researchers than clinicians, as these diagnoses tend to describe 
overlapping symptom patterns that differ only in frequency and severity (Demjaha et 
al., 2009; Reininghaus, Priebe, & Bentall, 2013). Diagnosis of these illnesses as discrete 




diagnoses of jealousy disorders, thus limiting the understanding of populations where 
jealousy symptoms are less severe but still an important feature. Therefore, better 
insight into the continuum of jealous ideation and delusion may be gained if additional 
research is conducted on dimensions of psychosis related to jealousy across these 
groups.  
Moreover, there appears to be under-reporting for cases of severe jealousy with 
low referral, hospitalisation and re-hospitalisation rates for jealousy delusions, unless 
they commit a crime (Gutierrez-Lobos, Schmid-Segal, Bankier, & Walter, 2001). This 
finding may be due to cultural ideas that normalise jealousy, categorising all but the 
most severe jealousy as normal. Furthermore, less severe jealousy that nevertheless 
remains potentially harmful is not distinguished etymologically and there appears to be 
a lack of acknowledgement that some forms of excessive or irrational jealousy may be 
indicative of underlying mental ill-health. 
Questionnaire research is overused and although it provides valuable data on 
some aspects of jealous cognition, it does not enable us to infer causal direction and 
determine whether mental illness, and specifically psychosis, precipitate suspicious 
jealousy. It also does not enable us to understand whether irrational jealousy might 
precede mental ill- health, perhaps as the result of alienating potential partners and the 
diminished social support that would arise. It is also possible that any underlying 
mechanisms are not easily accessible, and that research has failed to explore any latent 
dimension effectively. 
A significant limitation is the lack of research overtly focussed on cognitive bias 
in relationship to jealousy. There is no research on well-known cognitive biases in 




known bias, the ‘love-is-blind’ bias. This limits any conclusion that might be drawn 
about the role of cognitive bias in jealousy. In particular, the role of confirmation biases, 
which might illuminate whether, as in paranoia, people suffering from irrational 
jealousy also tend to infer more strongly than justified from limited information.  
Limitations of this Review 
One limitation of this review is that the definitions of jealousy used were limited 
to those related to romantic jealousy. Different conceptualisations of jealousy that 
include other kinds of familial jealousy, or that relate more closely to developmental 
approaches, or evolutionary biological imperatives were excluded from this review and 
this may have led to the exclusion of some papers that might have informed the overall 
perspective.  
Furthermore, the focus of this review on cognition and specifically cognition 
that is related to paranoia, e.g., cognitive biases, will have led to the exclusion of some 
papers that may have informed on the wider non-cognitive links between jealousy and 
paranoia, e.g., emotional deregulation. The constraint of search terms to focus on 
cognition may have led to the exclusion of papers with findings that were more broadly 
relevant to the research questions, and that were related to cognition but where 
cognition was not the primary focus of the research.  
Non-English papers were also not included in this review, limiting the ability to 
thoroughly evaluate findings from other countries that might have informed the research 
questions had they been included. Given cultural differences in the level of jealousy 
(Bhugra, 1993; Buunk & Hupka 1987; Canto et al., 2017) and an apparent substantial 
body of research which has not been translated to English (e.g., Demitaş & Dönmek, 




levels of jealousy [e.g., Brazil, Italy, Portugal, and Turkey, (Brase, 2003)] important 
insights into the role of cognition in jealousy in other cultures may have been omitted 
from the review. Inclusion of these papers may also have lent transcultural validity to 
the conceptualisation of jealousy (e.g., led to an understanding of alternative influences 
upon jealousy and conceptualisations of jealousy in countries where jealousy is 
understood to be particularly problematic or of particular research interest) and the 
cross-boundary findings related to paranoid processes in jealousy. Furthermore, the 
exclusion from this review of non-peer reviewed papers might have led to some 
publication bias in the findings presented. 
Implications and Future Research Directions  
This review supports the relationship between irrational jealousy and paranoid 
ideation and delusion. There is also support for generative and maintaining processes 
typically found in other forms of ideation (e.g., Freeman & Garety, 2004). However, 
there is little evidence of causal direction, especially related to the interaction of anxiety, 
psychotic states and belief inflexibility/rigidity. It remains important to establish if 
elevated anxiety is present before the onset of jealous ideational states or after. It also 
remains important to establish any role that belief inflexibility/rigidity has in jealous 
ideation maintenance. Important methodological limitations preclude any causal 
inferences from existing research. 
This review suggests the utility and appropriateness of exploring irrational 
jealousy and paranoia’s role as a latent psychotic phenomenon in intimate partner 
aggression and violence (IPV) perpetration, and to further research psychosis as a causal 
mechanism in IPV perpetration. Substantial evidence suggests both jealousy (Capaldi, 
Knoble, Shortt, & Kim, 2012; Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Hilberman & Munson, 1978; 




Ward, & Tritt, 2004; Whitehurst, 1971) and paranoia (Capaldi et al., 2012; Stith et al., 
2004) are the most robust and strongly correlated psychological variables to IPV 
perpetration. However, most research to date on IPV perpetration has sought to create 
risk-profiles of perpetrator characteristics based on personality disorder rather than 
exploring persistent psychological variables as potential mechanisms. 
When a transdiagnostic approach is taken, and single symptoms are 
desegregated from specific clinical diagnoses, the link between IPV perpetration and 
mental ill-health points towards a phenomenon that is psychosis-like rather than the 
result of a specific personality disorder, which is likely to suggest the causal 
mechanisms are also shared with other types of psychosis-like phenomena. A substantial 
body of evidence shows that general aggression and violence is related to active 
psychotic symptoms (Link, Stueve, & Phelan, 1998) and for psychiatric in-patient 
groups, distinct aspects of paranoia: hostile attribution bias (in ambiguous situations) 
and personalising bias, and measured violent behaviours (Waldheter, Jones, Johnson, & 
Penn, 2005) are related. Emotional distress, in particular, anger and anxiety are thought 
to trigger aggression (Nederlof, Muris, & Hovens, 2014). Aggression in paranoid 
populations appears to be in response to a perceived threat (McNiel, Eisner, & Binder, 
2000; Swanson, Holzer, Ganju, & Jono, 1990).  
A focus on how rather than if jealousy and paranoia might be related to IPV 
suggests the possibility that they are symptomatic of underlying irrational thinking, 
consistent with the departure from reality associated with psychosis. Threat/control-
override symptoms (TCO) which are related to paranoia, and the belief that one is being 
controlled or overridden by forces outside the self, (Link & Stueve, 1994) are 
hypothesised to be the mechanism that links psychotic states to aggression, with 




present in the general, non-clinical population, with psychotic-like experiences and 
paranoid ideation linked to aggressive responses (Kinoshita et al., 2011; Mojtabai, 
2006). However, there is no evidence of TCO symptoms being researched in relation to 
jealousy or IPV. 
This review finds good evidence for jealousy as a paranoid process, and 
therefore, any psychotic state may interact with emotionality to escalate or exacerbate 
jealous ideation and symptoms. Thus, it is desirable to explore potentially unconscious 
influences of anxiety on jealousy and determine if anxiety fluctuations are linked to 
fluctuations in the level and intensity of jealousy. Findings also support the idea that 
people suffering from irrational and excessive jealousy frequently use minor evidence to 
conclude their spouse is untrustworthy, and exploration of whether this bias exists in 
this population may suggest a mechanism by which this occurs. It seems plausible to 
anticipate that a jealous partner will display cognitive biases and distortions during 
partner conflict, where negative emotionality and distress may elevate irrational 
thoughts. From this review, thirteen research questions for future investigation are 
apparent (Table 6):  
 
Table 6. Questions for future investigation. 
1. In what way are jealousy and psychosis related? 
2. Do situational, mental, and affective factors interact to create suspiciousness in 
jealousy, and how? 
3. Can pathological jealousy, like psychosis, be modelled as a continuum of 
psychotic thought? 
4. What is the role of cognitive bias and faulty reasoning in jealousy?  
5. Is there any evidence for the existence of specific cognitive or reasoning bias in 
suspicious jealousy, in particular, the jumping-to-conclusions bias, and how do 




6. How do jealous people with reasonable evidence for their suspicions and those 
who are irrationally suspicious evaluate evidence, particularly in ambiguous 
social situations? 
7. Do partners in functional relationships display cognitive biases and distortion 
during conflict that relate to suspicious perceptions of their partner? 
8. What factors distinguish between irrational partner suspicions that are discounted 
and those that persist? 
9. What is the role of cognitive rigidity in jealousy ideation, what accounts for 
variability in levels of rigidity, and how do suspicions become rigid? 
10. Are fluctuations in anxiety levels related to the irrationality and intensity of 
jealous suspicions? 
11. Can it be shown that psychological factors are causal in jealous, suspicious 
thinking? 
12. Which factors distinguish between those who are irrationally suspicious and those 
whose partner suspicions are evidence-based? 
13. Do reductions and escalations in the levels of psychosis and other variables 






Questions 1–5, 7 & 8 are addressed in this thesis. These are more general 
questions which allow a logical starting point for establishing the basis for more 
detailed research into specific processes related to delusion-like cognition in jealousy.  
It is important to use research designs that enable differentiation between the 
process and content of jealous reasoning, such as diary studies, video recall, experience 
sampling, extended observation or experiment. These studies should control for general 
mental health problems, and in forensic populations for criminality to attempt to 
determine the unique contribution of psychosis. These can potentially show how 
process and content unfold over time and infer causality, especially regarding changes 
in cognition between anxious and non-anxious states. Moreover, designs other than 
cross-sectional would allow the exploration of causal direction and process in any 
interactions. 
Given jealousy and paranoia are both strongly related to partner aggression 
(Capaldi et al., 2012; Stith et al., 2004), further comparison studies should explore the 
boundaries between jealous cognition and affective process in dyadic interaction, in 
non-abusive, solely jealousy-prone, and partner aggressive groups at varying levels of 
severity and frequency. Additionally, more detailed research in forensic (specifically 
Partner Abusive) populations, is needed to explore if patterns of neurosis, psychosis, 
and thought rigidity found in normal and clinical populations are sustained or elevated 
in terms of thought persistence and severity in forensic populations.  
In the past, pathological jealousy has predominantly been studied in the context 
of severe mental illness, and furthermore, while trying to explain the relationship to a 
specific diagnosis, usually of personality or delusional disorder. Recently, several 




population; by making an analogy with the study of paranoia, the frequency of 
suspicious jealousy in the normal population might usefully be determined and any 
potential relationship with psychosis clarified. These developments and the findings of 
this review suggest that jealous suspicion should be studied in its own right, by merit of 
its likely relationship to paranoid thought. Improving understanding of the processes 
involved has the potential to be translated into improvements in interventions for 




CHAPTER 3. JEALOUSY: AN OVERVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF THEORIES, WITH 
A FOCUS ON ASPECTS RELATED TO DISTORTED COGNITION  
The previous chapter established that jealousy, persecutory thinking and 
psychosis are not dissimilar phenomena (i.e., they all share the presence of interpersonal 
suspicious thoughts, intrapersonal ruminative thoughts, and false accusations). In 
addition, it is suggested that they possess similar aetiological characteristics, 
mechanisms and physiopathology, and further suggested that they may share a common 
latent dimension. An increased understanding of the cognitive processes involved may 
play a vital role in gaining a better understanding of jealousy (Salovey, 1991) and 
provide insight as to how jealous people come to think and behave towards partners as 
they do. Through reviewing theories of jealousy, it may be possible to develop a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between jealousy and paranoia and to provide greater 
clarity about the underlying aetiology of suspicious jealousy.  
Theory shapes research formulation and interpretation, but without adequate 
empirical substantiation, theory is merely opinion (Wallis, 2010). Theory is particularly 
important in psychology as there are frequently multiple competing theories, often 
without clear evidence in favour of one. A good theory should not merely describe a 
phenomenon but should also attempt to explain what causes said phenomenon. In 
addition, sufficient detail about the suggested psychological mechanisms and cognitive 
processes responsible for a phenomenon should be provided in order to explain 
variations within the particular phenomenon. With reference to the topic of jealousy, it 
is suggested that a good theory in this area should provide a comprehensive map of 
components of jealousy (i.e., descriptions), provide detail regarding the organisation of 




regarding contexts in which acts of jealousy occur (i.e., responses to different 
environmental inputs). Finally, theory should provide a suggested explanation as to how 
the various issues associated with jealousy (e.g., suspiciousness and invasive 
behaviours) arise, are maintained, and interact with each other to produce behaviours 
associated with jealousy. Such detail is necessary where theories are used as the basis of 
intervention development.  
This chapter reviews, evaluates, and synthesises theories of jealousy. Limitations 
of the theories are discussed, and attempts are made to answer the questions posed in 
this thesis (i.e., might suspicious thinking in jealousy and paranoia be linked, and if so, 
how?). This review includes all widely used theories of jealousy, and, whilst some 
inclusion is made of the broader theoretical field, this is only where broader theories 
provide sufficient depth regarding explanations of jealous cognition, detail of the form 
and structure of jealousy, and/or provide explanations for a potential link between 
jealousy and psychosis. Theories are sought that, it is felt, best explain the causes of 
both rational and irrational jealousy, and the presence of comorbid psychotic states and 
irrational thinking (outlined in the previous chapter). The aim is to firstly provide the 
reader with an understanding of the phenomenon of jealousy based on a review of 
theory and to explain the empirically observed similarities between jealousy and 
paranoia/psychosis (described in the systematic review chapter). A secondary aim is to 
explore the full spectrum of jealousy related issues. Theories included in the following 
review have been developed from research with ‘normal’, clinical, and forensic 
populations.  
How has Jealousy been Categorised?  




that there are forms of jealousy that are less functional and more pathological. Romantic 
jealousy is assumed to occur when a real or imagined rival threatens a romantic 
relationship (Pines, 1992). In community studies it has been found that the experience 
of jealousy is nearly universal (Mullen & Martin, 1994), so it may be assumed that 
jealousy is a very common, and therefore normal experience. Dysfunctional forms have 
been identified such as Othello syndrome, conjugal paranoia, suspicious jealousy (e.g., 
Salovey, 1991), pathological jealousy (e.g., Mullen & Maack, 1985), abnormal and 
neurotic jealousy (e.g., Freud, 1921), irrational jealousy (e.g., Ellis, 1977), unprovoked 
jealousy (Hoaken, 1976), morbid jealousy (e.g., Kingham & Harvey, 2004), and 
cognitive or behavioural jealousy (e.g., Pfeiffer & Wong, 1989), but it is not clear 
whether any of these forms relate to distinct types or they are different terms that relate 
to a dysfunctional type of jealousy. Furthermore, the consequence of the subtyping, of 
what appear to be similar or equivalent forms, is that within psychological research they 
have often been treated as distinct subtypes according to which psychiatric diagnosis 
they most resemble (e.g., see Mathes & Severa, 1981; Sharpsteen, 1991; White, 1981).  
Research with large psychiatric cohorts suggests that problematic (and therefore, 
by definition, pathological) jealousy is present in many psychotic diagnoses (Soyka et 
al., 1991; Soyka, 1995). However, pathological jealousy is classified by the DSM-5 
(APA, 2013) rather narrowly as (a) obsessive jealousy, a “specified related disorder” of 
another compulsive-obsessive disorder; and (b) jealousy-type within the delusional 
disorder. It is suggested that as selection of participants for research often relies on their 
belonging to a particular diagnostic category, this narrow definition may have led to the 
majority of research on pathological jealousy having excluded many participants from 




selection, thus diverting possible explanations that explore common symptoms rather 
than diagnoses (Soyka, 1991; 1995).  
In addition to the issues surrounding the selection of participants for research, 
authors’ failure to distinguish between different kinds of jealousy makes it difficult to 
determine whether theories are making reference to normal jealousy, dysfunctional 
jealousy, or both. Jealousy has been studied within the fields of psychiatry and 
psychology, however there is a dearth of cross-disciplinary research and the different 
fields differ in definitions used and focus of study. The apparent consequences of this 
are that some authors (e.g., White & Mullen, 1989) identify a form of normal jealousy 
whereas others appear to consider all jealousy dysfunctional or abnormal; it is unclear 
as to whether researchers and theoreticians are referring to the same phenomenon when 
discussing jealousy. In addition, clinical/psychiatric definitions are often applied 
inappropriately to research within community populations where the phenomenon 
described appears qualitatively different (White & Mullen, 1989).  
A further problem with creating theoretical clarity is presented when trying to 
distinguish between different forms of jealousy. There have been a number of attempts 
to categorise types of jealousy in order to distinguish between normal and dysfunctional 
types. Salovey (1991) makes the distinction between jealousy in response to a real event 
(i.e., where a partner has definitely committed a transgression with another individual) 
and suspicious jealousy (i.e., in response to imagined events). Similarly, Ellis (1977) 
distinguishes between rational and irrational jealousy. He argues that rational jealousy is 
a response to a concrete threat with a high probability that an individual would lose their 




Additionally, boundaries between what is accepted as normal and pathological 
jealousy depend very much upon the prevailing culture and the socially accepted norms 
within that culture. Furthermore, norms have been found to change over time; for 
example, a century ago in the UK, acting in a jealous manner was considered to be 
socially acceptable, whereas nowadays, jealousy is perceived as an unhealthy and 
potentially pathological emotion (Mullen & Martin, 1994). Research has found that 
some Samoan cultures appear to be devoid of what we would consider jealousy (Mead, 
1977, as cited in Buunk, 1997).  
In reviewing descriptive theories of jealousy, it appears that there is overlap 
between definitions of abnormal types of jealousy but that normal and dysfunctional 
jealousy appear to be qualitatively distinct from each other. It has been said that the 
boundary between “normal” and “pathological” jealousy is difficult to define (Mullen, 
1991). It seems plausible that this is due to typological conceptualisations of irrational 
jealousy not fitting well with what is known about jealousy, and that a theoretical 
conceptualisation of jealousy on a continuum of severity might have greater validity.  
According to Theory, What Causes Jealousy? 
The following section reviews explanations as to how jealousy arises, how it is 
maintained, and how different behavioural outcomes occur. For clarity in understanding 
the mechanisms proposed by each theory, theories are organised into biological, 
individual, developmental, and situational strands (Ward & Seigert, 2008). Two 
evaluative tools are utilised in the following sections in order to assess the adequacy of 
a theory with reference to the theory’s ability to explain the nature and aetiology of 
jealousy. The first of these two tools was developed by Bradford Hill (1965) who 




relationship between a presumed cause and an observed effect.  
Table 7. Bradford Hill criteria for assessment of causal effect. 
The first five criteria relate to empirical aspects of causality  
Strength of association (i.e., effect size).  
 Consistency (reproducibility): it summarises the body of evidence over 
different observers, samples and places.  
 Specificity: other potential explanations are eliminated, and the 
population, site and disease are clear. 
Temporality: the cause should temporally precede the effect.  
 Biological gradient: greater exposure should lead to a higher level or 
incidence.  
The final four criteria relate to theory:  
 Plausibility: the mechanism should be plausible in terms of cause and 
effect.  
 Coherence: the laboratory and empirical findings should be coherent. 
 Experimental evidence.  
 Analogy: to explore similar factors.  
 
By applying these criteria to the body of theory on the topic of jealousy, it 
should be possible to identify what can be reasonably known and highlight where 
additional development is needed. Whilst details of a causal chain are difficult to obtain 
in psychology, each cause must occur via a mechanism or mechanisms. Without 
sufficient detail of the mechanism and a clear causal chain, a proposed link between 




Hill, 1965). The second tool was developed by Bechtel (2008) who summarises the 
importance of mapping entities (elements) to activities (processes) in mechanism 
discovery, pointing out that it is often this mapping that allows us to identify the 
working parts of a mechanism. This tool allows us to evaluate the proposed mechanisms 
put forward within a theory, thus guiding future research by both helping to clarify how 
transparent a theory is regarding proposed mechanisms, and by highlighting gaps in 
their logic.  
1. Early psychiatric explanations.  
Historically, jealousy was considered a type of paranoia and its cause attributed 
to psychodynamic or biological processes. It has been viewed as: a narcissistic wound, 
prioritising self-love over love of the other (Freud, 1925); a symptom of dementia 
praecox (Kraeplin, 1910); and as organic degeneration or a development of an 
underlying suspicious personality trait (Jaspers, 1910). The field of psychiatry has 
sought to establish a potential link between paranoia and jealousy and data supports the 
relationship between organic degeneration and jealousy in some cases. However, early 
psychiatric explanations have a number of potential weaknesses. Firstly, explanations of 
jealousy as a form of paranoia or psychosis are based on case studies of a distinct sub-
group of clinical patients, with severely disorganised personalities, who suffer from rare 
delusional forms of jealousy (e.g., Brunswick, 1929; Curling et al., 2018; Shingo et al., 
2013). Furthermore, despite frequent testing, there is a lack of empirical support for 
psychoanalytic (e.g., Freud, 1922/1940) notions that jealousy is based in childhood 
sibling rivalry, harsh discipline, attachment difficulties and parental conflict (Clanton & 
Kosins, 1991). Overall, there is little support for early theories of jealousy beyond the 




2. Biological explanations.  
2.1 Jealousy delusions are the result of toxicity and brain damage. 
Structural alterations of the right hemisphere have been found to increase the 
incidence of severe jealousy diagnosis (Ortigue & Bianchi-Demichelli, 2011). Brain 
lesions (specifically right frontal lobe damage, stroke, brain injury, disorder or disease 
affecting the right brain stem) have been found to lead to severe forms of jealousy 
(Ortigue & Bianchi-Demichelli, 2011). Damage to brain regions (i.e., the right 
hemisphere and emotion centres) have been related to false belief psychological systems 
and appear to be responsible for increased levels of suspicious jealousy (Marazitti et al., 
2003). In addition, there is evidence linking delusions in Othello syndrome and severe 
and delusional jealousy with underlying organic/toxic conditions. For example, 
dopamine agonist treatment for Parkinsonism has been linked to delusional jealousy 
(Georgiev et al., 2010; Poletti et al., 2012), as have alcohol side-effects or toxicity 
(Michael, Mirza, Mirza, Babu, & Vithayathil, 1995a; Shrestha, Rees, Rix, Hore, & 
Faragher, 1985). Furthermore, alcohol toxicity is associated with severe jealousy in 
community (de Bello et al., 2014; Mullen & Martin, 1994) and clinical populations 
(Michael et al., 1995; Silva et al., 1998). In each of these cases, toxicity occurs prior to 
the severe or delusional condition and ceases when the drug is removed (in the case of 
drugs to treat Parkinsonism). Given that the results of these combined individual studies 
and Ortigue and Bianchi-Demicelli’s (2011) review show that delusional jealousy 
results from brain damage to specified areas and also toxicity, and that these studies 
taken as a whole have a clear baseline (reports before injury or toxicity), the finding is 
replicated multiple times, across multiple sites, using designs capable of examining 




requirement of NIH grants), there is good evidence to conclude that severe delusional 
jealousy can be as a result of underlying organic mechanisms. However, there is 
insufficient evidence that organic explanations extrapolate to jealous ideation, which 
may be caused via a different mechanism or mechanisms.  
 3. Evolutionary biology.  
3.1 Jealousy arises in order to ensure paternity or economic resources.  
Arguably, the most influential theory of jealousy, with over five times more 
publications than any other jealousy theory, has been the Innate modular hypothesis 
(IMH; e.g., Buss et al., 1992). This theory attributes jealousy to an evolutionary 
mechanism: mate guarding behaviour, which is proposed to be a natural response to 
mate rivalry designed to ensure and protect the male’s paternity of any child (Buss, 
1988). The IMH claims that the function of jealousy is to ensure that a couple stays 
together long enough to ensure the survival of their genetic offspring. Buss et al.’s 
theory predicts that each gender will differ in terms of the situations that evoke 
jealousy; women become jealous when their partner has a potential emotional 
connection to a rival (which would constitute a threat to their mate’s continued care of 
the family) and males become jealous when there is the potential of a sexual connection 
to a rival (as it is then more difficult for the male to be certain they are the father of a 
child). 
The IMH appears to offer both a clear mechanism and a well-substantiated 
functional explanation for normal jealousy. However, whilst the IMH might explain 
normal jealousy as mate-guarding, the evidence for differences between genders is 
inconclusive (see Fredrick & Fales, 2014; Kato, 2017). Furthermore, whilst there is 




emotional infidelity and it appears female definitions of emotional infidelity constitute a 
more permanent threat to the relationship (Guitar et al., 2017). The IMH also has no 
explanation for irrational jealousy, or escalation of jealousy, other than increased 
environmental threat (increased rival attention). Furthermore, the IMH erroneously 
predicts that jealous responses (e.g., hostility and aggression) would always be directed 
towards a rival; however, evidence suggests that most hostility and aggression is 
directed toward the mate rather than a rival (e.g., Foss & Galloway, 1993). This 
omission by the IMH is of interest; attacking the mate does not appear to offer an 
evolutionary advantage in the way that attacking a rival would, although attacking a 
mate may make it more likely that they will remain faithful due to fear. In the longer 
term, attacking one’s mate is likely to result in their termination of the relationship 
(Ahmadabadi et al., 2018). Furthermore, jealous attacks are suggested as a leading 
cause of many mate homicides (Mužinić et al., 2003), and both outcomes are likely to 
result in any offspring’s failure to thrive (White & Mullen, 1989). So, whilst this theory 
provides a functional explanation for normal jealousy, despite substantial testing the 
authors’ claims about gender differences remain unsubstantiated and the theory fails to 
provide an explanation for suspicious forms of jealousy. 
4. Developmental Explanations 
4.1 Jealousy results from insecure attachment to a primary caregiver or from 
sibling rivalry. Feelings of anxiety that result in suspicions about partner infidelity has 
been proposed to be as a result of adult insecure attachment arising from insecure 
childhood attachment (Hart, 2013) in normal (Costa, Sophia, Sanches, Tavares, & 
Zilberman, 2015), clinical, and forensic populations (Dutton, van Ginkel, & Landolt, 




evidence base and it is proposed that no association exists at all between the two issues 
(Clanton & Kosins, 1991; Kosins, 1984). When neuroticism and social anxiety are 
statistically controlled for, the full effect of attachment is accounted for (Buunk, 1997).  
Adult insecure attachment findings in studies of jealousy may be a measurement 
artefact or tautological description of general anxiety or neurosis, and it seems more 
likely that neurosis (rather than attachment insecurity) is related to jealousy. An 
alternative developmental explanation is that jealousy results from childhood sibling 
rivalry (Buunk, 1997). Hart (2013) suggests that adult partner jealousy develops in a 
number of stages over the course of growing up, and that romantic jealousy is a 
combination of biological imperative (see Buss, IMH) and a ‘sensitive predisposition’ to 
rivalry for attention and love from the mother. However, there is no evidence to support 
the notion that sibling rivalry contributes to later jealousy (Clanton & Kosins, 1991; 
Kosins, 1984). Furthermore, the longitudinal cohort research necessary to support this 
view has not been conducted. 
5. Personality. 
5.1 Jealousy develops as the result of general insecurity, sensitivity and 
negativity.  
DeSteno (2006) proposes that jealousy arises as a response when an individual’s 
self-esteem or self-concept is threatened as a result of comparing themselves to the rival 
(DeSteno & Salovey, 1994). Other dispositional mechanisms suggested to increase 
jealousy are: a less benevolent attitude to the world (White, 1984), lower life 
satisfaction (Manges & Evenbeck, 1980), more external locus of control (Jaremko & 
Lindsey, 1979), and easy arousal (Bringle & Williams, 1979), or a greater sensitivity to 




esteem (see Chapter 2) and threat sensitivity (Bringle, Renner, Terry, & Davis, 1983; 
Cohen et al., 2014; Rydell et al., 2004), there is no empirical evidence for other 
dispositional causes. Although it is plausible that jealousy could develop as a result of 
low self-esteem, research on the relationship between self-esteem and jealousy is 
correlational and, as such, low self-esteem has not been verified as a cause of jealousy.  
5.2 Jealousy is the result of specific psychiatric disorders. 
Some theories suggest that jealousy results from a number of psychiatric 
disorders and, where an individual has no psychiatric diagnosis, it has been suggested 
that jealousy results from attenuated versions of these disorders that are expressed as 
personality traits). In particular, links have been found between jealousy and obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD) (Cobb & Marks, 1979; Ecker, 2012; Marazziti et al., 
2003a), borderline personality organisation and disorder (Dutton, 1994; Dutton et al., 
1996), and paranoia (Pines & Friedman, 1998; Tarrier, Beckett, Harwood, & Bishay, 
1990). Marazitti et al. (2010) proposed a model of pathological jealousy on the basis of 
four hypothesised underlying diagnostic dimensions: depressive; insecure attachment; 
obsession; and paranoia. However, the evidence for these dimensions (Lima et al., 2017; 
Marizitti et al., 2010) suggests that these dimensions are unstable, with named 
categories which do not reflect the included items. There is evidence that jealousy might 
be on a spectrum that spans personality traits and mental ill-health symptoms, although 
the patterns observed in the work by Lima et al. (2017) point to a mixture of 
dimensional intensities and categorical qualities (distressed affect, thought disorder, 
hostility) that are contributory factors with a hierarchical organisation; this structure will 





6. Situational context. 
6.1 Jealousy intensity is due to perceived relationship commitment.  
Knobloch and Solomon’s (2004) Relational Turbulence Model suggests that 
jealousy arises due to relational uncertainty. The theory appears to be based on 
attachment theories in that it suggests levels of jealousy differ according to the stage of 
a relationship (i.e., level of attachment) and according to the degree of commitment 
reflected by relationship stage). In particular, relational turbulence theory suggests that 
people make three primary appraisals in response to a perceived relationship threat: (1) 
the potential for a rival relationship to develop; (2) the likelihood that the rival 
relationship actually exists; and (3) the degree of harm posed by the potential or actual 
rival relationship. In addition to the apparent plausibility of this argument, findings of 
longitudinal research studies provide support for this theory, i.e., research shows that 
relational uncertainty is positively correlated with jealousy (Theiss & Solomon, 2006). 
6.2 The impact of cultural and situational factors on jealousy. 
Bryson et al. (1984) suggest that relationship investment, prior relationship 
satisfaction, the quality of alternative partners, gender, and ambiguity of the situation 
determine responses to jealousy provoking situations. Bryson et al. (1984) further assert 
that responses are a synthesis of unspecified individual characteristics and cultural 
norms regarding the expression of jealousy. A potential weakness of this explanation is 
that it is strongly reliant on contextual factors as opposed to individual level factors. For 
example, it suggests that suspiciousness is a function of the environment but fails to 
specify any mechanism by which this happens and furthermore does not explain how 
variations in the intensity of suspiciousness result from the particular environment. 




and respond to stimuli which could trigger feelings of jealousy, by shaping cultural 
norms for when it is appropriate to be jealous and the appropriate response to this. He 
suggests that individuals are more likely to feel threatened within a relationship in 
societies where: property ownership is important; people need descendants in order to 
ensure wellbeing in old age; marriage is required for socially appropriate sex; and adults 
require a mate both for economic survival and social status. He gives examples of 
cultures in which there is seemingly no jealousy and where the norms of ‘being 
respected’ result in culturally sanctioned appropriate behaviour. He also highlights that 
there are culturally appropriate behaviours for each gender. For example, in Apache 
culture it was appropriate for a male to kill a male rival, but a woman would only be 
able to publicly berate her husband. He purports that other factors also influence 
jealousy —culture being just one factor amongst many. A weakness of this view is it 
fails to detail individual variation within a culture or give any explanation as to how 
suspicious jealousy develops in an individual.  
7. Cognitive and Integrated Theories. 
Four theories that attempt to explain proximal and situational factors are 
outlined and critiqued below. The final two explanations include a multidimensional 
analysis (which provides detailed processes and mechanisms of jealousy), and in 
addition, include potential aetiologies of jealousy and explanations of differences 
between normal and suspicious jealousy.  
7.1 Jealousy occurs due to perceived inequality in the relationship  
Buunk’s exchange theory of jealousy (1991) claims that jealousy arises from a 
person’s relative satisfaction with their relationship which, in turn, is based on their 




an individual will evaluate the fairness and equality of their relationship and consider 
the cost of the potential loss of the relationship. Their appraisal also informs their choice 
of conflict strategy (e.g., aggression, problem-solving etc.), and is further determined by 
the relative priority given to their own and the partner’s priorities (Kelley, 1979). It is 
suggested that jealousy results from perceived relative equality and perceived likelihood 
of the relationship continuing. The balance of dependency within the romantic 
relationship will impact on jealousy in that the less dependent partner will have more 
power in the relationship and is therefore less likely to be jealous than the more 
dependent one. 
Buunk (1988) distinguishes between three forms of jealousy: reactive jealousy 
due to a partner’s real involvement with another; preventative jealousy, which is not a 
response to an actual event and even minor signs of attraction to another are interpreted 
as threats and will result in behaviours designed to control the partner; and self-
generated jealousy which, like reactive jealousy, evokes an emotional response, but is 
due to imagining the partner in jealousy provoking situations and results in anxiety and 
worry. Self-generated jealousy differs from preventative jealousy in that it does not 
involve controlling behaviours. Buunk’s (1991) suggested mechanism aims to explain 
behavioural strategies but does not explain increased sensitivity to minor relationship 
threats. His claims that preventative jealousy is difficult to distinguish from reactive 
jealousy are not supported by research. In addition, there is no research on variation in 
jealousy type due to felt or expressed emotion. Furthermore, there is no evidence that 
preventative jealousy is due to anxiety, or indeed that it determines whether other types 
of jealousy involve anxiety as part of the motivation for controlling behaviours. The 




in reactive jealousy (Barelds & Barelds-Dijkstra, 2007).  
7.2 Process theories. 
The following three theories are based on Lazarus and Folkman’s cognitive-
transactional theory of stress, coping and emotion (1984). The theory suggests that 
individuals appraise their environment to determine whether stimuli add to their 
wellbeing or are benign. If a threat is detected, then an individual will conduct a 
secondary appraisal to find a coping strategy. The effectiveness of the enacted coping 
strategies is then assessed, creating an ongoing feedback loop. 
7.2.1 Jealousy results from poor mental health, relationship dependency, 
perceived lack of alternatives, sex-role traditionalism and the appraisal of threat.  
Mathes’ cognitive theory of jealousy (1991) considers jealousy to be a universal 
response to a relationship-threatening situation and does not pathologise all forms of 
jealousy. In short, he suggests that jealousy results from relationship dependency, a 
perceived lack of alternatives and sex-role traditionalism. The perceived threat of losing 
relationship rewards and a reduction in self-esteem is dependent on the value placed on 
a relationship by the individual, the perceived probability that the rival will take the 
partner, and the extent to which the individual values monogamy. Mathes (1991) 
suggests that an individual’s psychological health and level of trait jealousy will 
influence the level of threat that is perceived by them, with a high level of trait jealousy 
leading to greater stress. If the situation is thought to pose a threat during the primary 
appraisal process, then the person will experience feelings of jealousy. A secondary 
appraisal then takes place during which the individual considers ways in which the 
situation could be remedied. Coping strategies suggested within the theory include 




over them. Mathes (1991) purports that both normal and irrational jealousy arise due to 
specific mental health and personality characteristics that influence both the appraisal of 
the situation and the choice of coping strategy. In contrast to many theories of jealousy, 
Mathes’ theory describes a number of apparently testable, cognitive processes involved 
in jealousy (specifically primary appraisal, secondary appraisal, and escalation or de-
escalation of emotional or behavioural responses based on feedback about coping 
strategy effectiveness), and that these behavioural responses are used as a form of 
anxiety reduction, and are potentially testable within the context of a research design 
that uses repeated measures to record thoughts, emotions and behaviours. Results of 
such studies could add support for Mathes’ theory.  
However, despite his proposal within the theory that jealousy is a personality 
trait, there is a lack of support for this within the wider literature. For example, if 
jealousy were a trait then it should appear as a discrete factor in the well substantiated 
Big Five personality trait model (Costa & McCrea, 1992; Digman, 1990) or the 16PF 
(Cattell et al., 1970). As such, it is suggested that jealousy is more likely to be a product 
of other dimensions of personality such as anxiety/neuroticism. Furthermore, the theory 
does not explain why an individual may experience more or less jealousy at particular 
times in their lives, and how mental health issues might impact jealousy. There are a 
number of kinds of poor mental health and mental health is not constant across an 
individual’s lifetime (e.g., Kurtz, 2005; Westerhof & Keyes, 2010). The lack of 
specificity in relating poor mental health in general to increased jealous pathology is not 
helpful in identifying exactly which aspects of poor mental health are problematic or 
causal in relation to jealousy. Therefore, the theory needs to detail which aspects of 




relationship. To date, theory lacks detail regarding how poor mental health and/or trait 
jealousy may lead to an acute jealousy episode, or how or which mental health issues 
may link to which affective, cognitive or behavioural jealousy outcomes. Only one 
research study appears to have investigated the link between mental ill-health and 
personality traits by measuring neuroticism, introversion/extroversion and dependency 
using a number of measures — only one of which was clinically robust. Of the 
numerous proposed relationships within the model, it generated evidence for a link 
between jealousy and the personality trait of neuroticism (Mathes, Roter, & Joerger, 
1982). In turn, neuroticism has been found to be associated with a range of mental 
disorders (Ormel et al., 2013; Tyrer, Casey & Gall, 1983). However, it is of note that the 
study adopted a cross-sectional design and as such, it is not possible to ascertain the 
direction of association between the neuroticism and jealousy.  
7.2.2. Jealousy results from social and cultural expectations, personal threat 
sensitivity, coping strategy choice, and the ability to test reality.  
White and Mullen’s (1989) Process-orientated model of romantic jealousy 
suggests that variation in people’s ability to ‘reality test’ leads to variation in levels of 
romantic jealousy; this issue is therefore instrumental in whether an individual displays 
rational or pathological forms of jealousy (White & Mullen, 1989). The model 
integrates a number of theories (e.g., Hupka, 1991; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) and 
suggests that jealousy is a complex, involving emotion. In addition, the model 
highlights that cognitive processes and subsequent behaviour are not unidimensional — 
i.e., there are many factors that need to be considered. Within the model, jealousy is 
seen as interactional and systemic. Rather than being deemed a discrete entity or trait, 
the model proposes that jealousy arises as a result of specific interactions within a 




impact of social and cultural factors as well as patterns of thought, emotion, and 
behaviour/s.  
Jealousy is said to result from primary appraisal of a threat to the continuation of 
the relationship or to a person’s self-concept due to a relationship threat. This primary 
appraisal is followed by a secondary appraisal whereby an individual will consider an 
appropriate coping strategy, and finally, will implement the coping strategy.  
White and Mullen’s (1989) model suggests there to be multiple jealousy patterns 
with multiple associated aetiologies that result in different patterns of emotion, thought, 
and behaviour. They suggest that isolating each individual mechanism or symptom is a 
useful way to proceed with further research. They propose that advances in 
understanding are best made by identifying relatively stable, causal factors in the 
relationship, personality, or culture, rather than treating jealousy as a personality 
characteristic. Whilst White and Mullen’s model integrates a number of prior theories 
and research findings into a coherent, multifactorial explanatory model, it remains only 
an associative model, based on hypothesised causal relationships. It remains largely 
untested and, where studies have been conducted, it is questionable whether the 
research designs are suited to the exploration processes, interactions and transactions 
over time, and have been cross-sectional (Buunk, 1997; Rydell et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, mechanisms that cause differences in reality-testing capacity and threat 
sensitivity could benefit from a more detailed explanation of these and the model has 
not led to research into whether these differences exist or what might cause them (see 




7.2.3. Jealousy is due to the individual’s sociocultural history. 
Bringle’s (1991) transactional model combines multiple factors related to 
jealousy. Bringle (1991) assumes that jealousy originates in an individual’s sociocultural 
history and that no a priori circumstances evoke jealousy. It suggests that both the 
person and the situation contribute to jealousy in varying degrees. Any event thought to 
have the potential to cause the loss of the desired relationship will be responded to with 
jealousy, i.e., jealousy does not only occur where the person perceives a loss of a 
romantic partner to a rival. The model suggests that commitment, insecurity and 
arousability (described in Table 8) must be present for a jealous response, and that 
increased levels of each increase the intensity of the jealous response.  
Table 8. Outline of factors that must be present for a jealous response. 
Commitment comes from the individual’s appraisal of the relationship, i.e., a perceived decline in the 
partner’s commitment will lead to insecurity. Insecurity is based on the appraisal of the partner’s 
commitment to the relationship and is influenced by the difficulty of accurately determining the 
partner’s actual commitment to a relationship.  
According to the model, insecurity is due to:  
1. Predisposing and background factors: i.e., factors that generate uncertainty about the partner’s 
relationship intentions, for example, low self-esteem, or low partner commitment to the relationship. 
2. A shift in partner commitment: i.e., whereby an individual believes that their partner’s priorities 
have changed from being concerned with joint goals to being more individualistic (Kelley, 1979; Pruit, 
1981). 
3. Jealousy evoking events: i.e., acute events that signal a reduction in the partner’s commitment to 
the relationship and a perceived loss of relationship stability and positive outcomes (Plutchik, 1980). 
Lastly, arousability refers to the apparent reciprocal relationship between prior events and generated 
emotions; this reciprocal relationship escalates the experienced emotional state (jealousy) and related 
cognitions (Bringle, 1998).  
The model suggest that commitment, arousability and insecurity all evolve from: 
(1) the person’s trait and situational aspects; (2) the relationship’s stable and transient 
states (e.g., the couple’s history, and whether they have just had an argument); and (3) 




appraisal of the relationship’s past rewards, and of the effect of the partner’s extradyadic 
behaviour on future outcomes, is influenced by personal, relational, and situational 
factors.  
What differentiates between normal and suspicious jealousy? 
 
Figure 2. Bringle’s categorisation of jealousy types. 
Bringle (1991) splits jealousy into normal and suspicious types (see Figure 2). 
Normal ‘reactive’ jealousy is thought to be largely rational, as it is based on 
substantiated evidence of the partner’s extradyadic involvement. Other researchers 
suggest that suspicious jealousy is not delusional where the partner is, in fact, 
unfaithful. Bringle (1991) argues that even when the partner is unfaithful, this does not 
mean that the suspicious partner is not delusional, i.e., partner infidelity and delusional 
thought are not mutually exclusive. He suggests that suspicious jealousy is, by nature, 
delusional, and outlines what contributes to this process (see Table 9). He further 
suggests that problems differentiating between the credibility of evidence for partner 
infidelity arise when moderate circumstances and minor events are taken as sufficient 




are justified when evidence is ambiguous and in responding to minor cues as though 
they were substantive evidence of their partner’s actual or intended infidelity.  
Table 9. Components of suspicious jealousy (Bringle, 1991).  
1. Excessive anxiety and worry, disproportionate to the exogenous evidence, 
where the content concerns what the partner might have done or is 
intending to do.  
2. Excessive mistrust of the partner.  
3. Regular snooping and checking on the partner and attempts to control their 
behaviour.  
4. Personality variables (described later in this section) and, to some extent, 
chronic relationship variables that lead to consistently high levels of 
dispositional insecurity.  
5. High levels of emotional response to relatively minor jealousy-evoking 
cues, in the absence of any major jealousy-evoking cues. 
 
How does Bringle suggest each form might arise? 
Dispositional jealousy is thought to arise within the parent-child relationship and 
is thought to be associated with other personality traits of both the parent and the child 
(Bringle & Williams, 1979). It is suggested that vulnerability to suspicious jealousy 
results from a combination of high emotional-reactivity and cognitive and behavioural 
‘coping strategies’ (Bringle & Buunk, 1985) related to heightened vigilance, agitation, 
mistrust, worrying and excessively emotional responding (Bringle, 1991).  
Bringle (1991) suggests, based on work by Beck (1976) and Larsen, Diener, and 
Cropanzano (1987), that there are three specific chronic personality traits related to 
suspicious jealousy:  




2. Selective abstraction (i.e., focus on the emotion-provoking aspects of an 
event).  
3. The overgeneralisation of isolated events to constitute evidence of a more 
comprehensive but hidden set of relationship threatening events. 
In reactive jealousy, priority is given to exogenous (i.e., relationship and 
situational) factors (see Figure 2), whereas in suspicious jealousy, evidence based on 
endogenous (i.e., personal) factors is prioritised by the individual, with irrational 
thinking arising from the elaboration of minor cues believed to confirm suspicions that 
relatively minor events constitute a significant threat. Suspicions are resistant to change, 
and partners’ declarations of commitment to the current relationship or lack of evidence 
for extra-relational involvement do not appease mistrust or excessive vigilance. 
Bringle’s model integrates both distal and proximal risk factors into a plausible, 
multifactorial explanation that includes a number of personality and sociocultural 
influences which impact upon the intensity and rationality of jealousy. It suggests there 
are a number of thought processes that contribute to jealousy that go beyond the more 
usual general discussion of personality variables and emotional responses highlighted in 
other theories and models; as such, it is better able to differentiate between normal and 
irrational jealousy. A significant strength of the model is that it goes beyond merely 
describing jealousy in that it suggests a number of specific, testable mechanisms that 
differentiate between reactive and irrational types of jealousy (i.e., the relative 
prioritisation of endogenous or exogenous factors, and specific cognitive biases and 
processes through which suspicious jealousy might arise and be maintained).  
However, a limitation of the model is that it does not integrate well-established 
biological contributions to underlying vulnerabilities to suspicious jealousy. 




model. For example, what Bringle (1991) identifies as chronic personality traits (e.g., 
self-referencing), could be better characterised as transient states or cognitive processes. 
In addition, arousability appears to be dispositional and not specific to jealousy. 
Furthermore, the model fails to specify which emotion is subject to high levels of 
emotional response relating to increased jealousy. It is therefore unclear how high levels 
of emotional response is distinct from emotional reactivity. Bringle also does not 
specify how factors interact; in particular there is insufficient detail about how affective 
and cognitive factors interact to produce behavioural outcomes (e.g., how vulnerabilities 
such as excessive anxiety interact with more proximal factors such as current irrational 
thinking to produce a particular outcome). Additionally, the model fails to suggest a 
clear mechanism for irrational jealousy maintenance, suggesting simply that this type of 
thinking is resistant to change but failing to explain why or how this might be so. Lastly, 
despite the theory’s potential and its testable hypotheses, unfortunately Bringle’s model 
has not been the basis of much research. Therefore, whilst individual influences on 
jealousy included in the model are substantiated by correlational evidence, there is a 
lack of evidence for the suggested processes/mechanisms, and no studies exist that 
explore the suggested developmental factors, cognitive biases, reality testing deficits, or 
relative importance of endogenous or exogenous factors.  




Table 10. Summary and comparison of jealousy theories. 
 
Theory Theoretical  
Background 
Quality of  
Evidence 





thesis  question 
Consistency,  
Specif ic i ty,  
Temporal i ty  
Plausibi l i ty  Coherence Evidence Components  Processes/  
mechanisms 
 
Biological           





Excel lent  –  
consis tent ,  
specif ic  regions 
effected,  cause 
before effect .  
Delusional  
changes not  
jealousy specif ic .   
Very plausible  l ink to  
al l  types of  severe 
delusions regardless  of  
content .   
High levels  
of  coherence 
Extensive 
tes t ing,  excel lent  
evidence for  
severe delusional  
forms 
Mult iple  types 
of  severe 
delusion 
related to  
toxici ty  and 
brain damage.  
Related to  
other  forms of  
delusion in  
form. 
Chemical  or  
mechanical  damage to  
specif ic  brain areas  
al ters  thought ,  mood,  
behaviour.  
Diff icul t  to  explain 
jealousy content .  
Fai lure to  specif ic  
pathways for  
interact ions between 
emotions,  thoughts  
and behaviours .   
Buss IMH Evolut ionary 
Biology 
Good evidence – 
biological  
component  
Weak evidence – 
gender  
differences  
Plausible  for  normal  
jealousy;  fa lsely 
predicts  aggression 
towards r ival /not  mate 
Mixed 
evidence for  
gender.   
Good 
evidence for  
biological  
imperat ive.   
Extensively 
tes ted,  good 
evidence 
Singular  form 
of  jealousy 
Mate Rivalry/Genetic  
Survival  
Diff icul t  to  explain 
jealous aggression 
towards mate rather  
than r ival .  Mixed and 
weak evidence for  
predicted gender  
differences.  Fai lure  
to  specify pathways 
for  interact ions 
between emotions,  
thoughts  and 
behaviours .  
Developmental         
Childhood 
Attachment  
Securi ty  
Psychodynamic 
Theory,  Hazan 




Poor evidence for  
mechanism. 
Inconsis tent  
evidence.  Any 
effect  explained 
by confounding 
variables .   
Implausible  –  effect  
more l ikely to  be 
explained by general  
anxiety.   
Incoherent  Poor cross-
sect ional ,  
correlat ional .  
Inconsis tent  but  
most ly  
unsupport ive 






Response to  
relat ionship threat .  
Childhood 
relat ionship with 
primary caregiver  
leads to  repet i t ion of  
securi ty  of  this  
experience in  Adult  
Romances 
Any associat ion with 
adult  a t tachment  is  
l ikely to  be spurious 
and wholly explained 
by anxiety or  
neurosis .  Fai lure  to  
specify pathways for  
interact ions between 
emotions,  thoughts  
and behaviours .  




Theory Theoretical  
Background 
Quality of  
Evidence 





thesis  question 
Consistency,  
Specif ic i ty,  
Temporal i ty  






insecuri ty,  
sensi t ivi ty,  
negat ivi ty  
Atheoret ical  –  
correlat ional  
evidence 
Inconsis tent  
evidence – poor 
for  other  
disposi t ional  
factors ,  Good 
evidence for  self-
esteem. 
Plausible  for  
relat ionship to  self-
concept  







sect ional ,  
inconsis tent  
f indings.   
Insecure 
jealousy  
Social  comparison 
with potent ia l  r ival ,  
re lated changes in  
self-concept .  External  
Locus of  control ,  
lower l i fe  
sat isfact ion,  less  
benevolent  a t t i tude to  
the world,  easy 
arousal  to  
environmental  threats .  
Evidence for  
disposi t ional  
mechanisms other  
than self-esteem 
poor.  Modelled on 
the basis  of  
correlat ion not  
theoret ical  
plausibi l i ty  or  
coherence.  Fai lure  to  
specify pathways for  
interact ions between 
emotions,  thoughts  
and behaviours .  




Diagnost ic  
categorisat ion 
of  mental  i l l -
heal th  
Poor evidence – 
individual  
diagnost ic  
categories ,  Low 
specif ic i ty  
between 
categories .  Good 
for  l inks with 
poor mental  
heal th .   
Plausible  l ink to  poor  
mental  heal th .  
Implausible  as  
general isat ion of  
part icular  symptom as 
an underlying trai t  
applied to  al l  s i tuat ions 
not  coherent  with 
known presentat ions of  
mental  i l lness .  






Inconsis tent  
f indings poor for  
categorisat ions.  
Good for  l ink to  
poor mental  
heal th .   





Personal i ty  
Disorder/Orga




Underlying mental  
i l lness  or  sub-cl inical  
t ra i t  for  specif ic  
disorder  leads to  
specif ic /related 
pat terns of  jealousy.   
No evidence for  
specif ic  pat terns  of  
jealousy related to  
mental  heal th  
category.  Fai lure  to  
specify pathways for  
interact ions between 
emotions,  thoughts  
and behaviours .  






Good evidence,  
longitudinal ,  
consis tent .  
Specif ic  and 
temporal .  
Findings 
consis tent  with 
suggested 
mechanism.  
Plausible  mechanism 
related to  current  
re lat ionship dynamics.  
Evidence 
coherent  
Good evidence – 
consis tent  across  
s tudies ,  
re lat ively few 
studies .   
Jealousy as  
one construct  
variat ion in  
intensi ty  and 
expression.  
Response to  
relat ionship threat .  
Jealousy is  related to  
level  of  perceived 
partner  and own 
commitment  to  the 
relat ionship at  that  
moment in  t ime.  
Has no explanat ion 
for  why some people 
might  perceive less  
commitment  from the 
partner  where there 
is  commitment  ( i .e . ,  
delusional  bel iefs  
about  the partner) .  
Fai lure to  specify 
pathways for  
interact ions between 
emotions,  thoughts  




Theory Theoretical  
Background 
Quality of  
Evidence 





thesis  question 
Consistency,  
Specif ic i ty,  
Temporal i ty  
Plausibi l i ty  Coherence Evidence Components  Processes/  
mechanisms 
 
Cultural   Anthropology Reasonable  
evidence – 
inf luence of  
cul ture .   
Plausible  explanat ion 
for  cul tural  differences,  
low level  of  detai l  and 
evidence for  individual  
variat ion within 
cul tures .   
Coherent  a t  a  
cul tural  level  
of  
explanat ion.   
Anthropological  
and case s tudy 
evidence.   
Jealousy as  
one construct  
variat ion in  
intensi ty  and 
expression.   
Response to  
relat ionship threat .  
Jealous responses are  
related to  both 
individual  differences 
and proscribed 
cul tural  expressions,  
which are  gendered.  
Limited scope in  
relat ion to  this  
thesis’s  quest ions.  
Rel ies  on s i tuat ional  
factors  to  predict  
variat ion in  
responses.  Explains  
suspiciousness  as  a  
funct ion of  the 
environment.  Doesn’t  
explain 
suspiciousness  
unrelated to  context  
( i .e . ,  delusional) .  
Fai lure to  specify 
pathways for  
interact ions between 
emotions,  thoughts  
and behaviours .  
















severi ty.   
Plausible  explanat ion 
for  or igin of  jealousy 
with a  part icular  
re lat ionship not  l inked 
plausibly to  typology,  
no explanat ion of  how 
people develop relat ive 







Correlat ional  
evidence.  
Evidence for  
typology weak.  
Good evidence 
for  threat  to  
rewards.   
React ive,  Self-
generated,  
Preventat ive 
types.   
Response to  
relat ionship threat .  
Individual’s  appraisal  
of  equal i ty/fairness  of  
effort  put  into 
relat ionship and 
relat ive rewards.   
No evidence for  
power differences 
inf luencing 
dependency – main 
causal  mechanism 
proposed.  No 
evidence for  
typology or  i ts  
specif ic i ty.  Fai lure  to  
specify pathways for  
interact ions between 
emotions,  thoughts  




Theory Theoretical  
Background 
Quality of  
Evidence 





thesis  question 
Consistency,  
Specif ic i ty,  
Temporal i ty  







Cognit ive-  
t ransact ional  
Theory of  
Stress ,  Coping,  
and Emotion 
Evidence good – 
neurot icism. Poor 
evidence – other  
personal i ty  
variables/process
.   
Plausible  explanat ion 
for  or igin,  and jealous 
outcomes including 




longitudinal ,  
t ime-series  
evidence.  
Methodology 
used for  
tes t ing 
theoret ical  
processes  not  
sui table .  
 
Contradictory/No 
evidence for  
jealousy trai t .  
Reasonable  
evidence for  l ink 
between jealousy 
and neurot icism.  
Normal and 
pathological   
Jealousy due to  
personal i ty  –  poor 
mental  heal th/ t ra i t  
jealousy.  Response to  
relat ionship threat  
determined by 
primary and 
secondary appraisal .   
Hypothesised process  
not  tes ted.  Tests  
unsui table  for  tes t ing 
t ransact ional  
theoret ical  basis .  
Lack of  detai l  –  
or igin or  nature of  
l ink with poor mental  
heal th .  Fai ls  to  
specify interact ions 
between emotions,  
thoughts  and 
behaviours .  







transact ional  





Li t t le  
evidence/ l imited 
tes t ing of  
process .   
Plausible  explanat ion 
for  or igin,  and jealous 
outcomes including 
irrat ional  jealousy.   
Coherent  –  
only one 
experimental  
tes t .  
Unsuitable  
methodology 
used for  
tes t ing 
theoret ical  
processes   
Reasonable  but  
not  extensive 
tes t ing.   
Normal 
symptomatic ,  
and 
pathological   
Jealousy – a  complex 
due to  person’s  
sociocultural  
past /current  s i tuat ion.  
Rat ional i ty  inf luenced 
by abi l i ty  to  real i ty  
tes t .  Response to  
relat ionship threat  
determined by 
primary/secondary 
appraisal .   
No test ing of  main 
theoret ical  c laim that  
suggested cause of  
i r ra t ional /rat ional  
jealousy – people’s  
abi l i ty  to  real i ty  tes t .  
Tests  have not  been 
sui table  for  tes t ing 
the t ransact ional  
dynamic theory is  
based on.  Fai lure  to  
specify pathways for  
interact ions between 
emotions and 




Theory Theoretical  
Background 
Quality of  
Evidence 





thesis  question 
Consistency,  
Specif ic i ty,  
Temporal i ty  








transact ional  





Li t t le  
evidence/ test ing 
of  process .  
Plausible  explanat ion 
for  or igin,  and jealous 
outcomes including 
irrat ional  jealousy.  
Detai led processes  for  
resul t ing 




longitudinal ,  




used for  
tes t ing 





tes t ing.   
Normal and 
suspicious 
Response to  
relat ionship threat .  
Jealousy – interact ion 
between person and 
environment.  Relat ive 
prior i ty  given to  
exogenous and 
endogenous factors  
determines rat ional i ty  
of  response.  
No effect ive tes t ing 
of  proposed cognit ive 
mechanisms.  Tests  
have not  been 
sui table  for  tes t ing 
the t ransact ional  
dynamic theory is  
based on.  Fai lure  to  
specify pathways for  
interact ions between 
emotions and 





Discussion and Conclusions  
The following sections will further the evaluative comments made above 
regarding the various theories of jealousy. The aim is to draw conclusions as to what we 
can reliably deduce from the body of research about the nature and aetiology of jealousy 
as a whole, with a particular emphasis on suspicious jealousy.  
It is apparent that, in outlining jealousy’s components and giving some 
indication of possible organisation, descriptive theories can be usefully drawn upon to 
inform future structural examinations. However, it is evident that many aetiological 
theories are not supported by research and, as such, the theories should be viewed with 
caution. There is a need for the further development and improvement of theories in 
order to better understand the causal factors of jealousy.  
Whilst a number of explanations outlined above may explain suspicious 
jealousy, there is a need for greater detail in theory about mechanisms that might result 
in jealous outcomes in order to further research those mechanisms/processes underlying 
jealousy, and how such mechanisms/processes interact to impact on the severity and 
duration of jealous thinking. In addition, there is a need for further research to better 
account for the suggestion of psychosis co-occurring with jealousy across normal, 
clinical, and forensic populations. Finally, it is suggested that it would be beneficial to 
develop an integrated framework (i.e., one which includes the wide range of identified 
potential causal factors (see Chapter 2), provides sufficient detail regarding the 
mechanisms involved in jealous thinking, and also provides a rationale for how these 
mechanisms result in the various outcomes associated with jealousy) as a starting point 




reality testing and psychotic tendencies in normal and sub-clinical jealous populations.  
Most theories outlined above agree that jealousy constitutes a perceived threat to 
a valued relationship of a dual nature, relating to both the receipt of rewards (e.g., sex 
and companionship) afforded by the relationship to be under threat, and/or to the self-
concept (in particular, self-esteem). In addition, the range of affect, cognition, and 
behaviours theoretically related to jealousy suggest that it is a heterogeneous 
phenomenon. There is also robust evidence (discussed above) regarding the context in 
which jealousy occurs, and that relational uncertainty is closely linked to the experience 
of jealousy (Bringle, 1988; Knobloch et al., 2001; White & Mullen, 1989). Furthermore, 
what determines an increase in severity is generally agreed upon (White & Mullen, 
1989) as relating to one or more of the following factors:  
• An increase in harmful behaviour to the self or a partner, with a focus on real or 
potential infidelity.  
• An increase in the intensity and manageability of associated affect.  
• The credibility (and bizarreness) of the source or nature of beliefs about the 
partner’s real or imagined infidelity. 
However, to date, there appears to be no reliable evidence as to what causes 
increases in the severity of jealousy. Additionally, many theories (with the exception of 
Buss’s IMH [1992], and research in the area of sibling rivalry and insecure attachment) 
have not led to research being conducted, and therefore remain unsubstantiated. 
Furthermore, to date, no theories have been developed that integrate all empirically 
substantiated factors. The failure to specify pathways for and interactions between 
affective, cognitive, and behavioural outcomes related to jealousy means that we do not 




anxiety and cognition interact with situational factors to produce jealous outcomes. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, psychologists have not sufficiently explained or 
theorised the relationship between psychotic disorders (which frequently co-occur with 
jealousy, see Chapter 2) and irrational thinking in jealousy.  
Whereas the IMH is well supported by adequate empirical research, most 
jealousy theories suffer from insufficient and inadequate testing of their suggested 
mechanisms; empirical tests of these theories are almost always assay-type correlational 
research of potential risk-factors for jealousy. This kind of research is inadequate for 
testing the causal mechanisms that these theories describe, therefore conclusions about 
the adequacy of each theory are difficult to make. However, despite the above 
limitations, it is suggested that psychologists could build upon the strengths of the major 
theories discussed above in order to construct a more comprehensive, explanatory 
theory of jealousy that includes greater elaboration of the differences in patterns and 
outcomes between rational and irrational forms of jealousy.  
It may be better to consider most suggested causes of jealousy as potential risk 
markers that need further organisation into an integrated model (e.g., Ward & Seigart, 
2008) and testing with sufficiently robust designs to establish temporal precedence. 
Some jealousy models (i.e., White & Mullen’s (1989), and Bringle’s (1991)) by 
incorporating and integrating aspects of biological, developmental, cultural and 
situational factors are sufficiently complex to accommodate multi-causal explanations. 
However, many cognitive theories currently omit developmental and biological 
explanations and their assumptions remain largely untested. In addition, better 




evidence for the currently suggested mechanisms (i.e., sibling rivalry, and insecure 
attachment) is, at best, weak (Clanton & Kosins, 1991; Kosins, 1984). Furthermore, the 
established contribution of evolutionary biological mechanisms to jealousy causation 
has been omitted from multifactorial models; however, it is felt that models would 
benefit from the integration of these mechanisms. In addition, there is a need for greater 
specificity as to how and which psychological vulnerabilities lead to specific behaviours 
associated with irrational jealousy.  
The current theoretical consensus appears to be that jealousy is, structurally, a 
complex of negative emotion, thinking and behaviour. Furthermore, as jealousy is a 
heterogeneous phenomenon, it is likely that multiple factors result in discrete patterns of 
jealousy with different or multiple aetiologies. However, it is unclear how the complex 
is organised and no current jealousy theory adequately explains the phenomenon in a 
way that can account for: different types of jealousy (i.e., normal and irrational); 
potential interactions between affect and cognition; the impact of biological and cultural 
influences; delusional thinking patterns; and the choices made regarding the enactment 
of jealous thoughts. Evidence would suggest that jealousy occurs as a result of a 
complex system of non-linear interactions between biology and environment which are 
yet to be adequately presented within any one theory or model. Whilst theory can be 
seen to map the scope of the phenomenon of jealousy (and related behaviours), it lacks 
explanatory power and appears to have insufficient empirical evidence for many of the 
suggested processes, mechanisms, and structures. It is necessary for theories to present 
more detailed conceptualisations of jealousy’s structure in order to determine distinct 




Theorists have suggested that the focus on pathologising all jealousy has led to 
difficulties in defining the boundaries between normal and pathological jealousy (White 
& Mullen, 1991). Chapter 2 suggests that the difficulty in defining boundaries between 
normal and pathological jealousy may be due to normal and pathological jealousy 
forming a continuum related to escalating psychosis-like symptoms, and therefore that 
any boundary is not clear-cut. As such, it may be important to develop a model of 
jealousy that acknowledges any potential cumulative dimension. 
There is a consensus that suspicious jealousy relates to irrational thinking and 
beliefs; however, it is suggested here that irrational jealousy may differ from paranoia 
only in content rather than form (see previous chapter). Clinicians and researchers alike 
have highlighted the presence of irrational thinking in jealousy (e.g., Bringle, 1991; 
Shepherd, 1961; White & Mullen, 1989); the frequent co-occurrence of paranoia or 
psychotic processes and jealousy comorbidity (Studies 3, 4 ,7, 9, 10, & 14; Chapter 2); 
and the frequent co-morbidity with diagnoses that also have psychotic symptoms 
(Soyka, 1991; Soyka & Schmidt, 2011). Where theory does mention and attempt to 
explain jealous cognition, there is a paucity of empirical evidence with which to support 
or reject hypotheses. Furthermore, despite the overlap between paranoia and jealousy 
described above, jealousy theory does not detail how these phenomena might be linked 
when explaining how irrational thought processes arise and are maintained.  
There is no published theory that maps all factors thought to be associated to the 
domain of jealous cognition. More specifically, despite evidence relating to the 
relationship between psychotic processes and suspicious jealousy (reviewed in the 




related to psychotic processes. The adequacy of jealousy measurement scales available 
to psychologists are a key limitation on the ability to determine the content of jealous 
cognition. If scales do not include the full range of factors then it will not be possible to 
ascertain, for example, links to psychotic processes.  
In explaining jealous cognition, most theories focus on the more ‘normal’ types 
of jealousy and therefore give no explanation for suspicious thinking that is found in 
more pathological types of jealousy. It is suggested that this is due to most theories 
being based on economic models and using student or community samples. Those 
theories that do suggest potential mechanisms are not comprehensive in their 
explanations. For example, Mathes’ cognitive theory details a process by which affect 
and cognition lead to behavioural outcomes, but it does not suggest which situational 
factors lead to which specific behavioural outcomes, and Bringle’s transactional theory 
theorises about both normal and suspicious jealousy but only offers rudimentary 
specification as to how these might differ from each other. In addition, Knobloch et al.’s 
(2001) theory of relationship development provides details regarding the relationship 
contexts in which jealousy might occur; they suggest that ambiguity regarding 
relationship status or continuation is an important factor in jealous cognitions. However, 
the theory does not go beyond this to detail further mechanisms.  
There appear to be only two theories that provide details of specific cognitive 
mechanisms that produce differences between thoughts in normal and suspicious 
jealousy. The first (White & Mullen, 1991) suggests differences in primary and 
secondary appraisal resulting in differences as to how reality is perceived. However 




problematic jealousy might result from cognitive bias or distortion, whereas normal 
jealousy does not. The other theories, whilst describing normal and pathological type/s 
of jealousy, do not appear to give a coherent or sufficiently detailed account of 
mechanisms or processes by which suspicious thoughts are generated, maintained, or 
decay.  
Five cognitive mechanisms are proposed by jealousy theories as playing a role 
in jealousy: elevated sensitivity to interpersonal threat (Bringle, 1991); cognitive bias 
and systematic error (Bringle, 1991); reality testing capacity (Dutton, 1994); thought 
rigidity (Mullen & White, 1989); and misperception of partner motives (Buunk, 1984; 
White, 1981). These cognitive processes are of particular interest as they are also central 
to paranoia (Bentall et al., 1991; Bentall et al., 2001; Freeman, 2007). However, despite 
cognitive theories having proposed a number of testable hypotheses, i.e., the five 
mechanisms identified above, there is very little evidence supporting the involvement of 




Table 11. Summary of hypothesised cognitive mechanisms, related affect, and any research that tests these.  
Theoret ical ly  suggested 
mechanism  
Current  support ing research  Findings Weaknesses 
Threat  percept ion (Bringle ,  
1991;  Mullen & White ,  
1989) 
Perceived threat  Rydell  e t  a l .  (2004) Both induced threats  to  self-esteem and negat ive 
social  judgements  of  relat ionship compatibi l i ty  
increased jealousy.  
Very small  sample,  predominantly  female 
 Threat  percept ion 
& ambiguity  
Cohen et  a l .  (2014)  Ambiguous onl ine messages to  a  potent ia l  
romantic  r ival  increase negat ive emotion,  jealousy 
and intent ions to  confront .   
Uses scenario responses 
Self-referencing in  
ambiguous s i tuat ions 
(Bringle ,  1991;  Mullen & 
White ,  1989) 
 NO TEST   
Thought  Rigidi ty  (Bringle ,  
1991) 
Ruminat ion Elphinston et  a l .  
(2013) 
Jealous ruminat ion is  l inked to  relat ionship 
dissat isfact ion.  
SEM (N=199),  using short-form measure of  a  
scale ,  
and la tent  (variables)  consis t ing of  two 
i tems.  
 Over-valued ideas  NO TEST   
Real i ty  Test ing (Dutton,  
1994) 
Real i ty  test ing Dutton (1994) Those with higher  borderl ine personal i ty  
organisat ion scores  also had higher  jealousy 
scores  and higher  levels  of  problems with real i ty  
tes t ing.  
This  is  a  cross-sect ional  s tudy not  
specif ical ly  designed to  test  l inks between 
jealousy and real i ty  tes t ing.  
Interpersonal  Sensi t ivi ty  
(Bringle ,  1991) 
Sensi t ivi ty  to  
cues 
Sobraske (2014)  Shows variat ion in  jealousy cue sensi t ivi ty.   Test  of  funct ional  hypothesis  of  IMH, males  
were tes ted for  sensi t ivi ty  to  gender  specif ic  
r ival  cues,  compared to  potent ial  mates  of  
higher  mate value.  
Negative Emotional i ty  (Bringle ,  1991)  
 Negative 
emotional i ty  
Gehl  (Thesis  IOWA) Depression and anxiety increase as  jealousy 
severi ty  and intensi ty  do.  
Unpublished,  not  peer  reviewed.  
 Depression Mullen and Maack 
(1985) 
Depression is  present  in  over  half  the cases  of  





One of the main aims of this review was to understand the role and nature of 
irrational and suspicious thinking in jealousy. It seems likely that the combined 
influence of a number of weaknesses in theory have resulted in two main issues. Firstly, 
the dearth of research on thought disorders and non-delusional psychotic thinking in 
jealousy (i.e., where jealousy delusion is not the primary diagnosis), and secondly the 
absence of theory that explains the thought disorder/psychosis continuum in those 
displaying moderate/normal/subclinical jealousy.  
Despite psychosis being proposed as a reason for jealousy in early psychiatric 
explanations (Freud, 1925; Jaspers, 1910; Kraeplin, 1910), thought disorder, psychosis, 
or paranoia have only received a very limited amount of attention from jealousy 
researchers. In situations where there is no primary delusional diagnosis, psychosis or 
thought disorder, psychosis has extremely rarely (Marazitti et al., 2003a, 2003b, 2010; 
Soyka & Schmidt, 2011) constituted a potential explanation for irrational jealousy – 
remaining firmly as an explanation for only very disorganised, delusional types of 
jealousy. Psychologists have predominantly studied jealousy as a mediating or predictor 
variable for relationship quality or outcome without making a distinction as to its 
rationality, and detailed explorations of irrationality have been ignored in most jealousy 
research. The most prolific theories (in terms of research generated) are felt to be the 
IMH and categorisation by adult attachment subtype. However, neither offer a 
perspective on suspicious aspects of jealousy; it is outside the scope of the former (with 
its focus on gender differences) and the latter has no supporting evidence for its claims.  
A number of features of suspicious jealousy appear to be more consistent with a 




mood or behaviours associated with jealousy by implicitly or explicitly attributing the 
cause of suspicious jealousy to discrete mental health diagnoses. This potentially 
inaccurate attribution is perhaps responsible for an absence of suggested mechanisms to 
explain why irrationally jealous individuals display various indicators of psychotic 
thinking in varying degrees of intensity. In addition, the attribution could have led to the 
omission of the suggestion that conditions typically co-morbid with psychosis are also 
present in those with jealousy, and that increasing psychotic symptoms are linked to 
increasing jealousy severity (see Chapter 2) across a wide range of diagnostic 
categories, and across different populations (i.e., community, clinical, sub-clinical, and 
forensic).  
Continuum theories of psychosis have been tested empirically and there is 
evidence that, for example, schizotypy and sub-clinical levels of psychosis frequently 
occur on a continuum in the general population (Bentall et al., 1988; Claridge, 1972, 
1987; Johns & van Os, 2001). Unlike more recent theories of persecutory ideation and 
psychosis in general (e.g., Bentall et al, 1988; Freeman, 2007; Johns & van Os, 2001), 
current jealousy theory is lacking in explanatory detail, e.g., Marazitti et al. (2013) and 
Soyka (1995) (i.e., using simple linkage to mental health diagnoses), which limits its 
capacity to produce a cohesive framework and testable hypotheses for research on mild 
and moderate forms of suspicious jealousy in normal, sub-threshold, and subclinical 
groups. It is suggested that theories of jealousy should include a clear description of the 
mechanisms involved, and clear explanation for the relationship of psychosis-like 
symptoms, and suspiciousness to jealousy. 




emotion and how this interaction motivates an individual’s behaviour (e.g., Ochsner & 
Gross, 2005; Sloman, 1987). In the broader field of psychology, negative emotion has 
also been suggested to cause thinking errors, i.e., people who feel inadequate, 
oversensitive and insecure make systematic errors in their perception and interpretation 
of events (Tarrier et al., 1990). Despite the presence of various negative emotions 
related to jealousy (which form part of many jealousy definitions), theories of jealousy 
do not include detail of how emotion and thought interact; an omission that may result 
in the failure of theories/models to effectively explain the escalation and entrenchment 
of suspicious thinking, partner surveillance, and/or aggressive jealousy-related 
behaviours. It is suggested that jealousy theory has, perhaps, fallen behind advances in 
the understanding of psychotic mechanisms that suggest, on the basis of robust 
experimental evidence, that negative emotion (specifically anxiety) is causal in the 
escalation of irrational thinking in psychotic states (Freeman & Garety, 2004; Freeman 
et al., 2002, 2006).  
Future Research and Development  
The above critique of published theories of jealousy suggests a number of 
developments that could be made in the area. There is a paucity of research on jealous 
cognition despite, nearly three decades ago, several key authors identifying potential 
areas where research could improve understanding of underlying mechanisms of 
jealousy. These include areas such as: thinking biases; faulty cognition; causal factors 
that influence threat appraisal; factors that differentiate threats to self (esteem) and 
threats to relationship (Mullen & White, 1989); reasoning in situations of relational 
ambiguity (Bringle, 1991); and reality testing (Dutton, 1984; White & Mullen, 1989). 




researched in relation to emotional distress and anxiety. It is the view of the author that 
the area would benefit from research using more robust designs than existing research, 
for example using comparison groups, experimental, and time-series research. This 
needs to take place in order to better investigate mechanisms/processes suggested by 
jealousy theories, and to further develop existing relational models of jealousy.  
It is suggested that, in order to avoid the aggregation of many likely causes 
under the umbrella of mental ill-health or disorder, it would be useful for researchers to 
view irrational thinking and paranoid processes in jealousy as potentially discrete. 
Therefore, research needs to be carried out to explore whether the systematic thinking 
biases suggested to underlie suspicious thinking (e.g., Freeman, Pugh & Garety, 2008) 
and indicative of a continuum of psychosis-like symptoms in the general population 
(van Os et al., 2008) are present during interpersonal conflict (where we can anticipate 
increased anxiety and distress), and furthermore, to determine whether these biases also 
relate to jealousy and how they influence relationship outcomes. Such research should 
include those specific thought biases, e.g., self-referencing of ambiguous cues, selective 
abstraction, and over-generalisation of isolated events, that have been hypothesised to 
relate to jealousy (Bringle, 1991). It would be of interest to see whether such biases 
were present in general (i.e., non-abusive) couple conflict, and how they are managed. 
Furthermore, it is considered to be important to explore the role of intuition in normal 
couple conflict and how threat detection differs in situations where one or both of the 
partners are irrationally suspicious. Lastly, it would be important to understand the role 
of emotion in the escalation of irrational thinking in interpersonal conflict, and how 
thought and emotional interactions evolve in these situations. In order to explore and 




benefit from further qualitative research using in-depth analytical techniques.  
Furthermore, the field lacks detail regarding jealousy’s structure. Jealousy has 
been explored predominantly as though it were a common set of symptoms (where 
irrational jealousy is related to the individuals having a particular type of mental illness 
or disorder), but seemingly without a robust evidence base for this suggested 
homogeneity. Furthermore, proposed jealousy types (outlined in the models reviewed 
above) may be a method artefact, due to the near exclusive use of factor analysis on 
groups of restricted range. As Mullen (1991) suggests, methods other than factor 
analysis should be used to explore the elements that constitute the construct and the 
structure of jealousy. Theories of jealousy have been developed within separate 
disciplines (i.e., psychiatry and psychology) on the basis of evidence from different 
participant groups (the former on the basis of clinical case study and observation and 
the latter largely with community or student samples). As such, theories lack a 
comprehensive, convincing explanation as to the mechanisms/processes underlying 
‘normal’ and suspicious types of jealousy and specific related cognition and behaviours. 
By using solely dimensional explanations, most theory fails to adequately account for 
the notion (see Chapter 2) that jealousy may also form a continuum or spectrum 
whereby sub-clinical psychotic ideation may be present and explain the co-occurrence 
of paranoia and jealousy in community and forensic samples (Capaldi et al., 2012; Stith 
et al., 2004), irrational jealous thoughts, and some types of problematic jealousy.  
It is evident that there is a need for a more comprehensive analysis of the 
structure of jealousy, the related feelings, thoughts and behaviour, and the potential 




clinical samples. This review highlights that jealousy comprises a number of different 
facets, and that we might expect to see these facets represented as a hierarchical 
continuum or a number of continua representing underlying latent cumulative 
dimensions. Furthermore, there is a need to explore these by using techniques other than 
factor analysis, such as multidimensional scaling (MDS) and principle component 
analysis (PCA) (White & Mullen, 1989) in order to reveal further detail about the 
organisation and intensity of different facets of jealousy. If it can be assumed that 
jealousy has a cumulative, hierarchical structure, we would anticipate that structures 
would emerge that are indicative of a continuum, similar to those found in schizotypy 
(Kidd et al., 1998), psychosis, and psychopathy.  
Theory Development 
In addition to the need for further research (as outlined above), there is also a 
need for further theory development in order to integrate research findings and provide 
additional testable hypotheses. It is suggested that future theories are integrative (e.g., 
see Beech & Ward, 2004) in order to provide a fuller explanation of jealousy. It is 
further suggested that theories need to include the potential underlying psychotic 
dimension of jealousy, and that authors attempt to explain how emotional distress, 
anxiety and irrational thinking might interact to escalate the rigidity, severity, and 
frequency of jealousy experience and expression. It also appears probable (see Chapter 
2) that neurosis and psychosis are likely to interact to play a part in the escalation of 
irrational thinking in jealousy; this issue should be taken into account in the 
development of jealousy theory. 
In conclusion, whilst making an invaluable contribution to understanding many 




behaviours), individual theories have failed to adequately integrate and explain all 
facets of jealousy and to identify factors that differentiate between normal and 
pathological jealousy (White & Mullen, 1991). The cognitive processes involved and 
explanations for the role of erroneous, suspicious thinking in jealousy are frequently 
insufficiently detailed or have not received adequate empirical testing. Therefore, there 
is a need for further empirical tests to be conducted to substantiate claims made by 
authors of theories in relation to the mechanisms they suggest are responsible for 





CHAPTER 4: THE STRUCTURE OF JEALOUSY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO 
PARANOID IDEATION  
When developing and testing a theory it is important to begin by examining the 
content (Roskam, in Borg, 1979, p.183) and structure (Canter, 1985) of the 
phenomenon. There are multiple, previous classifications of jealousy, and it has been 
associated with a wide range of constructs (see Chapters 2 & 3). However, as detailed in 
Chapters 2 and 3, theory and evidence related to jealousy is unclear, and what 
constitutes and causes jealousy, and its latent structure are not well understood and are 
contested. As evidenced by the numerous definitions, typologies, and classifications. 
This chapter will describe an empirical exploration of jealousy’s underlying structure 
using multidimensional scaling.  
Whilst, classification is frequently the first stage in understanding a 
phenomenon, and the various things that constitute it (Guttman, 1974). There remains a 
lack of agreement about what differentiates pathological and normal jealousy or indeed 
if they are different kinds and what processes or features distinguish adaptive from 
pathological jealousy. A detailed analysis of the structure of jealousy and its 
components, may lead to a better understanding of the scope and inter-relationship of 
the various components, and any processes involved in the escalation of its intensity. 
Consequentially, the relationship of jealousy’s structure to theory, may help to 
understand both variation in intensity and type and potential causes of jealousy and may 
enable better clinical interventions and more comprehensive measures to be developed. 
Jealousy has been understood as a unidimensional (e.g., IJS; Mathes and Severa, 




1989). Recent work (Lima et al., 2017) speculating that it might be dimensional, 
suggests that jealousy’s structure is still contested. It is currently unclear which of these 
viewpoints accurately represents jealousy and there is little empirical evidence as to 
whether jealousy has a categorical or dimensional structure or a combination of these. 
Previous attempts to understand the structure of jealousy using factor analysis 
have suggested differing structures, e.g., five factors (Marazitti et al., 2010): obsessive, 
paranoid, interpersonal sensitivity, self-esteem, abandonment fears, based on items 
generated by the researchers using diagnostic criteria from The diagnostic and 
statistical manual of mental disorders (4th ed.) (DSM IV; American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994). Alternatively, six-factors distinguished by differing threat source 
were suggested (Mathes & Severa, 1981), two factors related to attachment style, 
(Dutton, van Ginkle, & Landolt, 1996); or three types reactive, anxious and possessive 
(Barelds & Dijkstra, 2006). Each of the proposed structures has been reviewed in depth 
in Chapter 3 and therefore an analysis will not be repeated here. Furthermore, there is an 
ongoing debate about what discriminates normal and pathological jealousy (see Chapter 
3, for a discussion). It is fair to say that there is little clarity about jealousy’s structure as 
a whole.  
It is likely that previous understandings of jealousy’s structure, based on factor 
analysis, are at least somewhat accurate and representative of the universe of jealousy. 
However, factor analysis tends to reproduce structures within the data (observations) 
and therefore to also reproduce the theoretical approach of the author (Guttman, 1982). 
Whereas, a facet approach, by mapping regions, and using multidimensional scaling as 




of the phenomenon (Guttman, 1982; Shye, 1988). There is currently no integrated 
evidence-based framework by which to understand jealousy. The theoretical literature 
suggests a wide number of items might comprise jealousy and it is unclear whether 
current measures comprehensively measure all these aspects, or whether important 
factors/components are omitted. Also, despite previous attempts to map jealousy 
(Sobraske et al., 2013), and therefore describe everything that constitutes jealousy, this 
has not led to more comprehensive scale or theory development.  
Measures are frequently designed to reflect the theoretically proposed 
components and latent structures suggested to underlie them and therefore by examining 
the structures within a number of valid measures of a construct it should be possible to 
determine the validity of theoretically proposed components, and processes (Guttman, 
1974). A number of frequently used measures of jealousy, Bryson’s Jealousy Factors 
(Bryson, 1976;1977); Chronic Jealousy and Relationship Jealousy Scales (White, 1981, 
1984, 1985a,1985b); Interpersonal Jealousy Scale (Mathes & Severa, 1981); 
Interpersonal Relationship Scale (Hupka & Rusch, 1979, 1989), Multidimensional 
Jealousy Scale (Pfeiffer & Wong, 1989), Self-Report Jealousy Scale (Bringle et al., 
1979); and the Survey of Interpersonal Relations (Bush et al., 1988); were subject to a 
review by White and Mullen (1989) and found to have generally poor psychometric 
properties. Subsequently developed measures, e.g., the Questionario de Gelosia 
(QUEGE; Marazitti et al., 2010) have been used in few studies, and therefore 
preliminary evidence about scale quality is available. However, comparison of the 
results of the studies using the QUEGE (Lima et al., 2017; Marazitti et al., 2010; Tani & 
Ponti, 2016) shows that at least one of the sub-scales, interpersonal sensitivity, appears 




encapsulate or describe the items. Also, the factor structure appears unstable and does 
not relate well to the proposed underlying theory.  
Although White and Mullen’s (1989) review is now somewhat old, it reviews 
the psychometric properties of most measures in current use and is therefore included 
here. The review suggests that the poor psychometric qualities of most romantic 
jealousy measures result from multiple causes including: a focus on relationship quality 
rather than jealousy itself, inclusion of items that relate to non-romantic relationships 
(e.g., siblings), and the measurement of envy rather than romantic jealousy. The review 
further suggests that single or few item measures, and those measures that relate to 
conditions antecedent and correlated to jealousy (e.g., Bringle et al., 1983; Buunk, 
1982) also are unlikely to measure jealousy effectively. However, as discussed in the 
following paragraph, few measures do appear to somewhat validly and reliably measure 
jealousy.  
Two scales that measure only jealousy are the Interpersonal Jealousy Scale (IJS; 
Mathes & Severa, 1981) and the Multidimensional Jealousy Scale (MJS; Pfeffer & 
Wong, 1989). The first of these is the most frequently used measure of total jealousy of 
a number of unidimensional measures of jealousy, e.g., (Bringle et al., 1971; White 
1981). The second, the MJS was designed with a dimensional approach in mind, to 
measure three dimensions of jealousy proposed by theory, emotional, cognitive, and 
behavioural jealousy. These two scales have both been judged to have a reasonable 
reliability and validity by White and Mullen’s (1989) review. 
Scale Development  




reliability and structure. However, neither scale structure was empirically derived, e.g., 
by using factor analysis, during development. The following section details 
development, administration and structure of each scale.  
The Interpersonal Jealousy Scale (IJS; Mathes & Severa, 1981) was developed 
as a systematic measure of jealousy for research purposes. Development involved 
generating face-valid items, to result in a 28-item final scale, with each item rated on a 
nine-point Likert scale (from False — with a midpoint of Neither — True). High scores 
indicate higher levels of jealousy. The scale has a good internal reliability (α = .92) for 
both males and females. The initial scale had no reported factor analysis but was later 
validated on 79 married or dating couples (Mathes, Phillips, Skowran, & Dick, 1982) 
which suggested six components: obvious threat, threats from partner popularity, 
untrustworthy partner, old dates, partner’s indifference, and sex differences.  
 Obvious threat susceptibility explained 62.2% of the total variance and relates 
to real threats based on the actions of others or the partner. Threats from partner 
popularity was proposed to relate to threats due to a partner popularity with other 
people including sexual rivals. Untrustworthy partner related to partner behaviours that 
indicated an attraction to other people and that they were likely to be or had been 
unfaithful. Old dates referred to threats related to previous relationships. Partner’s 
indifference is related to the partner’s lack of commitment to the current relationship. 
The final factor sex differences related to gender-based response differences. The factors 
were not used in scale development or to provide sub-scales.  
The MJS (Pfeiffer & Wong, 1989) was developed to measure jealousy as a 




and Buunk, 1985; White, 1984). Scale development involved factor analytic refinement 
of face-valid items related to definitions of emotional, cognitive and, behavioural 
jealousy. Jealousy is understood as partly normative, consisting of thoughts and feelings 
experienced by most people that are designed to either protect the relationship or detect 
infidelity, or alternatively as emotions, thoughts and behaviours that are based on 
conditioned emotional responses, or otherwise as imagined events (paranoia) (White, 
1984). It is suggested that emotional jealousy is a normative response to either realistic 
threats or a is conditioned response, e.g., when a remarried man experiences jealousy 
about his ex-wife’s new partner. Whereas, cognitive and behavioural jealousy are non-
normative. Factor analysis resulted in three proposed factors, each related to the initial 
definitions. The final scale items all had Pearson Item/Total correlations above 0.6. 
Coefficients for each sub-scale were — Cognitive, α =0.92; Emotional, α =0.85; 
Behavioral, α =0.89. Across five studies, the scale was found to be stable and reliable, 
with very good internal consistency (α range .83 – .92) (Elphinson, Feeney, & Noller, 
2011; Lucas, Pereira, & Esgalhardo, 2012; Pfeiffer & Wong, 1989). It is a 24-item 
(three sub-scale) self-administered questionnaire developed for use by researchers for 
measurement of the general population. The scale is divided into three sub-scales, 
emotional, cognitive and behavioral jealousy. Each sub-scale is rated on a seven-point 
scale, as follows: Cognitive (rated from All the time –Never); Emotional (rated from 
Very pleased – Very upset) with high scores indicating high levels of emotional jealousy; 
and Behavioral (rated from Never – All the time) with high scores indicating high levels 
of behavioural jealousy. Unlike White’s (1981) suggestion that jealousy was an 
essentially rational (i.e. based on real threat) sequence of unpleasant emotion, cognitive 




jealousy can have apparently irrational elements, with no set sequence to the individual 
jealousy components which can operate in parallel and interact with one another. 
Principle components factor analysis during scale development revealed three discrete 
factors, each with high internal consistency. The emotional sub-scale explains 11.7% of 
the variance and consists of eight items that measure emotional responses to jealousy 
threats, it is proposed to be composed of two types of emotion that which is due to a real 
threat and that which is a conditioned response, for example, feeling jealous about a 
previous partner. The cognitive sub-scale explains 33.1% of the variance and is 
composed of eight items; it forms a measure of jealous thinking that includes two types 
of thought, (a) that based on the appraisal of real threats, and (b) paranoid thoughts 
based on imagined threats. The behavioral sub-scale explains 13.6% of the variance and 
is composed of eight items that measure two discrete behavioural responses to jealousy 
(which do not have separate sub-scales) (a) detective actions items and (b) protective 
actions.  
In summary, theories on which the IJS and MJS scales are based, suggest that 
jealousy is structured according to personality-related components: emotion, cognition 
and behaviour (Pfeffer & Wong, 1991; White & Mullen, 1989). Furthermore, that there 
is further division on the basis of threat source (Mathes & Severa, 1981) and that 
behaviour is divided into detective and protective actions (Rodriguez, DiBello, Øverup, 
& Neighbours, 2015). Other jealousy theory, reviewed in Chapter 3, suggests that we 
might expect to find distinct regions that represent manifestations of jealousy related to 
different underlying psychiatric conditions (Marazitti et al., 2010). However, on the 
basis of the review described in Chapters 2 and 3, it is more likely that we would expect 




types, (b) that demonstrates a psychosis/schizotypy-like cumulative structure related to 
increasing anxiety (Freeman et al., 2002) and suspiciousness, (i.e. escalation of 
perceived threat where there is a lack of real-world evidence in support of the threat), 
(c) that has divisions related to conditioned responses (related to past experience) and 
(d) that has divisions related to the use of ambiguous cues, (imagined threats, paranoid 
ideation/suspiciousness).  
Theoretical Rationale for a MDS Approach 
Despite competing theories and disagreement about what comprises jealousy, (as 
discussed in Chapter 2), the body of literature points at two general forms, normal and 
pathological. Although, the literature makes frequent reference to personality 
dimensions and subcategories of jealousy, i.e., subclinical typologies, for example 
Marazitti et al. (2010). It is unclear what predispositions, basic evolutionary 
mechanisms, or experiential learning cause increased jealous pathology. However, the 
systematic literature review reported in Chapter 2, points towards a more general 
paranoid dimension underlying some, if not most, presentations of pathological 
jealousy. Jealousy has not previously been explored in relation to established measures 
of clinical or sub-clinical paranoid thinking, and therefore it is not clear if, or how, 
dimensions of paranoid thought might be related to jealousy in the general population.  
The current study proposes to use a number of established jealousy scales to 
explore their construct validly by examining structures within them. Then to determine 
a comprehensive set of elements that reflect both the structure of the diverse scales and 
collectively describe the underlying theoretical elements. Then to identify any 
omissions in the measures current mapping of the domain (Shye, 1988, 1989; Shye & 




general populations, those aspects of jealousy most associated with paranoid thought 
will be identified, to determine if there is a basis for a latent paranoid dimension in 
jealousy. Facet theory (Shye & Elizur, 1994) will be used to identify the pattern of 
correlation between jealousy variables and paranoia variables and inquire whether they 
form a well-defined region in the SSA depicted jealousy space. If these variables are 
indeed related, then by the continuity principle (Shye, 1998, p. 166; Shye & Elizur, 
1994. p. 101), a distinct jealousy sub-space would be identified that is closely associated 
with paranoia.  
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a non-parametric data reduction technique 
with a number of advantages over alternatives i.e., factor analysis (FA) and principle 
component analysis (PCA) (e.g., no parametric assumptions are made, it is applicable to 
ordinal data, Borg & Groenen, 2005). It overcomes several limitations of other forms of 
structural analysis (e.g., factor analysis) such as over-inclusive factors, sensitivity to 
sample characteristics, frequency bias and factor rotation problems of other methods 
that explore structure (Kline, 1999; Nunnally, 1978). MDS is a useful way to understand 
relationships between all items in an analysis simultaneously and uncover the 
underlying psychometric structure, any processes involved and to infer from these the 
interplay between theory and empiricism. Statistical associations are represented as 
geometric distances between variables, where more proximal items/points are more 
related (e.g., Borg & Groenen, 1997; Coxon & Davies, 1982), with points mapped in a 
predefined geometric space, usually two or three dimensions. Interpretation of the 
structure and meaning of regions or facets uses both theoretical and statistical evidence 
and logic (Guttman, 1959). The use of this technique enables examination of 




represent the relationships between items within a Euclidean geometric space that is 
easily interpreted (Bishopp & Hare, 2008). There are many different forms of MDS 
technique, which if not degenerate, produce similar structures (Borg & Groenen, 2005). 
Smallest Space Analysis (SSA) is most suited for creation of robust, structural non-
linear solutions where the items or objects are thought to belong to the same universe of 
objects or items, specifically the same phenomenon or construct (Guttman, 1968).  
The aim is to conduct an exploratory MDS analysis to identify patterns in the 
structure of jealousy and the relationship of structure to prior theory. Specifically, can 
regions be identified that relate to distinct modes of functioning (cognitive, affective, 
behavioural), sources of threat, or that relate to distinct personality pathologies. By 
using a large dataset of measures the aim was to explore the structures within a number 
of concurrent tests aimed at exploring jealousy and its hypothesised relationship to 
paranoia. The results were intended to (a) determine the construct validity of the 
measures, which can be seen as a direct reflection of underlying theoretical elements; 
and due to each scales assessment of slightly varying aspects of jealousy, (b) to identify 
a set of theoretically valid components that provide a comprehensive classification of 
jealousy; (c) to determine to what extent the measures represent the wider theoretical 
literature; (d) to highlight the similarities and difference between aspects of the jealousy 
complex (behaviours/affect/cognitions), as well as identifying any underlying 
dimensions; and finally (e) to compare these similarities, differences and dimensions to 
those of paranoia.  
It is hypothesised that jealousy will form distinct sub-regions related to normal 




thought. Specifically, that when subjected to MDS, variables will parallel those 
observed in the structure of paranoia, with anxiety items being closely related to 
escalation, and with a distinct suspicious region. 
It is also hypothesised that suspicious jealousy will show a closer relationship to 
paranoia than it does to more normal forms of jealousy. An SSA will used to identify 
which paranoia items are more closely related to jealousy. This will be tested with 
reference to facet theory (Shye & Elizur, 1994), to enquire which jealousy items are 
more highly correlated with paranoia items and whether distinct sub-regions are formed 
that relate to aspects of paranoia. If they do, then a distinct content subspace is 
identified that is best associated with suspicious thinking regardless of theme.  
Method  
Participants 
Two hundred and fifty adults (Age range 18-29 years, 224 female) took part. 
Sampling size and power estimates were made using G power (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2007). Participants were undergraduates recruited via the University 
of Birmingham Research Participation Scheme, who received course credit for 
involvement. Consent was gained for each participant prior to scale administration. 
Study procedure and data collection, along with all other research in this thesis, 
followed the Code of Ethics and Conduct of the British Psychological Society (2015) 
and was approved by the Science, Technology, Engineering & Mathematics Ethical 
Review Committee of the University of Birmingham, ERN15-1423 (see Appendix C). 
Measures 




components of jealousy and paranoia. The jealousy measures are described above. 
Measures of paranoia are described below.  
Paranoia Scale.  
The Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) has been one of the most 
widely used dimensional measures of paranoia. It was developed to measure paranoia in 
the general population. Development involved several rounds, with items generated 
initially using the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI; Hathaway & 
McKinley, 1942). Items for each of five aspects of paranoia identified within the MMPI 
were selected and combined with items from several other paranoia scales. The 
resulting 32 items were administered to 144 participants (86 female). Items were then 
eliminated on the basis of item/total correlation, factor loadings, and extreme skew. 
Resulting in a 20-item scale, with a reliability coefficient of α= .84. Factor analysis 
(unrotated) using a sample of 581 complete surveys over 4 studies, revealed two factors, 
but no item loaded more than 0.3 on the second factor. The final scale includes items 
that assess self-consciousness, self-reference and targeting. Items are rated on a 5-point 
scale (1–5), with overall scores ranging from 20–100. Higher scores indicate higher 
levels of paranoid ideation. The Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) is 
unidimensional with a single factor explaining 25% of the variance, which is proposed 
to relate to an underlying factor of paranoiac responses, self-referencing.  
The Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale (G-PTS; Green et al., 2007) was developed 
to explore multiple dimensions of subclinical paranoid. It considers wariness of others 
to some extent as a potentially adaptive trait that should exist dimensionally in the 
population. Development included deriving initial items using author experience, other 




initial 95-item instrument was tested through three surveys, resulting in 353 complete 
surveys of people with no mental illness, and 50 surveys of those with current 
persecutory delusions. The final 24-item scale was achieved through analysis, including 
a PCA, which suggested two factors. Final items were selected for face-validity, 
item/total correlations, inclusion of conviction, preoccupation, distress and ability to 
discriminate between general and clinical populations. Reliability coefficients are 
respectively for general/clinical populations, α=.95, α=.90. The resulting questionnaire 
is self-administered, and measures paranoid ideation, with two sub-scales each of 16 
items. Part A measures ideas of social reference and Part B ideas of persecution, (α =. 
90 in clinical samples; α = .95 in non-clinical samples; test-retest reliability, ICC 
coefficients of .83). Items are rated on a 5-point scale (Not at all—Totally). Higher 
scores indicate higher levels of paranoid thinking. Paranoid thinking incorporates 
subscales of belief conviction, preoccupation and distress. The persecution sub scale 
explains 44.2% of the variance and consists of eight items that refer to beliefs that 
others are intending harm towards the responder and that they are singled out for unfair 
treatment. The self-reference sub-scale explains 5.5% of the variance and consists of 
eight items that refer to self-referent thoughts that the respondent is being observed, for 
example that they are being watched, or communicated with (e.g., given information 
such as hints, double meanings etc…). The scale also shows convergent validity in both 
large clinical and non-clinical samples (Green et al., 2007). 
Procedure 
The questionnaires, were completed by respondents as part of a test battery in 
which demographic data was also collected, the study was completed online using the 




Full item descriptions for the questionnaires with abbreviations used in the analysis are 
available in Appendix E Participants were recruited on a voluntary basis and unless 
participants opted in for a further study (reported in Chapter 6) their responses were 
completely anonymous and confidential. Participants were given a brief explanation of 
the study and then asked to complete each question by indicating their response on an 
online response form. Once completed, the results were collated by the online interface 
into Excel for analysis.  
MDS progresses through several distinct phases of analysis. The procedures and 
the results of each phase are discussed below.  
Data Analysis 
Data generated from the questionnaire responses, were coded according to the 
guidelines in the original psychometric test manual or original authors’ paper. Data were 
screened using Little’s Missing Data (Little & Rubin, 1987) and found to be Missing 
Completely at Random (MCAR), (c2=19455.74, N=250, p=1.000). Missing data (7 data 
points) were then replaced sub-scale by sub-scale by the median trend method (using all 
data for estimation) and means and standard deviations checked to ensure that there was 
no significant difference before and after missing data replacement. Descriptive 
statistics were then generated for each total score and sub-scale score of the included 
questionnaires and compared to previously reported norm scores (reported in Table 12). 
Data were then analysed using smallest space analysis (SSA; Lingoes, 1973). SSA is a 
Non-metric multidimensional scaling (MDS) procedure based on the assumption that 
data represented as Euclidean distances are more readily interpreted visually due to their 




proximity of points in the plot relates to the strength of their association. A non-metric 
model is used as it is assumed that the relationship both between items and between 
participants is not equivalent, e.g., that one person’s response of ‘6’ (1 point less than 
the maximum of 7, Very upset) on item 13 of the IJS scale ‘If my partner were to date 
others I would feel unhappy’, is not exactly the same level and type of emotion and 
therefore equivalent to another participants response to the same question. Also, that a 
participant’s score on this item may not exactly be equivalent to their response of ‘6’ for 
another item within the scale, or when compared to a ‘6’ on another scale.  
SSA represents co-occurring variables, in this study jealousy and paranoid 
thinking, as distances in a low dimensional geometric space. The SSA program 
(HUDAP; Amar & Toledano, 2001) generates relationship coefficients between all 
variables . These coefficients (correlation matrix) are used to generate a visual 
representation of variables with points representing items. Items that are closer to each 
other have higher associations with each other. Items that are further away from each 
other are more dissimilar. SSA represents the ranks of the distance between points and 
the ranks of the relationship coefficients. It captures the relative size of association and 
is therefore appropriate for testing assumptions about dimensions, categories and 
process. Geometric overlap between items is indicative of conceptual equivalence, that 
items are parallel, and therefore redundant (Kline, 1986). 
MDS models have been used productively in a number of areas from 
intelligence (Guttman, 1954), to educational coping behaviours (Ding & Yang, 2013). 
The particular usefulness of SSA is that it represents scores as rank-ordered distances in 




scaled questionnaires, ordinal data, and data that are not likely to conform to parametric 
assumptions (such as paranoid thinking in the general population that is likely to have a 
strong negative skew). MDS models, unlike other factor reduction models [e.g., factor 
analysis, cluster analysis and structural equation modelling (SEM)], give a visual 
representation that indicates the relationship of each dimension to the other, in an easily 
interpretable form and so can give an indication of cumulative latent dimensions, e.g., a 
schizotypy dimension. To test hypotheses about dimensions and structure, the SSA 
configuration is converted from co-ordinates to points on a visual map and the patterns 
between points are examined.  
Scales relating to each construct (jealousy or paranoia) were first entered 
individually, with separate analyses conducted for each jealousy or paranoia scale, 
before analysing all scales together in order to sequentially model and explore the 
variables and therefore constructs. Each analytic phase and the related results are 
reported phase-by-phase.  
Analysis and Results 
Sample Characteristics  
The sample comprised 250 participants (224 females). Who were cohabiting 
(n=12), single (n= 73), in a stable relationship more than 1 month (n=150), dating but 
not cohabiting (n= 14). In the current sample, the persecution sub-scale scores 
approximated those in prior, non-clinical studies using the same measures (Green et al., 
2008). However, the range of scores and overall mean, were elevated for the self-
reference subscale. The mean and standard deviation in clinical samples (Green et al., 




clinical sample which was 26.8 (10.4). For the persecution subscale the clinical groups 
had a mean of 55.4 (15.7) compared to non-clinical group mean 22.1 (9.2). The current 
study shows a higher mean score for the self-reference subscale than that obtained for 
non-clinical samples, and persecutory subscale scores similar to those obtained for the 
non-clinical sample in Green et al. (2008).  
Most sample mean scores (and where available, standard deviations) were 
similar to previous norm groups on each of the measures (see Table 12). There were no 
significant differences between male and female scores. However, t-tests revealed 
significant differences between the sample and the norm groups on the self-reference 
subscale of the G-PTS and on each subscale of the MJS, with elevated scores for both 
male and female subgroups in the sample, with the exception of the MJS behavioral 
subscale for males in this sample (t -test results are reported in an additional table in 
Appendix D).The distribution of scores indicates that there is sufficient variance in 
severity and intensity in each of the measured variables to assume that the sample 
contains participants who represent the full expected range of scores within a 
community sample, with some participants receiving scores within the clinical range. 
That a sub-group of participants show elevated scores on both the G-PTS self-reference 
subscale and the majority of MJS subscales, is consistent with the studies hypothesis 
that elevated paranoid ideation is related to increases in jealous ideation. Norm group 
scores show similar variation and mean scores for both male and female participants 






Amar’s (1997) weak monotonicity coefficient (MONCO) for ordinal data was 
used to identify any non-linear correlations (Amar & Toledano, 1997), which are 
common in social data. Reverse scored items were recoded, and a correlation matrix 
Table 12. Sample scores (compared to population norms for each of the scores).  
Scale (subscale)  Sample scores  Norm scores  (and where avai lable  
cl inical  groups)  
IJS;  Mathes,  Phil ips ,  Scowran,  & Dick (1982),  U.S.  s tudents  
 Male:  M145.42,  (SD  37.45,  range 67-201) 
Female:  M132.24,  (SD33.51,  range 43-224)  
Total :  M133.71,  (SD  34.31,  43-224) 
Male:  M139,  SD35.69  
Female:  M127.04,  SD36.02  
Total :  Not  reported  
MJS; Elphinson et  a l .  (2011) ,  Austral ian s tudents ;  Pfeiffer  & Wong (1989),  U.S.  s tudents ;  Radev & 
Hedrih (2017),  Serbian s tudents   
Emotional  
Male:  M39.69,  (SD4.3,range 34-50)  
Female:  M42.35,  (SD6.88,  range 10-99)  
Total :  M42.08,  (SD6.70,  range 10-99)  
Male:  M26.89,  male;  ) , (SD  & range 
not  reported)  
Female:  M30.30 female ) , (SD  & 
range not  reported)  
Total: Not reported 
Cognit ive  
Male:  M21.19 (SD10.36,  range 8-43)  
Female:  M20.57 (SD10.44,  range 8-56)  
Total :  M20 .63(SD10.42,  range 8-56)  
Male:  M8.40 ) , (SD  & range not  
reported)  
Female:  M8.32 ) , (SD  & range not  
reported)  
Total: Not reported 
Behavioural  Male:  M13.05 (SD4.92,  range 8-27)  
Female:  M17.61 (SD8.55,  range 8-99)  
Total :  M17.18,  (SD  6 .52,  range 8-99)  
Male:  M12.52  
Female:  M14.59  
Total: Not reported 
PS;  Fenigstein & Vanable (1992) ,  UK students  
 
Male:  M39.65,  (SD14.72,  range 20-64)  
Female:  M44.51,  (SD16.52,  range 20-100) 
Total :  M44,  (SD16.38,  range 20-100)  
(95.6 % would be classif ied with some level  
of  sub-cl inical  paranoia)  
 Male (M43.3) ,  (SD  & range not  
reported)   
Female(M42.3) , (SD  & range not  
reported)  
Total :  M42.7 (SD10.2,  range 20-
100) 
G-PTS ;  Green et  a l .  (2008) UK students  and workers ,  c l inical  comparison sample)  
Self-Reference Male:  M30.62,  (SD11.28,  range 16-56)  
Female:  M32.89,  (SD12.36,  range 16-67)  
Total :  M32.66,  (SD12.25,  range 16-67)  
14.8% of this  sample scored above the 
cl inical  mean.  (96% had some paranoid 
thoughts ,  and 84% would be classif ied with 
sub-cl inical  paranoia related to  self -referent  
thought)   
Nonclinical  M26.8 (SD10.4) ,   
Clinical  M46.4 (SD16.4)  (male and 
female not  defined)  
Persecut ion Male:  M23.73 (SD12.12,  range 16-61 
Female:M23.53,  (SD11.15,  range 16-82 
Total :M23.55,  (SD11.23,  range 16-82)  
3 .6% of  the sample scored above the cl inical  
mean (76.4% had some paranoid thoughts ,  
and 58% would be classif ied with sub-
cl inical  paranoia related to  persecutory 
thoughts)  
Nonclinical  M22.1 (SD9.2)   
Clinical  M55.4 (SD15.7)  (male and 




was computed from the coefficients. SSA-1 was then used to create a visual 
representation of the questionnaire items. The coefficient of alienation (Borg & Lingoes, 
1987) indicates how well data fit a particular spatial representation, with higher 
coefficients indicating poorer fit. Guttman (1968) suggests that values lower than .15 
are acceptable. However, Borg (2019) suggests that an acceptable fit will depend on the 
number of items, the error in the data, and the logical strength of the theoretical 
interpretation. It has been suggested that in addition to Borg’s determinants of 
acceptable fit, parsimony is of greater importance than strict fitting criteria (Shye, 
1998). The regional hypothesis (Coombs, 1964) suggests that items with a common 
theme will be found in the same region of SSA space. For all sections of these results, a 
visual representation was partitioned to identify distinct regions that represent 
conceptual, statistical and theoretically related sub-components interpreted on the basis 
of items content.  
Results from Phase One: Jealousy Scales 
1. Interpersonal Jealousy Scale (IJS). The result of the SSA of the IJS is 
presented in Figure 3 in two dimensions. Each point is a jealousy item derived from the 
IJS, (Mathes & Severa, 1981). The closer any two variables are the more likely that 
when a participant responds to one, they will also respond similarly to the other. The 
Guttman-Lingoes coefficient of alienation for a three-dimensional solution is .13 in 12 
iterations, indicating a reasonable fit to the spatial representation of the items 
(Guttman,1968). This coefficient is a measure of how well the analysis fits into the two-
dimensional visual representation of interrelationships between the scale items. Figure 3 
shows a structure with three regions that appear to represent two latent scalar structures.  




(indicated by orange circles in Figure 3). Each of these items is negatively correlated 
with all the other items and together form a separate region. Analysis of the stress per 
point suggested that they add much error to the SSA solution. They seem to refer to 
variables that have been theoretically proposed to relate to jealousy, e.g., insecure 
attachment, but that do not appear to relate well to jealousy empirically. A further likely 
explanation for the misfit is that these items are very ambiguously worded, e.g., 
UncomfParty, rather than only being understood as referring to jealousy could be 
understood as a measure of social anxiety by someone who does not like to be left alone 
in situations with novel people, or GoodExpress might be understood as a level of 
discomfort with emotional expression. A decision was made to remove these seven 
items (marked Ö in  Figure 4, p. 154) from further analyses. Figure 4 shows a 







Figure 3. One by two projection of the three-dimensional smallest space analysis (SSA) of IJS scale 
items. 
This shows four regions segmented by lines and elements within each represented by different coloured 
circles.The upper region relates to items that might be considered normal jealousy. The central region is 
composed of items that relate to pathology and becomes increasingly pathological as it proceeds 
clockwise toward the centre right .The left-hand region represents a number of items that appear to 





Figure 4. One by two projection of the three-dimensional smallest space analysis (SSA) of IJS scale 
items (after removal of attachment and pro-relationship behavioural items items).  
This shows three regions segmented by lines and elements within each represented by different coloured 
circles. The triangular region to the right is related to items that might be considered normal jealousy. 
Both other regions are composed of items that relate to pathology. The top region relates to 
possessiveness and hostility which also appears related to anger. The lower region is related to 
suspiciousness and is also related to anxiety. The starred items in the item legend relate to items removed 
from the scale for the subsequent analysis. 
The regions shown in Figure 4 are partially ordered and possibly dimensional, 
reflecting a sequence that relates to feelings, thoughts and behaviours. The first region 




participants would endorse and are sentiments or conditions where most people who 
desire a monogamous relationship are likely to experience jealousy as a result, and 
relate to situations where there is substantiated evidence related to infidelity. The second 
region marked (nine items) Annoyed/Possess, can be further understood by exploration 
of three separate clusters within it. Three items are found in close proximity to the 
Normal region and might be considered, whilst suspicious, to be more normal as they 
are better evidenced. To the left side of the central region there are six items that relate 
to either felt anger or protective actions designed to prevent loss of a partner. The 
adjacent region Anxious/Suspicious has eight items which form a cluster related to 
anxious emotions and suspiciousness. One item, AdmireIrritated appears to be 
misclassified. This item relates to both angry and anxious affect which may be the 
source of the overlap.  
Table 13. Sub-regions within the main regions depicted in Figure 4. 
Dimension Items 
Suspicious — near normal (3) WrongName, Kissing,and Friendex 
Annoyed/Possessive — anger/protective 
behaviour (6 items) 
Faultfind, Resentex, Possessto, UnhappyPic, 
OthrPossess, LitupUnease 
Anxious/suspicious (9) WorkSuspic, HelpJeal, Tkenway, KnowDid, 
InCommonEnv, CloseAngry, OldFriAnnoy, Admire 
Irritated 
 
The horizonal dimension, shows some ordering with decreasing levels of 
concrete evidence in support of a jealous response, as the model progresses to the left. 
In summary, it suggests a scalar structure that is both dimensional and cumulative, 
which varies according to the concreteness of evidence used and the type of affect 





Figure 5. Three-dimensional smallest space analysis plot of MJS scale items.  
This shows three distinct regions represented by different coloured circles. Normal/emotional jealousy at 
the bottom left. An area related to cognitive/suspicious jealousy that starts at the bottom right and 
becomes increasingly pathological as it ascends toward the top left, and a region related to behaviours 
associated with jealousy toward the top left.  
2. Multidimensional Jealousy Scale (MJS). The Guttman-Lingoes coefficient 




three regions of eight items each related to the scale author’s proposed sub-scale 
structure. Items contained in the emotional region relate to instances with substantiated 
evidence for a partner’s involvement with another, increasingly abstract evidence is 
used as the basis for a jealous response as the points ascend to the right. The cognitive 
sub-scale includes items that relate to suspicions about a partner’s involvement with 
another that have little or no basis in concrete evidence. The cognitive sub-scale can be 
subdivided into separate sub-regions that each contain four items, detailed in Table 14, 
which relate to Distress and Preoccupation. The behavioural region is not organised as 
predicted by the theoretical model and separate detective and protective behavioural 
clusters could not be identified.  
Table 14. Items in the MJS organised by dimension. 
Dimension Items 
Distress:  SuspectCrazyAbout, WorryOtherChase, 
SuspectAttract, SusptClose 
Preoccupation WorrySmeSeduce, SuspPhys, 
ThinkOtherIntrst,ThinkSecrtDev 
 
3. Jealousy: Combined Scales. The Guttman- Lingoes coefficient of alienation 
for a two-dimensional solution was .14 in 20 iterations, indicating a good fit to the 





Figure 6. Two-dimensional smallest space analysis of All Jealousy scale items. 
(there is a region represented by circles in the bottom right corner that relates to normal jealousy. The 
outlying circles in the lower left, and upper right and left. quadrants represent items are directly linked to 
the participants experience. The overall shape indicates a that jealousy has a four-dimensional structure. 
The shape and organisation partially replicate the underlying latent structure found in both the IJS and 
MJS scales. The IJS has a dimension that relates to possessiveness, hostility and anger that is not 
measured in the MJS. The MJS has items that relate to suspicious thought and anxiety that is not 
measured by the IJS. 
 
 The scalogram in Figure 6 suggests jealousy’s structure is both cumulative and 
dimensional. Normal jealousy items from both scales lie in the lower right-hand 
quadrant of the figure as the indicated. The jealousy process then appears to progress 
through possessiveness and angry responses (lower left quadrant) to increasing anxiety 
and suspiciousness (upper left quadrant), which in turn, appears to progress to jealous 
behaviours and threats (in the upper left quadrant). Jealous behaviours form a distinct 




reasonably founded), precede increased negative affect, annoyance and anxiety. These 
items are also proximal to the regions that reflect suspiciousness. In sum, the plot 
suggests a progressive escalation of normal jealousy to suspicious jealousy, that is 
related hierarchically to two types of negative affect: firstly, to anger or annoyance, and 
then subsequently to anxiety. The pattern culminates in jealous behaviours.  
Interestingly, jealousy that relates to past partners is also strongly related to 
protective behaviours, annoyance and hostility, suggesting that those who are jealous of 
previous partners may also more likely to engage in protective or hostile behaviours 
towards the partner. This suggests that jealousy toward past partnerships may be a good 
indicator of pathology.  
Results from Phase Two: Paranoia Scales 
3. Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992 ). The Guttman-Lingoes 
coefficient of alienation for a two-dimensional solution was .15 in 18 iterations, 





Figure 7. Two-dimensional smallest space analysis of Paranoia Scale items.  
This shows a cluster below that relates to people who are not known (strangers or acquaintances) as we 
move toward the left-hand side of the plot items refer to known people and at the extreme left family are 
referenced. Clusters appear to relate to the nature of threat experienced with circles in the lower left 
relating to threats that carry the risk of social exclusion or ostracism. With those on the lower left related 
to surveillance, and the mid left to lack of care and concern from others. The upper left quadrant 
represents items linked to physical threats or insults. The dotted line represents the division into self-
referent and persecutory ideas.  
Figure 7 shows the scalogram for the Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 
1992), the area is sub-divided into two regions, summarised in Table 15, which relate to 
the type of threat perceived and whether the threat is thought to be overt (a direct threat 
to safety or of social ostracism) or covert (a disguised threat). Direct threats identify a 




people or person that the person can identify. Covert threats are threat experiences that 
are concealed from the person and enacted indirectly, and where a specified group or 
person cannot be identified. 
Table 15. Items in the Paranoia Scale organised by dimension. 
Dimension Items 
Direct threats (11 items)  InsultUnkind, Punished, StealCred, NoneCare, 
ParentFault, Soneinfor, JealIdeas, RawDeal,, 
Dislikehelp, Followed, PeopleWatch 
Covert threats (7 items) Useful, NotTrust, BehindBack, Strangers, UnfairMeans, 
HiddenReas, GuardFriend 
 
4. Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale (G-PTS, Green et al., 2007). The Guttman-
Lingoes coefficient of alienation for a three-dimensional solution is .18 in 26 iterations, 





Figure 8. Two-dimensional smallest space analysis plot of G-TPS items.  
Contours mark the discrete sub-scales. Movement towards the centroid (central region) appears to 
indicate increasing pathology, suggesting that persecutory thinking is indicative of greater pathology than 
self-referencing. Areas within the outer circle are marked into a progressive escalation of symptoms. 
 




structure (Guttman, 1954) contained within the plot. Each area relates discretely to self-
reference items (the outer circle) or persecutory items (the inner circle) The lack of 
overlap between items in each scale suggests that there are two related, but discrete, 
sub-components that comprise paranoid ideation. It also suggests that self-referent and 
persecutory thoughts are ordered and reflect increasing severity of psychotic symptoms.  
The plot shows distinct regions related to the conviction, preoccupation and 
distress sub-scales, for both the self-reference and the persecutory sub-scale. The 
proximity of other items not included in the original, conviction, preoccupation and 
distress sub-scales, suggests that other items not originally included in those sub-scales 
may also be related to these dimensions of paranoid ideation. Furthermore, these sub-
scales appear to be more clearly defined in the self-reference region, suggesting that 
these concepts may not relate equally to all types of paranoid thought. Items in the 
centre (persecution) are more highly correlated. Therefore, it is more likely that those 





Figure 9. Two-dimensional smallest space analysis plot of combined PS & G-PTS items.  
Items related to self-referent thought (in the upper region) and persecutory thought (in the lower region) 
form distinct regions, for both scales. N/A relates to items in the PS which could not be classified as 
either self-referent or persecutory. Each scale is represented by different sized dots, to aid identification. 
5. Combined paranoia. Stress–1 for a two-dimensional solution is .112 in 168 
iterations, indicating a good fit to the spatial representation of the items (Kruskal, 1964). 
The plot in Figure 9 shows a great deal of overlap in items in the combined paranoia 
scales. This suggests that items within these scales are measuring the same aspect of 
paranoia. However, the plot separates into two clear regions. The items present a 
potentially cumulative structure, whereby less frequently endorsed items are positioned 
toward the upper left of the plot and more frequently endorsed items in the lower area. 
This plot shows many redundant items (overlap indicates measurement of the same 
concept, Kline, 1986). Therefore, for ease of interpretation only the G-PTS items are 




identified sub-components over different intensities and severities (see Figure 9).  
Results from Phase Three: Combined Jealousy and Paranoia Scales 
The Guttman-Lingoes coefficient of alienation for a three-dimensional solution 





Figure 10. Two-dimensional amallest apace analysis plot of jealousy and paranoia items.  
The Guttman ‘horseshoe’ suggests a cumulative process which is demarcated into progressive regions, from ‘normal’ jealousy through a cumulative process (top left) to 
invasive behaviours (top right).The dimension is marked by an escalation of symptoms and pathology, which appears to progress via anxiety. This suggests that jealousy has a 
cumulative structure and also that escalating suspiciousness is closely related to paranoid ideation. (It was not possible to include all item labels due to space restrictions, 









The plot in Figure 10 forms a Guttman ‘horseshoe’, indicating a single 
cumulative dimension that has been compressed into two dimensions (Guttman, 1957). 
The ‘horseshoe’ is composed of regions of items which indicate a dimensional, 
cumulative structure . Increases in jealousy are related to both experiences of negative 
emotion and decreases in the level of evidence. (Figure 11 shows magnified items that 
are obscured in Figure 10. to allow easier viewing). Each region shown on the plot is 
described sequentially in greater detail in Table 16. Further explanations of these 
relationships follow in the next section. 
The Process of Jealousy Escalation  
A summary of each region, sub-region, and individual item labels are given in 
Table 16. The first region, Normal/Mate-guarding, includes items that relate to jealous 
expression where there is substantial evidence of infidelity or threat to the relationship. 
Subsequent regions relate to increasing Unease, where there is increasing anxiety and a 
sense of unease with the partner’s behaviours. Unease appears to be based on more 
minor evidence compared to the prior Normal jealousy region. The subsequent area 
Annoyed/Possessiveness is comprised of items which are closely related. Therefore, 
people who endorse one of these items are also likely to endorse the others and to 
engage in any related behaviours. The items relate to feelings of annoyance and hostility 
toward rivals and possessiveness toward the partner. The density of items suggests a 
close relationship between angry feelings, possessiveness and hostile sentiment. The 
Anxious/Suspicious region contains items related to anxious concerns about a partner’s 
fidelity, suspiciousness about other’s honesty, perceived threat from a rival’s approach 
to the partner, or from a mate’s attraction to a rival. The the associated behavioural 
items representing protective actions (Rodriguez et al., 2015) that involve interrogation 




potential rival.  
The penultimate region Inquisitive combines anxiety about partner attraction to 
others, and threats from potential mates. Items are not related to concrete evidence of 
infidelity. The other items in this region, relate to detective behaviours (Rodriguez et al., 
2015) designed to detect or prevent infidelity, e.g., surprise visits in order to ascertain 
who is with the partner. Inquisitive behaviours are closely related and appear in the 
same dimension. demonstrates a close relationship between self-referent beliefs and 
protective behaviours. The most closely related paranoiac thoughts refer to ostracism, 
social exclusion, and relate to preoccupation—being unable to dismiss upsetting or 
worry thoughts. There is much overlap between persecutory items, which indicates that 
many of the items in the scale are redundant and therefore should be removed.  
Invasive. This region forms a cluster of jealous cognitions and detective 
behaviours, designed to determine if a mate is unfaithful (Rodriguez et al., 2015). The 
close association indicates that suspicions that a partner is involved in an intimate 
relationship are likely to co-occur with detective behaviours. Furthermore, these ideas 
and behaviours represented by these items are more closely related to persecutory 
ideation, in particular to belief conviction, certainty and surveillance ideas, than to 
normal mate guarding. 
Table 16. Items in each dimension of the combined jealousy and paranoia scale, by sub-dimension. 
Region Sub-region Items 
Normal/Mate-guarding.  
 
 The first region includes six items 
OtherDate, HugKiss, Flirting, 
OtherTryCl, UnhapDate, Faithful that 
relate to jealous expression where there is 
substantial evidence of infidelity or threat 
to the relationship.  





Region Sub-region Items 
Annoyed/Possessiveness (12 items) 
 
Annoyed CloseWork, FriendEx, SmileFriendly, 
LitupUnease. AdmireIrr, WrongName, 
CloseAngry  
 Possessive Possessto,,OherPossess,ThinkOtherIntrst, 
UnhapPic, OldFriAnnoy. 
Anxious/Suspicious, (9 items)  Suspiciousness (5 
items) 
Resentex, InCommonEn, , SusptAttract, 
WorryOthrChase, WorrySmeSedce 
 Protective 
Actions (4 items) 
FaultFind, KnowDid, JoinIn, QstnWhere, 
Inquisitive( 8 Items)  Anxiety and 
partners attraction 
to others (1 item) 
HelpJeal, WorkSuspic, NotSeemed, 
UpsetBehind, ThinkGoss,  
 
 Threats from 







 Self-referential (8 
Items 
 
Invasive (8 items).  Ideas related to 
partner’s serious 
involvement with 






QustnPhone, UnexpectCall, HndbgPoc, 
SurpriseWho 
 
Table 16 shows items within each overlapping cluster described in Figures 10 
and 11. There was overlap in five clusters where distinct items could not be established 
in the scalogram. Cluster 1 consisted of 10 items which all relate to ideational 
conviction that others are intending harm. Cluster 2 consisted of two items which both 
relate to perceived social ridicule and judgement. Cluster 3 consisted of three items: 
which all relate to preoccupation with perceived intentions of others to distress the 
respondent; Cluster 4 consisted of two items: which both refer to behaviours designed 
to detect infidelity; Cluster 5 consisted of two items which both refer to perceived 




Table 17. Details of items within the overlapping item clusters shown in Figures 10 and 11.  
G-
PTS 
1. Ideational conviction SR10–CertFollowed, P2–DefPers, P3–HaveIntend, P4–
Stared, P6–ConvConsp, P7–SureHarm, P8–DistHarm, P11–
DistPers, P13–PersePlay, P16–AngHurt 
G-
PTS 
2. Perceived social 
ridicule/judgement 
SR2–HeardRef, and SR4–DefLaugh 
G-
PTS 
3. Preoccupation with 
intention to distress 
SR15–WorryIntrst, P9–PreoccUp, P14–FeelBad  
MJS 4. Infidelity detection 
behaviour 





SR6–DroppingHints and SR12–Checkup 
N.B. SR refers to the Self-reference subscale of the G-PTS. P refers to the Persecution subscale of 
the G-PTS, Beh refers to the Behavioral subscale of the MJS. 
Patterns of Co-occurrence. The jealousy process evolves clockwise from 
normal jealousy around the ‘horseshoe’ structure. It is theoretically interesting that the 
cumulative structure progresses through several discrete negative emotions, this 
suggests a significant loss of information pertinent to jealousy escalation when 
measurement clusters negative emotions into a single ‘negative affect’ category. 
Increasing negative emotion such as anxiety, sadness and anger also indicates increasing 
jealousy escalation. Although, it might be anticipated that anger would relate to more 
intense jealous responses, the scalograms indicate that increasing anxiety motivates or 
indicates a more intense response. This follows a cumulative process, with annoyance, 
preceding discomfort, which then precedes anxiety and inquisitional behaviours. There 
appear to be clear dimensions of negative affect, and related behaviours. Whereby, 
worry and increasing anxiety are associated with overt inquisitional behaviours e.g., 
increased questioning. Increasing anxiety is also more related to inquisitional 
behaviours and the self-reference sub-scale of paranoia. More invasive behaviours are 




associated with both increased jealousy and suspiciousness and also increased 
persecutory thought. More covert behaviours e.g., surprise visits and going through 
drawers or personal property are indicative of high levels of jealousy and more closely 
related to persecutory ideas.  
In summary, there appears to be a discontinuity between normal ‘mate guarding’ 
and pathological jealousy that suggests the escalation of jealousy symptoms via a 
psychosis-like process. Jealousy appears to escalate via emotional response. 
Furthermore, it suggests that there is a closer relationship between suspicious thinking 
in both jealousy and paranoia and that these kinds of jealousy are relatively unrelated to 
better evidenced kinds of normal/mate guarding jealousy. With the variables related to 
paranoid ideation and suspiciousness central to the pathological dimensions of jealousy, 
there is much overlap between cognitive jealousy and suspicious and self-referent 
aspects of jealousy.  
Discussion 
Summary  
Despite historical attention to jealousy in relation to paranoia (e.g., Freud, 1923), 
most recent studies and theory have related jealousy to multiple and diverse variables 
(e.g., Buunk, 1997; Hart, 2013; Marazitti et al., 2010). Chapters 1 and 2 suggested that 
there may be an association between jealousy and paranoia. The study reported here is 
the first empirical test to use multidimensional scaling to explore the structure of 
jealousy and test for a latent dimension that may underlie both jealous and paranoiac 
suspicious thought.  
Overall, there is evidence for a normal/pathological divide in the structure of 




with emotional, cognitive and behavioural components. There is, however, no evidence 
to suggest that pathological jealousy is subdivided into clear DSM IV-TR (APA, 2000) 
diagnostic types as Marazitti et al., (2010) suggest. Rather, the process of pathological 
jealousy follows a continuum, resulting in a pattern of escalating severity that is 
psychosis-like. Jealousy appears to have a cumulative process, with increases in 
intensity/severity related to two factors, the level of evidence used to support jealous 
notions (major, minor evidence, ambiguous cues), and to the type of negative affect 
experienced. 
Furthermore, it appears that the emotional, cognitive and behavioural 
typological structure of jealousy is likely subject to some misnaming, as many processes 
revealed in the scalograms as related to suspicious jealousy also involve affect. The 
process suggested by the current analysis indicates that ‘normal’ jealousy relates to the 
level of evidence used to form a judgement and not the relationship to emotion; and the 
cognitive and behavioural subtypes form distinct clusters of both thought and related 
behaviour, and indicate increasing preoccupation and suspiciousness, which eventually 
materialises in action (behaviour). This process is phased, and relates to distinct clusters 
which comprise cognitive, behaviour, and emotional components, and which relate to 
different emotions. The process originates in normal jealousy which appears to be a 
normative response to well-evidenced relationship threat. More minor evidence of 
relationship threat is related to both possessiveness and feelings of annoyance. 
However, subsequent increases in jealousy are related less to annoyance, anger or 
possessiveness but to increased anxiety, suspiciousness, and increasingly pathological 
behaviours.  




jealousy and paranoia space and cover different aspects of jealousy. In conclusion, the 
jealousy space is not represented fully by either scale alone. In particular the IJS does 
not measure behavioural aspects of jealousy well. Whereas, the MJS does not measure 
annoyed/possessive/hostile aspects of jealousy well. Both scales alone are somewhat 
indicative of a cumulative structure revealed by the MDS plots, however the MJS 
appears to more effectively scale jealousy. These findings will be discussed in relation 
to theory in subsequent paragraphs.  
The G-PTS reflects the theorised structure of paranoia suggested by Green et al. 
(2008) with two distinct regions related to persecution and self-reference which are also 
hierarchically ordered, and have distinct clusters related to preoccupation, distress and 
certainty. However, the regions related to the preoccupation, distress and certainty, only 
appear to relate clearly to self-referent ideation. Three regions of the combined jealousy 
and paranoia structure relate to paranoid ideation. Anxiety is related to increasing 
suspiciousness. Inquisitiveness is closely related to self-referent ideas, preoccupation 
and distress and ‘preventative’ behaviours. Finally, Invasiveness is more related to 
persecutory ideation, surveillance, certainty and to ‘detective’ behaviours.  
Finally, and most importantly, the proximity and overlap of items within the 
paranoia scales with suspicious and pathological jealousy items suggests a relationship 
between suspiciousness in both jealousy and paranoia. The identification of this distinct 
suspicious sub-space, comprised of items from both the jealousy and paranoia scales, 
suggests that the paranoia and jealousy scales measure a similar underlying construct, 
namely a single latent psychotic dimension with two sub-divided main dimensions. In 
sum, this suggests that suspicious pathological jealousy is more closely related to 




related to theory and prior research in the following paragraphs and suggestions are 
made for further research.  
The Structure of Jealousy 
The results support a multifaceted notion of jealousy that has four, dimensional 
facets evolving from a distinct normal kind of jealousy. This contrasts with notions of 
unidimensional (Mathes & Severa, 1982), three (Barelds & Dijkstra, 2007; Pfeiffer & 
Wong, 1989), or five factor solutions (Marazitti et al., 2010). In contrast with factor 
analyses of jealousy (Lima et al., 2017; Marazitti et al., 2010) there is no evidence for a 
five-factor solution or distinct regions in the jealousy space that relate to other 
psychopathology such as obsessiveness or depression. 
The findings presented here suggest that normal jealousy results from direct 
relationship threats, e.g., a partner who is dating others or who shows clear interest in 
becoming involved with someone else and reflects an innate preference for a faithful or 
monogamous partner (see Buss et al., 1992; White & Mullen, 1991). Normal jealousy 
therefore has much in common with normal mate-guarding behaviour (Buss et al., 
1992).  
The process described follows a circumplex structure, as do other kinds of affect 
(Russell, 1980), which suggests that normal jealousy, rather than having different types 
that relate to either emotion, cognition or behaviour, is a basic motivation that becomes 
distorted by specific affective (i.e., anger and anxiety) and cognitive processes (i.e., 
suspiciousness). Secondly, severity is not determined by its relationship to either 
emotion, cognition or behaviour, but these three aspects of personality form complexes 
that define stages of escalating jealousy.  




of evidence used, and the specific negative emotion experienced that drive the 
pathological escalation of jealousy. In line with Bringle (1991), findings suggest that 
increases in pathology are related to the use of increasingly ambiguous cues and 
evidence to support jealous ideas. Also, there is a sequenced relationship between the 
types of negative affect and jealousy escalation; first anger and aggression are 
implicated, followed by anxiety which is related to further increases.  
Psychometric Properties of the Scales. 
Both jealousy scales explored have some consistencies in their structure, with 
regions related to Pfeiffer and Wong’s (1989) original factor structure: emotional, 
cognitive and behavioral jealousy. However, whereas the MJS was designed to measure 
multidimensional jealousy as defined by Mullen and Maack (1985) i.e. that emotion, 
cognition and behaviour do not constituted discrete factors, but are aspects of jealousy. 
The original intention of Mullen and Maack (1985), was for the development of a 
multidimensional measure that included emotion, cognition and behaviours. Pfeiffer and 
Wong (1989) appear to have mislabelled the emotional sub-scale, which might have 
been better labelled reactive jealousy as it relates more to a person’s response to the 
level of evidence than to the jealousy’s basis in an emotional response. The findings 
presented here appear to be better aligned with Mullen and Maack’s (1985) original 
theoretical notion, than with Pfeiffer and Wong’s (1989) suggested structure. Whereby, 
jealousy types form complexes of related emotion, cognition and behaviour that should 
be included in measures, rather than being viewed as discrete components. The results 
here suggest that emotion is pervasive and that different emotional sub-types cannot be 
identified.  




single point related to sad affect. Theory suggests that there is a relationship between 
sad and depressed affect and jealousy. Therefore, items related to sad affect appear to be 
omitted from both jealousy scales. The scales also contain no behavioural items related 
to normal and few related to possessive jealousy which theory suggests should be 
included. In summary, neither scale adequately measures the structure of jealousy 
suggested by the results, and they should be revised to include items that measure 
sad/depressed affect, and possessive and normal jealousy behaviours.  
The Relationship of Jealousy to Paranoia 
The structure of paranoia hypothesised by Green et al. (2008) is reproduced in 
the current analysis; more respondents in this student population sample endorse self-
referent items, and fewer endorse persecution items, suggesting that persecutory items 
indicate more severe paranoia. In addition, the findings suggest that suspicious jealousy 
may share a close relationship to paranoia and have a latent psychosis-like process. It 
appears likely that the specific content of thoughts i.e., paranoid or jealous ideas, may 
be less important to the escalation process, than the type of evidence (i.e., major, minor, 
or ambiguous cues) used to support the jealous belief. The relationship of the most 
severe jealousy thoughts and behaviours to the G-PTS belief certainty sub-scale 
supports this claim. Belief certainty has been found to relate to the onset and 
maintenance of paranoid ideas (Garety & Freeman, 1999) and the findings here suggest 
that this may also be the case for more severely jealousy ideation. Furthermore, greater 
severity in jealous ideation and behaviour (as suggested by frequency of item 
endorsement) is related to endorsement of those G-PTS scale items that indicate more 
severe paranoid ideation (Freeman et al., 2019).  




suggested to result in paranoid escalation (Freeman et al., 2002), giving reasonable 
support to the notion that, like increases in anxiety causing increased paranoid ideation 
(Bennett & Corcoran, 2010), this may also be the case for jealous ideation. The process 
outlined here, suggests that this due to raised levels of general anxiety. In cases of 
paranoia it is suggested that individuals misattribute increased anxiety to external 
causes, leading to an escalation of paranoia, increased distress, preoccupation and 
greater certainty (Freeman, Garety, & Kuipers, 2001). The findings here suggest that 
this may also be the case for jealousy. Further support for an anxiety-driven process 
underlying suspicious jealousy is that, like paranoia (Freeman et al., 2001), both anxiety 
and suspiciousness increase in parallel, and escalation results in increased distress and 
preoccupation.  
Although these findings are tentative, the clinical implications of this research 
are that jealous pathology may benefit from treatments that have been found suitable for 
reduction of psychosis, for example anxiety reduction (Freeman et al., 2015) and sleep 
pattern regulation (Freeman et al., 2017). One area where this might prove useful is in 
relation to intimate partner abuse, where jealousy is often problematic but is often not 
treated in relation to mental ill-health or specifically, as suggested here, to increased 
psychosis-like symptoms (for a review of treatment approaches see Arias, Arce, & 
Villariño, 2013). Treatment as such, might prove useful in improving outcomes in 
jealousy-related intimate partner abuse. 
There are several limitations to the current research. Although the sample size 
was adequate, it comprised mainly females who are suggested to have less severe 
jealousy pathologies (Daly & Wilson, 1982, 1988). However, in this dataset both 




the variance in responses is adequate for effective model building (Henricksson & 
Wolming, 1998; Hunter & Schmitt, 1990). However, comparison of the findings with a 
more gender representative sample might be justified. Furthermore, a stratified sample 
including clinical and forensic populations would give more information about the more 
pathological extreme of the jealousy structure as it relates to increased paranoia. A 
further limitation is that these findings are tentative and require replication. Although 
the two scales used had the best psychometric properties of currently existing scales and 
represent the core psychological domains of cognition, affect and behaviour; as 
previously discussed, (see p. 174–5), there are several omissions and weaknesses in the 
scales used and they would benefit from further revision. Therefore, an item-response 
theory approach should be used to improve current jealousy scales. Furthermore, 
although MDS techniques can indicate a cumulative structure (Borg, Groenen, & Mair, 
2013) this requires additional testing to confirm i.e., the use of item response theory 
techniques (see Hambleton, Swaminathan, & Rogers, 1991); and research designs that 
can capture cause and effect processes. Finally, further experimental or in-depth 
research should further explore the suggested psychosis-like process and mechanisms 
in-vivo. 
Conclusion  
Chapter Four aimed to explore the latent structure of jealousy, the 
interrelationship of its dimensions, and its relationship to paranoia. It also explored the 
adequacy, psychometric properties, and overlap between a number of measurement 
scales, in order to further explore the relationship between jealousy and paranoia. The 
findings suggest that it is possible to distinguish normal from pathological jealousy on 
the basis of the level of evidence used to justify jealousy and its emotional content. In 




that is related to psychotic-like symptoms. The following chapter continues the 
systematic empirical investigation of jealousy by exploring further the latent cumulative 




CHAPTER 5. DO JEALOUSY AND PARANOIA GO TOGETHER? AN ITEM 
RESPONSE THEORY ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
JEALOUSY AND PARANOID THINKING  
This chapter using the same data as Chapter 4 builds on the analyses in that 
chapter to further explore the suggested cumulative nature of both paranoia and jealousy 
as indicated by the multidimensional scaling analysis (MDS).The structural analyses 
described in the previous chapter suggest that jealousy may be conceptualized as a 
continuum, and additionally that there may be considerable overlap between paranoid 
ideation and more pathological forms of jealousy. 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, jealousy has largely been treated as a 
categorical latent construct (e.g., Buunk & Dijkstra, 2006; Marazitti et al., 2010; 
Pfeiffer & Wong,1989); however, recent suggestions (Lima et al., 2017) are that it may 
be continuous in nature. MDS analyses in the previous chapter indicate a range of facets 
which collectively explain the phenomenon. However, MDS analyses alone cannot say 
whether or not they collectively form a hierarchical or superordinate dimension. In the 
same way that psychopathy comprises a set of factors which are both dimensional 
(Bishopp & Hare, 2008) and can be considered within a superordinate cumulative 
dimension (Bolt, Hare, Vitale, & Newman, 2004). Pathological jealousy might be 
viewed in a very similar way, albeit with a different set of personality facets, and has 
been examined here within a similar methodological approach. Additionally, the 
previous chapters, Two, Three and Four suggested there may be considerable overlap 
between paranoid ideation and more pathological forms of jealousy. This chapter aims 
to test these assumptions using item response theory . 
As stated in previous chapters, jealousy is frequent in the general population, 




unfounded suspicion about their partner’s fidelity (Mullen, 1991), and often associated 
with partner aggression, controlling and coercive behaviours (Dutton et al., 1996). 
There is current uncertainty in what underlies jealousy in pathological conditions, and 
whether pathological jealousy is a distinct type of jealousy or whether it is a heightened 
form of normal jealousy. On the other hand, paranoia is treated as a distinct construct, 
but as described in Chapters 2 and 3, it appears to display considerable overlap with 
jealousy, that might be indicative of a shared underlying process. In order to identify the 
precursors to and outcomes associated with problematic jealousy, an understanding of 
the constructs underlying it is essential, as well as the relationship of normal to 
pathological jealousy and its overlap with paranoia.  
Jealousy is frequently described as an emotion (Sharpsteen, 1993), or a 
combination of emotion, thought and behaviours (Mullen, 1991). Furthermore, there is 
great disagreement about how many dimensions it consists of, with variation between a 
single dimension and over six dimensions, (see Bringle, 1991; Rydell & Bringle, 2007). 
It seems reasonable to conclude that despite efforts at achieving effective operational 
definitions and measurement there is still a great deal of disagreement about what 
jealousy is and how it is structured. On the other hand, paranoia is generally better 
described in terms in terms of abnormality and mental ill-health, where the sufferer has 
unsubstantiated suspicions about other’s intentions (Bentall et al., 2009) and there is 
also substantial evidence that it exists on a continuum within the population (Johns et 
al., 2004). We might, on the basis of these notions expect jealousy and paranoia to have 
very different structures. However, despite the structure for jealousy that the previous 
literature would predict, it appears likely on the basis of the evidence collated in 
Chapter 2 and the findings of Chapter 4 that jealousy will be structured similarly to 




Although classification and psychometric assessment tools are available for both 
paranoia and jealousy (e.g., Green et al., 2008; Pfeiffer & Wong, 1989). The definition 
and distinction between the two constructs in unclear. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 indicated that 
the true character of jealousy may include an overlap with paranoia. Specifically, 
suspicious jealousy may indicate the presence of an underlying latent psychotic process, 
underpinning both paranoia and suspicious jealousy. Although functional definitions of 
paranoia include distorted thinking about both potential harm to the self and jealousy 
(Bentall, 2003), jealousy is frequently only measured as a single item on paranoia 
scales. For example, the Paranoia/Suspiciousness Questionnaire (Rawlings & Freeman, 
1996) has one item ‘Are you sometimes eaten up with jealousy?’. As a result, it is 
unclear whether some types of jealousy might be classified as a type of paranoid 
ideation. As Freeman (2007) points out in his extensive review of the field, there is a 
tendency to ignore the multidimensionality of the experience of paranoia and a failure to 
define the phenomena in detail. Also, by examining these constructs together, a more 
comprehensive set of elements can be determined from which to theorise. A method 
which would enable this analysis is item response theory (IRT). 
Item response theory is the name of a set of mathematical models, which include 
Rasch Analysis, that are used to create scalar measures from ordinal measures. These 
models estimate of ability (or severity) are independent of the sample characteristics 
(Lord & Novick, 1968). Rasch models were originally designed for use with 
dichotomous data, but the models have been extended to polytomous data (e.g., 
Andrich, 1978; Masters, 1982). Rasch analysis differs from other polytomous item 
response models, as only single parameter difficulty, is modelled. Granger (2007) 
summarises Rasch analysis as a unique mathematical modelling approach to 




of item difficulty and person ability. Rasch analysis is used to transform ordinal scales 
into interval measures that can be used in parametric statistical analysis. Using the 
statistics generated by the model it is possible to decide whether any measurement item 
should be deleted, rescored or reworded. It also enables decisions to be made about cut-
points and sufficient items to be included in a scale. Rasch analysis makes the 
assumption that the amount of a person’s skill or attribute, (Theta, q), and difficulty or 
easiness of any item that measures this skill can be positioned relative to each other and 
therefore measured on a shared latent continuum using a probability model. It further 
assumes that the relative positions of these are invariant (other than any included error) 
as they constitute genuine scalar measurement. Much the same way as we can measure 
the relative temperature of something in degrees Kelvin. Rasch analysis allows rating of 
a reduced set of attributes that represent the underlying trait. Unlike, classical test 
methodology, the more usual type of scaling used in psychology in particular, it does so 
in such a way that the sum of these measures represents how much of that trait has been 
measured. Given disagreement about the structure of jealousy, the understanding of any 
latent processes underlying jealousy, and a lack of understanding of which items in 
jealousy scales in general, and the jealousy scales used here in particular, indicate lesser 
or greater intensity, IRT is well suited to provide information that is not available via 
classical test theory measurement (de Alaya, 2009). Given the sample variation in both 
jealousy and paranoia studies which span, forensic, clinical and general population 
samples the psychometric properties of Rasch-based IRT solutions are particularly 
useful in measuring across samples as the method produces measurement that it scalar 
and both item and person invariant.  
The Current Study 




chapter hopes to further clarify the nature and underlying structure of jealousy, using 
item response theory, which can lend support for whether, or not, these constructs form 
a cumulative structure. An understanding was sought of jealousy in relation to its 
conceptual proximity to paranoid ideation in order to clarify whether this suggests an 
underlying latent process that might explain similarities in both behaviour and cognition 
between pathological jealousy and paranoia. Secondly, the current research sought to 
explore the cumulative nature of jealousy suggested by the MDS analysis. In particular, 
to explore the suggested overlap between paranoid ideation and jealousy. A sub-aim of 
this exploration was to determine if a more comprehensive, yet parsimonious jealousy 
scale was suggested upon analysis of the included rating scales.  
Method  
The sample, the measures used, the administration procedure, and the data for 
this study are the same as those used in the previous chapter. 
Measures 
1. Paranoia. 
The Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale (G-PTS; Green et al., 2007) ), is a self-
administered questionnaire with two sub-scales each of 16 items. Part A measures ideas 
of social reference —mild social concerns, and Part B ideas of persecution —beliefs 
concerning mild, moderate and severe threat (Cronbach’s α = .90 in clinical samples; = 
.95 in non-clinical samples; test-retest reliability, ICC coefficients of .83) and they also 
show convergent validity in both clinical and non-clinical samples. Higher scores 
indicate higher levels of paranoid thinking. 
The Trait Paranoia Scale (PS; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) is a 20-item self-




assess both ideas of self-reference and persecution. Items are rated on a 5-point scale (1-
5), with overall scores ranging from 20 to 100. Higher scores indicate higher levels of 
paranoid ideation.  
2. Jealousy.  
The Interpersonal Jealousy Scale (IJS; Mathes, Phillips, Skowran, & Dick, 1982; 
Mathes & Severa, 1981) is a self-administered 28-item scale that measures romantic 
jealousy.  
The Multidimensional Jealousy Scale (MJS: Pfeiffer & Wong, 1989) is a 24-
item self-administered questionnaire developed for use within the general population. It 
has three sub-scales: cognitive jealousy, which refers to participant worries and 
suspicions regarding partner infidelity; emotional jealousy, which refers to negative 
emotions in response to a perceived threat to a romantic relationship; and behavioural 
jealousy, the investigative or protective actions a person takes in order to minimise or 
eliminate a perceived threat of either real or imaginary relationship rivals. Across five 
studies, the scale was found to be stable and reliable, with very good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s α ranges .83–.92) (Elphinson, Feeney, & Noller, 2011; Lucas, 
Pereira, & Esgalhardo, 2012; Pfeiffer & Wong, 1989).  
Procedure 
1. IRT and the Rating Scale Model. IRT is a statistical framework for 
modelling items from either interval level data or ordinal models with some form of 
monotonicity (Hambleton, Swiminathan, & Rogers, 1991). A specific model that is 
theoretically suited for scales that use discrete categories scored using multiple 
responses e.g., Likert Scales, but where response categories also differ between items, is 




per item and estimation of person parameters.  
2. Assessing PCM Fit. Various methods have been suggested for the assessment 
of fit in IRT models. Despite no perfect solution having been found, several of the 
proposed indices have been found useful for model evaluation (Anderson, Li, & 
Vermunt, 2007). All basic IRT models assume unidimensionality of the latent structure, 
which was tested in the previous chapter using MDS modelling. Rasch models also 
assume the invariance of trait (q) and item (a1, b1) parameter estimates. Hambleton et 
al. (1991, p.64) suggest that it is possible to provide an approximation of these by 
comparison of the parameter estimates of odd and even, and male and female items in 
each scale. If the model assumptions are not violated it is possible to compare the 
predicted and actual estimates (Drasgow et al., 1985) using the robust, ZL statistic 
developed by Drasgow et al. (1985) to estimate person and item fit.  
3. Analytic procedure. Analyses were carried out using SPSS version 24 (IBM, 
2016) and R software, 3.5.2 (2018-12-20) —"Eggshell Igloo", using the eRM package 
developed for extended Rasch modelling in R (Mair & Hatzinger, 2007), which uses a 
Conditional Maximum Likelihood Model. Questionnaire Items were coded according to 
the guidelines in the original psychometric test manual or the original paper. Categories 
of the original IJS were collapsed from the original nine to five equally explanatory 
categories to facilitate interpretation.  
Results 
Choice of Model 
A number of different item response models are available, which are suited to 




function appropriate to the data is important. For the individual scales either the Rating 
Scale Model (RSM; Andrich, 1978) or the partial credit model (PCM; Masters, 1982) 
was fitted, as they are both one parameter models (Rasch models) suitable for 
polytomous data. The RSM model was fitted where possible, as it provides invariant 
category boundaries within a scale, allowing assessment of the appropriateness of 
response category ordering within the Likert Scale (Andrich, 1978). One of the scales 
(the Interpersonal Jealousy Scale) had incomplete responses for some scale item 
categories; therefore, the PCM was fitted for this scale. Items were eliminated from 
each individual scale to provide a combined model. Each of the scales described has a 
polytomous response format (Likert Scale). As the individual scales in the combined 
analysis had varying numbers of response category, the RSM could not be fitted. 
Therefore, an alternative Rasch model, the partial credit model (PCM) suitable for both 
ordinal rating scales and varying category responses was fitted (Masters, 1982) for the 
combined scales. Person and item parameters were specified as follows: Severity 
(attribute location on a unidimensional scale, b1), Significance (probability of each item 
misfit); Infit and Outfit are reported in Table 18. Items are presented in ascending 
Severity order in Figure 12, with item reversals also indicated. Items which do not fit the 
latent structure are discussed below and an improved model (Model 2) was fitted as 
suggested by the Infit and Outfit statistics obtained from Model 1. Models 1 and 2 were 
compared using their respective Goodness of Fit indices (see Table 22).  
Descriptive Analyses and Sample Characteristics  
The sample characteristics and descriptive analyses are reported in the previous 




The Rasch Analysis.  
1. Estimation and elimination from individual scales. (N.B. Items are referred 
to in the text with the name of the scale and the item number, e.g., Interpersonal 
Jealousy Scale, Item 4 becomes IJS4)  
The 24 item MJS is considered a single scale, with three subscales. A total of 
seven items show significant Outfit. Two items have Outfit statistics that indicated they 
should be eliminated (either the Mean Square (above 1.3) or t statistic (outside ±1.96). 
Five items have significant Infit and should be eliminated due to their lack of reliable 
discrimination (Mean Square less than 0.5, or t statistic outside ±1.96).  
The 28-item IJS is considered a single scale. A total of twelve items show 
significant Misfit. Eleven items show significant Outfit, suggesting that they are also 
measuring other extraneous factors unrelated to the latent trait and are significantly 
more varied than expected, indicating that they measure something other than the latent 
variable. One item has too little variability (Infit) and therefore provides little useful 
information related to the latent variable. 
The 32 G-PTS items are considered as a single scale, consisting of two 
subscales. A total of 11 of the 32 items from the G-PTS show statistically significant 
Misfit. Values greater than 1.3 indicate item responses are more varied than the model 
predicts, suggesting that these items other extraneous factors are confounding responses 
that are not related to the latent trait that the item is proposed to measure. Appendix F 
shows the fit for all MJS, IJS and G-PTS items from the individual scales.  
Too little variation is indicated by responses that are less than 0.5 logits and 




little useful information about a respondent’s relative position on the latent variable.  
 
Table 18. Detail of item Misfit by scale.  
Scale Statistic Item # and Short Label 
MJS Infit Cog 1–SuspectSee, Cog3–SuspAttract, Cog4–
SuspPhys, Cog6–WorrySmeSedce, Cog7–
ThinkSecrtDev 
 Outfit Cog8–SuspCrazyAbt & Beh7–Joinin, 
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 Outfit IJS 3–AdmireIrr, IJS5–PleasedFriend, IJS7–
WendGood, IJS12–HelpJeal, , IJS15–
CloseAngry, IJS16–NocareFlirt, IJS17–
Tkenaway, IJS19–PleasedCompass, IJS20–
OthrPossess, IJS23–LitupUnease, and IJS28–
WrongName, 
G-PTS Infit P6–ConvConsp, P7–SureHarm, P8–DistHarm, 
P9–PreoccUp, P12–AnnoyUpset, P13–
PersePlay.    
 Outfit SR7–NotSeemed, SR10–CertFollowed, SR12–
Checkup, SR15–WorryIntrst; P3– HaveIntend 
 
 2. Estimation from the combined scale. The three scales initially provided 84 
items. Eight items from the IJS that had been eliminated for the MDS analysis in 
Chapter 4, due to poor fit with the structure, were also eliminated the current Rasch 
analysis (see Chapter 4: IJS5R–Pleased Friend, IJS6R–WendGood, IJS8–Past Sad, 
IJS9–TimeFlat, IJS10–UncomfParty, IJS18R–NewFriend, IJS19R–PleasedCompass, 
IJS21RGoodExpress). In addition to Misfit, these items were eliminated as they seemed 
likely to be endorsed by respondents differently; whilst some responders may endorse 
an item in relation to their jealousy, others may be responding to a different, related but 
distinct phenomenon that the items also appear to measure, e.g., pro-relationship 
behaviours, secure attachment, and social anxiety.  
A logical next step in polytomous item analysis is to assess whether categories 




assessment revealed that many of the thresholds in each ordinal scale were 
misordered/reversed. This suggests that the response design is not congruent with the 
authors theoretical intention. Table 18. shows the thresholds (in logits) between 
categories, the thresholds suggest that overall the categories increase monotonically, but 
that scale categories should be collapsed.  
Full descriptions of individual scale items, and the Misfit for individual scales 
are provided in Appendices D and E. Misfit statistics are standardised normal variables 
with an anticipated score of 0, these statistics are used to test hypotheses about item fit 
to the model. Inspection of the Misfit statistics produced by the PCM analyses of the 
remaining items for each individual scale indicated many items that did not fit the latent 
dimension well.  
Further visual inspection of the MDS scalogram and the correlation matrix for 
the combined IJS, MJS and G-PTS scales, revealed a number of items occupying the 
same dimensional space. Overlap in the MDS scalogram indicates that items measure 
the same aspect of the latent variable and are therefore redundant (Kline, 1999).  
Initial item elimination, as described above, resulted in 42 retained items that 
were input to the full model. Item parameter estimates in Table 19. include the difficulty 
parameter ( β1), the Outfit index (Mean Square), Infit (Mean Square) and a probability 
of Misfit index (t-square statistic of Mean Square). Items in the table are ordered 
according to severity of the latent variable ( β1). As seen in Table 19, positive values 
indicate a greater severity, whereas negative values indicate a lower severity. Items 
marked in bold have significant Misfit (as evidenced by Outfit values less than 0.7 or 
greater than 1.3, or t statistic values that fall outside ±1.96 (Wright & Linacre, 1994). 










Table 19.  Fi t t ing the IRT model  to  jealousy and paranoia  scale  i tems.  
I tem Name Short  Label  MDS Category Frequency β1 Outf i t  Inf i t  !  
MJS_Emo6 OtherDate 1 95.6 -1.11122 0.997 1.035 0.485 
MJS_Emo7 HugKiss  1  89.6 -1.04405 1.019 1.007 0.388 
MJS_Emo5 Flir t ing 1 95.6 -0.97113 0.95 0.953 0.689 
MJS_Emo4 OthrTryCl 1 94.8 -0.80882 0.931 0.962 0.764 
MJS_Emo1 CommentLook 2 63.2 -0.52765 0.993 0.961 0.501 
MJS_Emo2 ExciteTalk 2 71.6 -0.46833 0.896 0.908 0.87 
IJS_13 InCmmonEnv 4 73.2 -0.46308 1.234 1.161 0.006 
IJS_25 Possessto  3 72 -0.35757 0.913 0.901 0.824 
MJS_Emo8 CloseWork 2 35.6 -0.29119 0.953 0.955 0.678 
MJS_Emo3 SmileFriendly 2 28.8 -0.28715 0.952 0.951 0.679 
IJS_22 Kissing 3 48.8 -0.08604 1.05 1.026 0.265 
IJS_26** Resentex 3 43.6 0.02326 1.194 1.162 0.017 
GPTSSR_8 Convinced Talking 4 56.4 0.07687 0.882 0.884 0.903 
IJS_15** Fai thful  1  47.2 0.09434 1.193 1.141 0.017 
IJS_2* KnowDid 4 45.6 0.13354 1.431 1.362 0 
IJS_4** WorkSuspic 4 45.6 0.13626 1.184 1.11 0.022 
MJS_Cog5 ThnkOthrInts t  3  63.2 0.22398 1.042 1.064 0.297 
GPTSSR_1*
* Gossip 4 49.2 0.25318 0.814 0.83 0.984 
GPTSSR_3 UpsetFrndJdge 5 45.2 0.33355 0.918 0.914 0.808 
GPTSP_5 Annoy 5 38.8 0.42259 0.908 0.909 0.838 
IJS_7* HelpJeal  4  6 .4  0.44322 1.796 1.429 0 
GPTSSR_5*
* ThkAvoid 5 29.6 0.52314 0.752 0.806 0.998 
MJS_Beh3 QstnPast  4  42 0.54206 1.007 0.995 0.441 
GPTSSR_16
* ThinkTalking 5 28.8 0.55772 0.731 0.772 0.999 
GPTSSR_14 FrustLaugh 5 26.8 0.59703 0.796 0.864 0.991 
MJS_Cog1 SusptSee 6 20 0.61929 1.259 1.07 0.003 
MJS_Beh6** QstnWhere 5 47.6 0.62823 1.223 1.157 0.008 
MJS_Beh2 UnexptCall  6  20.4 0.63522 1.142 1.07 0.056 
GPTSSR_11 CertHost  5  25.6 0.63855 0.83 0.86 0.974 
GPTSP_15** HostPurp 5 22 0.64724 0.752 0.826 0.998 
GPTSSR_13
* StressWatch 5 26.4 0.67334 0.774 0.845 0.996 
MJS_Beh4 SmthgNast  5  23.6 0.68124 0.97 1.027 0.604 
GPTSP_1 CertInfor  6  22.8 0.69692 0.936 0.898 0.742 
GPTSSR_9*
* SingleOut 5  24 0.71187 0.757 0.793 0.998 
GPTSP_14** FeelBad 5 16.8 0.77766 0.703 0.768 1 
MJS_Beh5 QstnPhone 6 22.4 0.81793 0.977 1.075 0.574 
GPTSSR_2 HeardRef 5 31.2 0.87926 0.881 0.878 0.905 
GPTSP_16 AngHurt  6  12.4 0.91813 0.899 0.915 0.863 
GPTSP_2 DefPers  6  10.8 0.92876 0.831 0.821 0.973 
GPTSSR_6 DroppingHints  5  14.8 0.95733 0.809 0.853 0.986 
GPTSP_10 Confuse 6 10 1.0365 0.72 0.831 1 
MJS_Beh1 HndbgPoc 6 4.4  1.24263 1.256 1.076 0.003 
Notes  *Outf i t  MSQ indicates  e l iminat ion,  **t-s tat is t ic  indicates  el iminat ion ( i tems to  be el iminated in  
bold) .  
β= the posi t ion of  the i tem along the unidimensional  t ra i t  







Items at the top of Table 19 relate to less severe jealousy, those at the bottom of 
the table relate to greater severity and increasing suspiciousness and pathology. The 
Misfit statistics derived from of 42 item model (Model 1) indicate 13 items (in bold) 
show significant Misfit, and do not fit the unidimensional cumulative model. Two items 
show significant Outfit, and other items have significant Infit and therefore do not 
discriminate well, (these are indicated with an asterisk in Table 19 and detailed in Table 
20). The results suggest that of the 42 remaining items, 29 items represent a cumulative 
latent jealousy trait comprised of various cognitions, affect, and behaviours. The 29 
retained items (detailed in Table 21) are as follows: IJS— three items; from the MJS — 
eight emotional sub-scale items, five behavioral subscale items, and two cognitive 
subscale items; from the G-PTS — six self-reference sub-scale items and five 
persecutory sub scale items.  
Table 20. Items removed from the combined Rasch scale. 
Excluded Items   
IJS Outfit IJS 2–KnowDid, Beh 1–HandbgPoc.  
 Infit  IJS 4–WorkSuspic, 7– HelpJeal, 15–Faithful, 26–Resentex 
  B6–QstnWhere, 
  SR1–Gossip, 5–ThkAvoid, 9–SingleOut, 13–StressWatch, 16–
ThinkTalking 
  P10 – Confuse, 14 – FeelBad.  
 
Table 21. Items retained in the Model 2.  
(29 items). 
Retained Items 
IJS  13–InCommonEnv, 22–Kissing, 25–Possessto 
MJS Emotional (8 items) Emo1–CommentLook, 2–ExciteTalk, 3–SmileFriendly, 4–
OtherTryCl, 5–Flirting, 6–OtherDate, 7–HugKiss, 8–
CloseWork 
 Cognitive (2 items) Cog, 2–WorryOthrChase, 5–ThnkOthrIntst 
 Behavioural (5 items) Beh 1–HandbgPoc, 2–UnexptCall, 3–QstnPast, 4–
SmthgNast, 5–QstnPhone 
 Self-reference (6. items)  SR 2–HeardRef, 3–UpsetFrndJdge, 6–DroppingHints, 8–
ConvincedTalking, 11–CertHost, 14–FrustLaugh 






Comparison of PCM Model 1 and Model 2 
Results of the PCM fitting of this improved model and a comparison of joint 
log-likelihood fit statistics between Model 1 (42 items) and Model 2 (29 items) suggests 
that the more parsimonious 29 item model does not differ in fit with the latent variable 
[Likelihood Ratio = -9572.798 (74), p = 1], i.e., it is non-significant. The Anderson LR 
test for this model is also nonsignificant (LR value= 68.53 (62), p = 0.266 which 
indicates subgroup homogeneity/model fit.  
Table 22. Fit statistics for Model 1 and 2.  
 Value Npar AIC BIC cAIC 
Model 1 -13542.01 316 277716.01 28831.31 29147.31 
Model 2 -8695.68 215 17821.36 18580.19 18795.19 
The item parameters of Model 2 are presented in Figure 12. with the items 
geographic location representing the severity of the underlying unidimensional 
trait. That these items (including those that are thought to describe normal jealousy) 
form a single continuous dimension (displayed in Figure 12) indicates that there is a 
single latent trait underlying increases in jealous severity. The continuum has an 
observed predominance of better evidenced or justified relationship threat at the lower 
end (top of the diagram); the central region shows increased jealousy, has more self-
referent thought, greater distress, social anxiety, and interrogative behaviours; and the 
upper end (bottom of the diagram) has more persecutory thought, abnormal perception, 






Figure 12. Location and item fit of the Model 1 jealousy items. 
 
N.B. Red asterisks indicate items that Misfit the model suggested by the MDS. * indicates item reversal. 
Horizonal red lines indicate categories in the cumulative structure identified during MDS Analysis, these 
sections are numbered by cumulative category.
 
Discussion  
To our knowledge, this is the first study to assess jealousy and paranoia 
measures concurrently in order to determine if there is evidence for a cumulative latent 




in this chapter indicate, that as the MDS analysis in Chapter 4 suggested, the current 
sample jealousy is indeed cumulative. Given the use of Rasch analysis this finding is 
anticipated to be invariant in the general population. It is fair to conclude therefore that 
suspiciousness is a singular cumulative phenomenon, with both jealousy and paranoia 
comprising a single process which underlies increasing severity. The findings also 
indicate a substantial overlap between jealousy and paranoia, whereby increasing levels 
of anxiety precede both increased jealous pathology and paranoid ideation. Therefore, it 
is likely that the same underlying psychosis-like process causes jealous and paranoid 
pathology; as evidenced by increased severity in items from both scales which follows a 
psychosis-like or schizotypy process (Kidd, Hammond, & Bishopp, 1998).  
The final retained scale items discriminate the latent dimension well. As might 
be expected the most severe items relate to invasive behaviours, and persecutory 
thought. Whereas, the least severe items relate to thoughts and emotions that result from 
substantiated behaviours that are more likely to indicate intimacy with a potential rival 
rather than resulting from imagined partner behaviours. What is more unexpected is the 
apparent anxiety process by which severity increases that mirrors that of paranoia and 
other forms of psychosis (Freeman et al., 2002).  
The suggested process outlined in Chapter, 4 is largely reproduced and 
augmented by the scaling analysis presented in this chapter. Chapter Four suggested that 
jealousy may be cumulative; this chapter’s findings extend this by suggesting that there 
are no underlying distinct factors. Rather, that jealousy has (a) a dimensional structure 
which is qualitatively different, depending on the level of severity, and (b) that a number 
of personality traits, e.g., neuroticism and hostility, contribute to jealousy escalation. 




chapter. Descriptively, higher jealousy and higher paranoia levels are related, and 
jealousy forms a single cumulative, latent unidimensional structure indicative of an 
escalating process with a common latent origin.  
Escalation of both jealous and paranoid pathology was found to relate to 
increasing anxiety, distress, and level of ideation/delusion. This is notable as, rather than 
suggesting distinct neurotic/psychotic subtypes, it suggests that suspiciousness and the 
invasive or aggressive behaviours associated with jealousy result from a process. 
Whereby unproblematic jealousy is more closely related to concrete events that threaten 
the romantic relationship, and angry thoughts (i.e., reactive jealousy, Bringle, 1991; 
Bringle & Buunk, 1991), and problematic jealousy is more closely related to increases 
in anxiety, accompanied by increased paranoia, suspiciousness and preceding invasive 
or hostile partner or rival-directed behaviours.  
 Similarly, to models of paranoia (Freeman et al., 2002) increasing levels of 
anxiety appear to drive the escalation of self-referent thoughts, and suspiciousness in 
jealousy. In non-clinical groups ideas of self-reference are more common than 
persecutory ideation, whereas in clinical groups the reverse pattern is observed (Green 
et al., 2008). This process is also mirrored in the current analysis, with persecutory 
ideation indicative of greater jealous severity. The most extreme jealous behaviours, as 
measured by the scales included in this research (that might be considered less severe 
than those exhibited by clinical and forensic populations), are related to suspicious 
persecutory thoughts. 
Previous research and theory (discussed in Chapter 2), is largely based on factor 
analyses, and has mostly conceptualized the structure of jealousy as typological, with 




related to discrete clinical diagnoses, e.g., depression, psychosis or obsession (e.g., 
Marazitti et al., 2010), or types related to the perceived source of relational threat 
(Mathes & Severa, 1981). However, more recent suggestions have suggested that a 
specific form of psychotic jealousy may be continuous in nature (Lima et al., 2017).  
Contrary to these findings, the current results indicate that jealousy as a whole is 
continuous in nature. That is, it forms a unidimensional cumulative, latent process that 
evolves from an unproblematic (normal) form. Furthermore, it suggests not a psychotic 
form (e.g., Marazitti et al., 2010) but a psychotic-like process is involved in jealousy 
escalation in non-clinical populations and that psychosis-like ideation and delusion, is 
not only related to severe delusional forms. Furthermore, these findings suggest that 
psychotic or neurotic jealousy are not distinct forms of jealousy, as Marazitti et al. 
(2010) suggest but that neurosis-like symptoms relate to lesser severity and that 
psychosis-like symptoms relate to greater severity. Given that in the current results the 
enhanced focus on persecutory rather than self-referent thought in both forms of 
suspicious thought (i.e. jealousy and paranoia) is associated with more severe ideation; 
this adds to the accumulated evidence that persecutory thinking is involved with greater 
severity (see Green et al., 2008).  
This study used Rasch analyses to examine responses on several of the most 
popular measures of jealousy and paranoia. Findings related to the scales suggests three 
areas for development. Firstly, findings suggest a great deal of redundancy in items 
included in all the analysed scales and that scales could be usefully shortened to make 
more precise and concise measures. Findings also suggest that the item bank should be 
extended. Whilst items that measure respondents’ thoughts and feelings are well 




these and their relationship to each other and behaviours. Items that relate to behaviours 
at the less severe (normal) end of the scale are absent. The items also do not capture 
behaviours (such as stalking or partner aggression) that research relates to more 
clinical/forensic populations, and therefore it has not been possible to describe their 
relationship to the proposed continuum. Furthermore, the ordering of response 
categories in the analysis suggests that respondents do not conceptualise intensity in the 
same way as the test developers have. There is a great deal of reversal in the category 
ordering, particularly in the nine-point IJS. Therefore, all the scales require revision of 
the response categories which should be collapsed to result in fewer response points.  
Clinical Implications 
The way jealousy is conceptualised appears contradictory in that it may, even at 
what appear to be severe levels of distorted thinking (delusion) have the tendency to be 
normalised, as evidenced by the lack of focus on jealous pathology in all but the most 
severe kinds (Soyka & Schmitt, 2011) and lower hospitalisation, treatment and 
readmission rates for individuals where jealousy is the primary focus of delusion 
(Crowe et al., 1988; Gutierrez-Lobos, Schmid-Segal, Bankier, & Walter, 2001); or 
paradoxically, given the prevalence of jealousy in the population that should indicate its 
normality, it is often pathologised (Mullen, 1991). Forensic studies suggest jealousy is 
the symptom of personality disorder (Dutton, 1994) or alternatively that it only becomes 
a forensic problem when it results in aggression or control against a romantic partner 
(Archer & Webb, 2006). However, the findings here suggest that jealousy may be more 
effectively characterised by its relationship to psychosis, and therefore that it is present 
on a continuum in the general population, with increases in both jealous and paranoia 
pathology related to the underlying psychotic trait. The findings presented here, would 




anger management, or amelioration of other mental health conditions should be 
explored. Furthermore, findings suggest that methods used to alleviate symptoms of 
other delusional conditions, e.g., paranoid ideation, such as anti-psychotic medication, 
sleep management and anxiety management, (Rehman et al., 2018) may also be helpful 
in cases of increased jealous pathology.  
Limitations of the present study include the relatively small sample size for a 
community study. However, despite the sample size in this analysis being relatively 
small for Rasch analyses (Linacre, 1994), the sample is adequate for the parameter 
estimation, and furthermore the participants within this analyses span typical scores for 
a community sample (see Green et al., 2008) with a proportion of participants (58% 
with subclinical persecutory ideation, 84% with sub-clinical self-referent ideation, 
Green et al., 2008); 95.6% some level of sub-clinical paranoia, (Fenigstein & Vanable, 
1992) also scoring within the sub-clinical range on measures of paranoia the current 
analysis is likely to give information across the expected range of a community sample. 
The inclusion here of those who score within the clinical range means that these results 
should encapsulate the more severe end of the community range and are suggestive of 
those that might be found in clinical populations. By using a Rasch analysis with an 
adequate population, the sample characteristics should not influence the relationship 
between the explored concepts. A further limitation relates to the gender biased sample, 
which was due to the inclusion of social science students who received credit for 
participation and who are mainly female. Future analyses should seek to remedy this.   
Conclusions 
Due to their differing content, irrational thoughts and jealous thinking are treated as 




associations between the presence of irrational and its relationship to jealous pathology. 
However, this study shows a clear interrelationship between pathological jealousy and 
paranoid ideation, in that they form a unidimensional structure. In addition, increasing 
paranoid pathology is not differentiated from increasing jealous pathology. That items 
show a lack of distinctiveness between jealousy and paranoia suggests that they 
describe the same latent construct. It is likely therefore that increasing pathology in both 
constructs is related to shared underlying psychological and physiological processes that 
warrant further investigation. If improvement of the understanding and differentiation of 
underlying processes are targeted by future research, Rasch analysis should be applied 
to clinical and forensic samples, using an extended item bank of more severe behaviours 




CHAPTER 6: (MIS) UNDERSTANDING PROCESSES IN THE CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION OF ROMANTIC DYADS: A CUED RECALL STUDY  
The preceding two chapters explored jealousy’s structure and its relationship to 
paranoia. The findings also suggested that there is a likely overlap in the different kinds 
of interpersonal, suspicious thought.  
One reason why both jealousy and paranoia are the target of research interest is 
due to the impact that both can have on social relationships, in particular their influence 
on relationship quality, conflict escalation and interpersonal aggression. What is clear is 
that, as they are both types of social cognition where a relationship or relationships are 
their focus, neither paranoia nor jealousy exist without the context of a relationship.  
As previous chapters suggest that different types of irrational thoughts co-occur, 
it is possible that both types of thinking evolve concurrently within the social 
relationship itself and influence, or are influenced by, the social relationships towards 
which they are targeted. However, even research that proposes to take an in-depth 
approach (e.g., for jealousy; Soltani et al., 2017; and for paranoia; Dickson et al., 2016) 
does not explore either dyadically, i.e., it is decontextualised, and it therefore fails to 
give an account of the dynamics of these kinds of social thinking within a relationship. 
Furthermore, it is not clear if these thoughts and dynamics also occur in healthy 
relationships, or how this might happen, i.e., what is the process that this takes, and 
what the subsequent influence of irrational thoughts on the social relationship might be. 
This chapter considers whether processes revealed in previous analyses (Chapters 3 & 
4) are found within conflict resolution in functional romantic relationships. Specifically, 




and irrational thinking, in real time, within a dyadic framework, from a number of 
different perspectives. 
Cognition refers to unconscious mental mechanisms that bring about 
representations of experience, of which we may or more often may not, become 
consciously aware; social cognition refers to any cognitive process involving other 
people (Frith & Blakemore, 2005). Green, Horan, and Lee (2015) suggest social 
cognition encompasses the processes involved in thinking about ourselves and other 
people and can be categorised into four areas: social cue perception; experience sharing; 
inferring other peoples' thoughts and emotions (i.e., mentalising); and management of 
emotional reactions. One type of social cognition, the understanding of another’s 
intentions and mental states, is most often, automatic, intuitive and triggered by stimuli 
of which we are not necessarily aware but may become so during reflection (Frith & 
Blakemore, 2005).  
Impairments in non-social and social cognition are features of psychosis and 
contribute a great deal to the burden of mental illness and pathology (Green et al., 
2015). Recent research reviews indicate specific patterns of dysfunction whereby 
sufferers of psychosis show normal functioning in areas thought previously to be 
abnormal, such as emotional and non-emotional facial and verbal recognition, 
experience-sharing capacity and the ability for emotional recognition in self and other; 
the key problems people with psychosis face are with social cue perception, mentalising 
(empathic accuracy) and emotion regulation (Savla et al., 2013). In addition to the 
greater levels of general distress suffered by people with paranoia, impairments in these 




the type of process employed (Green et al., 2008; van Os et al., 1969; van Os et al., 
2009). It is likely given the prevalence of psychosis (Johns et al., 2004, Johns & van Os, 
2001) and paranoia (Bebbington et al., 2013; Freeman, Gittins, et al., 2008) symptoms 
in the general population, that sub-clinical symptoms characteristic of psychosis, 
including impairments in socio-cognitive function are also present in varying degrees in 
normal populations on a continuum of severity.  
The socio-cognitive impairments in psychosis and pathological forms of 
jealousy have certain parallel features (outlined in previous chapters), such as increased 
threat sensitivity, rigid thinking, and self-referencing in ambiguous situations (Bringle, 
1991). In order to determine if and how these phenomena are related, it is important to 
understand both the sequence in which irrational thinking unfolds, and the social 
context in which it occurs. Developing new insights into the role of erroneous social 
cognition and its connection to relationship outcomes in the general population would 
seem like a logical step in better understanding any cognitive processes involved, in 
particular the form that any socio-cognitive impairment might take within a dyadic 
relationship. Those processes by which both accurate and inaccurate understanding of 
others’ intentions arise and are maintained during interpersonal transactions could give 
further information about how they are related.  
In terms of increased threat sensitivity, social events are experienced as salient in 
deciding whether there is a threat (Kapur, 2003). Epidemiological data consistently 
suggests that people with paranoia differ from the non-paranoiac regarding which 
situations and whom they find threatening; and that unsafe and stressful social 




(Fornells-Ambrojo et al., 2015). In daily-life people with low to medium paranoia 
scores respond differently and tend to perceive greater threat when interacting with 
unknown people, whereas people high in paranoia perceive high levels of threat from 
both familiar and unfamiliar people (Collip et al., 2011). Stress is generally thought to 
be a response to threat (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Selye, 1946). Couple conflict is 
found to be stressful by many people (Coyne et al., 2001), and therefore it seems 
reasonable to suggest that the threat present in partner disagreements may be perceived 
as more threatening by people with paranoia, as the person is familiar and partner 
conflict is a situation where social threat is often experienced.  
Processing complex emotions, such as jealousy, differs from that of simple 
emotions and require more than just the facial recognition of emotion; there is an 
implied awareness of another’s thinking about oneself and the relation of oneself to 
others (Blakemore, Winston, & Frith, 2004). Mentalising is a complex process that 
appears impaired in psychosis (Green et al., 2015) and schizophrenia (Bentall et al., 
2001). Mentalising is an implicit, automatic, intuitive and innate ability to recognise 
other people’s intentions and inner mental states; it is an important part of effective 
social interaction (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). It is long established that this pervasive 
and automatic response appears to occur prior to deliberative, more reasoned thought 
(Heider & Simmel, 1944) and could therefore be said to be intuitive, i.e., automatic, 
prior to deliberative thought (Frith & Blakemore, 2005).  
In summary, impairments in social cognition symptomatic of psychosis, in 
particular in those abilities to mentalise and correctly interpret the actions of others, also 




2001; Frith, 1992). These are likely to incur social penalties, for example, in the 
inability to successfully resolve conflict. 
It is likely to be difficult, even for those without socio-cognitive impairments, to 
accurately decide on other’s motivations or whether what is being said is truthful. Social 
situations often involve making judgements where available information is incomplete 
or ambiguous. A factor that complicates these judgements is that, as most people’s 
everyday experience would suggest, others sometimes deliberately engage in deception. 
Most adults understand that their own perspective and those of other people on the same 
event can differ and that implicit judgments about another person’s perspective often 
need to be made, which in turn, can sometimes lead to the misinterpretation of other’s 
actions as insults (Frith & Blakemore, 2005). Couples frequently begin conflict 
resolution by ‘mindreading’ (Gottman, 1979). In romantic relationships the inaccurate 
construal or representation of meaning can become especially emotive and feeling 
misunderstood contributes a great deal to marital conflict and distress (Gottman, 1998). 
Effective conflict resolution requires people to use complex reasoning about their own 
state of mind, views and feelings (self-awareness) and those of others. In addition, it 
requires people to be reasonable and flexible in order to acknowledge and/or 
accommodate the other’s point of view (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1981).  
We might hypothesise that conflict resolution is one social activity which those 
with impaired ability to understand other’s intentions find difficult. Social cue 
perception, mentalising, and emotion regulation, proposed to result in relationship 
difficulties (Frith & Blakemore, 2005), are the social cognitive processes impaired in 




those processes necessary for the effective resolution of couple conflict. Furthermore, 
stressful situations increase the likelihood of irrational beliefs surfacing and forming 
(Freeman & Garety, 2006; Myin-Germeys et al., 2005). As partner conflict is found 
particularly stressful by many people (Harburg, Kaciroti, Gleiberman, Schork, & Julius, 
2008), it is likely that partner conflicts will be a situation where social cognitive 
impairments will arise. Rationality in this context is defined as practical rationality (for 
a discussion see Craigie, 2011). An act or belief is considered to be irrational if it is 
unlikely to help the person meet their goals. People who are overly suspicious might be 
generally understood as having a number of difficulties with social interactions 
(Freeman & Garety, 2006) including withdrawing from social contact, being difficult to 
reason with, perceiving offence where no offence is meant, making claims that are not 
plausible, or unfoundedly accusing others of behaviour or intentions. It is likely that 
these behaviours would adversely impact their ability to meet their social goals. In the 
case of social relationships, it might be suggested that behaving in ways that are likely 
to alienate someone with whom we wish to sustain a relationship does not constitute a 
practically rational decision. Irrational thoughts are likely to play two roles: firstly, they 
are enacted in order to protect the self from perceived threats, and secondly, because 
these threats are generally exaggerated or misconstrued, they undermine the mutual 
understanding and trust in the relationship unless the other party accommodates the 
irrationality, in an asymmetrical solution to the relational problem. The understanding of 
rationality for the purposes of this chapter, does not mean absence of emotion or 
empathy. Rationality here means that an individual’s responses may be understood not 
just by reference to a person’s logical deduction or cognitions about an event or 





Previous chapters noted that jealousy has frequently been explored using cross-
sectional/static techniques. However, an established technique for exploring social 
cognition is to use qualitative and dialogic techniques that capture the rich, dynamic, 
processual nature of social interaction (Frith & Blakemore, 2005). Furthermore, the 
transactional stress model (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), on which cognitive models of 
jealousy are based, suggests a process by which stress (and therefore jealousy) unfolds. 
In order to effectively research this evolving process, the research requires exploration 
using micro-analytic methods that allow tracking of the phenomenon over time allowing 
intra and interindividual changes to be effectively captured (Lazarus, 1999) giving an 
understanding of causal direction and more accurate assessment of the relationship 
between variables. However, no research using a suitable design was found. Whilst 
there is some research on the role of intra-personal processes in virtual-reality 
environments (Fornells-Ambrojo et al., 2015) the processes that relate to real-world 
development and maintenance of paranoid processes during potentially threatening 
dyadic interaction (such as relationship disagreement) are unresearched. Irrational 
thinking may play a role in conflict escalation and it is important to understand whether 
it is present during partner conflict in non-clinical populations and how it is managed.  
Furthermore, little is known about how irrational beliefs change. By using 
irrational or erroneous thoughts about partner intentions as a target for understanding, it 
may be possible to learn more about this process. Given that the whole premise of 
‘talking therapies’, such as counselling and Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, is that 




short leap to suggest that belief change is socially facilitated. Aspects of couple dyadic 
interaction may contribute to belief flexibility or rigidity. Therefore, a qualitative 
approach should be employed to develop an understanding of the socio-cognitive 
processes in real time, and within a more natural evolving dynamic situation, that 
mimics typical disagreements.  
There are ethical and methodological issues with recruiting to a study of 
couples, where one partner is believed to be very jealous. However, as previous chapters 
outline suspicious thinking occurs frequently in the general population and as discussed 
above, is likely to be the source of some conflict within most relationships. Therefore, 
by exploring conflict resolution within the dyad, and in particular by asking how each 
participant perceives the other’s intentions, it is hoped to explore the role played by 
social cognition and emotion in everyday relationships, and furthermore to elicit 
discussion of participants’ irrational thought processes.  
Cued Recall 
Cued recall has been used to understand socio-cognitive partner processes in 
general research (Darling & Clarke, 2009; Hinnekens, Ickes, Schryver, & Verhofstadt, 
2016; Hinnekens, Loeys, Schryver, & Verhofstadt, 2018; Simpson et al., 2011; Thomas 
& Fletcher, 2003; Welsh & Dickson, 2005) and interpretive studies (Meneses & Larkin, 
2015). As reports are made after the event, the method is seen as having less impact 
upon cognition than other think-aloud methods (Suchman, 1987). This method allows 
understanding of interaction processes and so is appropriate to theories based on 
transactional models of ideation and delusion (Freeman & Garety, 2004) and jealousy 
(Bringle, 1991; Mullen & White, 1989). Video recall techniques enable a view of 




directionality in people’s reasoning processes, including processes that initiate fact 
checking and proposed mechanisms, for example anxiety cues, said to precede more 
intuitive, experiential reasoning. The method also enables people to recall more detail 
about their thought processes, motivations, emotional state and perceptions than 
interview alone (Henry & Fetters, 2012; Welsh & Dickson, 2005).  
As yet, there has been no in-depth study that explores the process and context of 
(mis) understanding and reasoning, the role of intuition and irrational beliefs in couple 
conflict discussions, and how truth and reality are negotiated and co-constructed in 
every-day couple conflict situations. The exploration of couple conflict in non-clinical 
couples, in vivo, gives a dynamic situation within which to explore how people come to 
understand or misunderstand each other, to see if elements of irrational thinking, biases, 
and unchecked use of intuition can be detected and if erroneous beliefs are amenable to 
challenge. In addition, this method can be used to explore which type of challenges 
work to change these beliefs and which do not and in what circumstances. 
The overall aim is to explore reasoning about other’s intentions and irrational 
beliefs in couples’ attempts to resolve conflict and how these are managed in a non-
aggressive relationship. Furthermore, the study aims to explore sequences and the 
context of how partners come to understand their own and the other’s intentions and 
irrational beliefs, make themselves understood, and how both intuition and irrational 
thinking are managed and viewed. In particular, within the context of a couple cued 
recall disagreement discussion: 
1. How and when do accurate or erroneous understandings of the other’s 





2. How and when do irrational beliefs arise, how are these irrational beliefs 
revised or maintained, and how do they influence the discussion? 
3. How can we conceptualise how partner’s individual credibility and power 
are managed and negotiated in conflict discussions? 
Method 
The current study takes a qualitative approach. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted, and written accounts provided by participants. Data were analysed using 
interpretive and critical analyses.  
Participants 
The study involved five English-speaking dyads of heterosexual intimate 
partners, recruited via the University of Birmingham Research Participation Scheme as 
a follow-up from a prior questionnaire study. All participants were screened for partner 
abusive behaviours (using the CTS-R; Strauss, Hamby, & Boney-McCoy, 1996) and 
were either unpaid or received course credits for involvement. Consent was gained at 
each of the three procedural stages for each participant. Nineteen participants with 
romantic partners (71%) indicated that they would be prepared to take part in the follow 
up study, seven couples with the longest-standing relationships were approached to take 
part. Five couples selected into the study (with one additional couple, who met the 
criteria for inclusion, selected to take part when one couple’s data proved to be unusable 
due to a recording problem).  
Interview Preparation 
A semi-structured interview schedule was prepared during supervision 
discussions to explore a conflict situation and the process each couple used in order to 





A pilot study, not reported here, with a single dyad was conducted to test the 
procedure (i.e., camera position and sound recording settings). Data collection was 
divided into three stages detailed below: discussing a disagreement; participating in a 
joint interview; and completing a series of individual written questions.  
Couples were asked to choose a previous or on-going disagreement which they 
were both willing to discuss with the researcher.  
Stage 1: A guided discussion took place in the presence of the researcher, who 
provided a single initial directional question, ‘Could you take a few moments to think 
about a recent conflict situation from your own point of view (pause). Then if you both 
tell me how it started and then developed and how you resolved or didn’t resolve it. 
Who would like to go first?’ Prompts and probes were used to ensure sufficient 
coverage of the disagreement for analysis (Schedule in Appendix G). This discussion 
lasted for approximately 15 minutes and was video recorded with the camera positioned 
so that the full body and face of both participants was captured in addition to dialogue. 
After finishing the discussion, the camera was stopped. Instructions were then reviewed 
for the following stage. 
Stage 2: Video footage was replayed to the participants on a computer screen. 
Participants were asked to pause the video whenever they noticed a significant moment 
and to comment upon what it was that made them pause. Participants were shown how 
to control the playback so that they could pause it when they needed. They were asked 
to recall what they were thinking at the time and to elaborate on their thoughts. A 




discussion. The discussion was audio-recorded using a digital recorder. The interview 
finished when the dyad ran out of comments on the recorded experience.  
Stage 3: This final stage was introduced with the objective of gaining a view of 
individual perspectives regarding matters that had arisen in stages 1 and 2. Couples 
were separated into nearby private rooms to answer some pre-prepared written 
questions about their thinking in relation to the discussion (see Appendix I). The 
questions were, in part, constructed using The Safety Behaviours Questionnaire — 
Persecutory Beliefs (SBQ; Freeman et al., 2001), which has proven validity in accessing 
psychotic processes in community and clinical samples (see Appendix J)  
Analytic procedure 
Transcript analysis followed a procedure suggested by King et al. (2008) that 
was consistent with the approach underlying each of the methods used: Framework 
Analysis, and IPA (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009), and Critical Analysis (Billig, 1996; 
Harré, 1997). Verbatim transcripts of the dyadic discussion and couple interview were 
made by the investigator, followed by a pluralistic analysis of the accounts. The data 
were imported into NVivo for Mac (www.qsrinternational) software, to facilitate 
organisation and systematic coding using theoretically informed constructs derived from 
the literature and emergent themes to code data. Accounts were re-read to ensure 
familiarity with the data. One set of accounts was hand-coded descriptively, line-by-
line, and then coded for emergent analytic themes by the investigator and reviewed with 
an academic supervisor. Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) methodology 
was then used to generate themes and subthemes within the data ‘using data as a lever 
to evaluate existing theories and models’ (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009, p. 48). One 




coded separately by two coders, the author and her supervisor (ML). These reports were 
then checked for agreement on codes. Further individual reports were each then coded 
by the author separately and then emergent themes where checked with the author’s 
supervisor with themes and sub-themes verified in the rest of the data. Subsequently, the 
audio and video-recordings from two couples were viewed and listened to by both 
supervisors (ML & DB) to both verify the codes with the data and incorporate 
alternative understandings of the data. A shortlist of themes and subthemes was then 
verified by an experienced researcher from a different area of psychology, using a 
sample of two anonymised transcripts and selected quotations from the remaining 
transcripts, and any additional understandings were again incorporated. In addition, 
Miranda Fricker’s (2007) critical feminist epistemological injustice theory (detailed in 
this chapter’s discussion) was used to explore an emergent theme of power, credibility 
and voice. To garner empirical support for the post hoc interpretations of the rationality 
or irrationality of participant’s beliefs, three judges (doctoral students in psychology) 
who were blind to the study and its results, independently assessed the relative 
rationality of each judgement, gave a subjective assessment of its likelihood, and 
reported experience and counter-arguments in the dialogue that would suggest the belief 
was inaccurate. The supervisor (ML), who is an expert in the phenomenological method 
then reviewed the completed analysis and confirmed that the correct process had been 






Overview of Results Section: 
Summary of Findings 
 Question 1: How do people come to (mis)understand their partner’s 
  intentions? In addition, which aspects of the people and  
  situation might influence whether such (mis)understandings 
  are revised or maintained and by what process do either 
  occur? 
  Process 1: Understanding the other’s intentions  
  Process 2: Revising understanding of the other’s intentions  
  Process 3: Maintaining the original understanding of the other’s  
 intentions  
 Question 2: How do irrational beliefs arise, and do conflict discussions 
  contribute to their revision or maintenance?  
  Process 4: Difficulty in dismissing irrational thoughts based on intuition 
  Process 5: Accommodation  
 Question 3: How are partner’s positioned (Davies & Harré, 1990) in 
  conflict discussions, by irrational thinking or erroneous  
  intuition?  
  Process 6: Sense of not being able to make oneself understood  
Couples’ disagreements had various themes, summarised in Table 23. Couple number 
1’s disagreement focused on another male that the male partner thought of as a romantic 
rival. Couple two discussed the woman’s repeated enquiry about the man’s health and 
wellbeing. Couple 3 disagreed about her spending habits; with the man maintaining his 
girlfriend spent recklessly. Couple 4 disagreed about who removed food from the 
household, centring on the female’s fear of food contamination. Couple 5 disagreed 
about preferred noise-levels particularly from electronic entertainment, with the woman 
wishing noise levels to be lower than the man. In general, disagreements were discussed 
calmly and each member of the couple attempted to present their views openly. Each 
disagreement differed in terms of its constructiveness. Interestingly, the focus of each 




belief held by one partner. Table 23 provides information about participants as well as 
the subject of conflict. Throughout the results section, unless otherwise stated, 
quotations were chosen for typicality.  
Table 23. Summary of participant details. 
1.  Brandon and Brigid 19 18 Jealousy  Cohabit ing 1yr.  7  months.  
2 .  Jed and Hope 20 19 Trust  and 
Phobia 
Dating 5 yrs .  3  months.  
3 .  Uzma and Ali  19 18 Spending/Money Dating 2 yrs .  7  months.  
4 .  Dan and Hannah 25 26 Responsibi l i t ies  
and Phobia  
Cohabit ing 4 yrs .  7  months.  
5 .  Jenny and Peter  30 31 Preferred Level  
of  Noise  
Married 7 yrs .  2  months.  
 
The results are organised according to which research question they answered 
and subdivided into processes found in the data, and then into phases or factors within 
each process. Process Five overlaps two questions, 2 and 3; with only the final phase of 
Process Five relating to question 3. 
Irrationality was defined here as an idea held by an individual that appears 
implausible or improbable due to the given evidence, counter-evidence, or usual 
behaviour of the people involved or where the irrationality of the belief was raised or 
acknowledged by at least one party: either the holder themselves, the partner, or the 
interviewer. An example, of this is Hannah who has what might be considered a phobic 
response i.e., very afraid of and has an exaggerated gag response, to food that is out-of-
date or mouldy, and therefore for example, will not approach the fridge to remove it. 
She attempts to manage food storage in order to avoid contact with food, and also 















Her views about food 
contamination and her 
response here are judged to 
be irrational on the basis 
that 
a) the food she is avoiding 
is unlikely to constitute a 
health threat given the 
evidence, that she is afraid 
of the sight, smell and 
physical contact with rather 
than the eating of mouldy 
food, for example she says, 
 
Hannah: ‘Where I just don’t like the smell, and how it 
will look. And anything like that it makes me feel sick. 
I’ll just ask you to do it’ and So that I don’t have to be 
in that situation where I’m really trying a/not be sick, 
because of the food’. 
And later on 
Dan: Sometimes it’s perfectly fine, and then you just 
chuck it in the bin wash off the bin and its fine.  
Hannah: ‘But it’s not it’s just like looking at the smell 
and everything. It makes me feel so ill’, 
b) that the exaggeration or 
irrationality of these beliefs 
are acknowledged in the 
interview by the couple 
Dan: ‘I really don’t like think a lot of that’s like more 
mental than actual like the physical input. Like you 
know it is just food that’s gone slightly old. It’s it’s you 
you feel like that’s really horrible, so you have like 
that experience of being really scared of it or 
whatever’. 
Later in the discussion:  
Hannah: So, when you say, ‘Oh you’re deciding to do 
something’ as if its intentional. That I want to be like 
this, if that makes sense, I don’t obviously want this! 
Kind of. like obviously, yeah it would be easier, if I 
could just take the food out, put it in the bin. We don’t 
have to have the discussion about it, cause I could just 
do it; whereas to me, it sounds like you think I’m just 
doing it to be difficult. 
There is also some discussion between the couple of 
desensitisation and flooding techniques referring to her 
fears of food, which suggests that they both believe it 
to be irrational.  
 
 
The concept of irrationality used here is that a seemingly irrational belief might 
be understood firstly, as mentioned above, by its functionality, but also in relation to the 
belief-holder’s past experience or their current emotional state. Thus, an empathetic 
listener would be able to understand why the holder of the erroneous belief understood 
the situation in the way that they did, given the belief holder’s past experience or their 




current emotional state. Therefore, in this study and in contrast to other common 
conceptualisations, irrationality was not judged on the basis that a seemingly erroneous 
belief was incomprehensible or not understandable (Jaspers, 1997). 
Summary of Processes  
Five discussion transcripts, five interview transcripts and ten written question 
booklets were generated and analysed to reveal processes in both recalled incidents and 
the video-recall discussion. This analysis was used to answer the research questions 
using illustrative participant quotes and focussing on similarities or dissimilarities 
between the couples. Six main processes associated with intention understanding and 
irrational thought emerged that show some cross-case variation across: Understanding 
the other’s intentions; Revising beliefs about the other’s intentions; Difficulty in 
dismissing intuition; Difficulty of dismissing irrational thoughts based on intuition; 
Accommodation; and The sense of not being able to make oneself understood.  
Question 1: How do Understandings of a Partner’s Intentions Arise, and in What 
Circumstances and in Addition, How and in What Circumstances are they Revised 
or Maintained?  
Process 1: Understanding the other’s intentions. More accurate5 
understandings of a partner’s intentions seemed to reflect the presented evidence and 
employed a process that was iterative. Furthermore, where initial judgements were 
inaccurate, people who eventually formed more accurate beliefs, were able to revise 
them by incorporating subsequent information that contradicted the initial belief (e.g., 
their recollections of the partner’s previous behaviours or their partner’s own account of 
 





their intentions that contradicted the assumed intention). Whereas those who maintained 
the initial unlikely belief appeared to use only confirmatory evidence. A main source of 
evidence used was repeated conflict; partner disagreements, due to both the content of 
the partner’s challenge, and active resistance by one partner to the position or behaviour 
of the other, served to initiate partner’s awareness of each other’s intentions and 
motivations. Understandings of partner’s intentions were formed using a composite of 
the different evidence available. People used different blends of internal (intuitive 
inferences/emotional) evidence and external (contextual/behavioural) evidence to form 
decisions about their partner’s intentions, combining: intuition (i.e., fast, automatic 
thinking processes often upon reflection based on interpretations of the other’s body 
language and voice tone); contextual information about the situation (e.g., social 
expectations attached to a role); and also rationales based on their partner’s previous 
behaviour. This blend appeared to determine the accuracy and rationality of beliefs 
about the other’s intentions  
1.1 Intuition. Like nearly all psychological concepts, intuition has multiple and 
contested definitions and has been the subject of much debate which is difficult to 
resolve as much of it hinges on the nature of consciousness (and therefore 
unconsciousness) (Epstein, 2010). Here, intuition is defined as awareness that is non-
analytic, unconscious, rapid, effortless, and involves associative thinking, in contrast to 
reasoning which is based on the systematic and deliberative search for counter-
evidence, recognition and incorporation of information about the immediate situational 
context or knowledge of previous situations (e.g., Chen, Duckworth, & Chaiken, 1999; 
Kahneman, 2003; Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In 




inferences result in misunderstandings and misinterpretations6 more frequently. Their 
use has a number of important characteristics that warrant further discussion.  
In this study, the use of experiential/intuitive inferences about the intentions and 
mental state of other’s appears to occur prior to more deliberate reasoning. It is only 
upon reflection that partners become aware of contradictory or ambiguous information 
about their partner’s intentions. Reflection is initiated either due to a partner’s challenge 
or self-reflections upon seeing the video recording. The content of participant’s 
deliberate reasoning (as evidenced in the dialogue and written commentary) suggests 
that cues for intuitive understanding were often the partner’s body language and vocal 
tone. The dialogue (i.e., partner disagreement with the suggested interpretation of their 
actions or the weight of evidence provided suggesting a more likely interpretation) 
suggests this information is then elaborated on with inaccurate assumptions about the 
meaning of these behaviours. Most partners used verbal and visual cues to draw 
conclusions about the content of the other’s inner world. It appears that whilst these 
cues are useful in accurately inferring the partner’s felt emotions, inferences that go 
beyond this and attribute further meaning to a behaviour are sources of inaccuracy and 
perhaps conflict escalation, due to feeling misunderstood.  
1.2 Context and Behaviour. Partners formed understandings of each other’s 
intentions using their partner’s prior behaviour to predict their partner’s intentions in the 
current situation. Partner’s explanatory talk during the discussion and recollections of 
partner’s previous explanations were used to construct understanding of the partner’s 
 
6 Misperception and misinterpretation here refer to different processes. Following the established tradition in 
cognitive psychology, perception is understood as a passive process and interpretation an active process. 




intentions. Participants’ accounts with apparently accurate content use contextual 
information as evidence to establish a view of the other’s intentions, and a reliance on 
contextual information leads to fewer erroneous conclusions. Table 24 shows examples 
of how both types of evidence are used to form understandings of intentions.  
Table 24. Themes and quotations for how understanding intentions arises. 
Category Themes & Illustration 




ref lect ion on 
intent ions 
1.  Resis tance/circular  
arguments   
Leah: So pret ty  much most  of  the t ime Dan wil l  put  
something in  there and forget  about  i t  for  about  2  weeks.  
And i t  gets  real ly  mouldy and then I  can’t…he is  r ight  I  
can’t  s tand s tuf f  l ike  that .  I t  makes me l ike  gag.  But  I  don’t  
l ike  i t  and so I  can I  ask him nicely  to  do i t  and he thinks  
he’s  always l ike  no challenge yoursel f  you know he wants  
me to  l ike  get  new horizons or  something and I’m l ike  no 
(All)  (5)  
 2 .  Partner ’s  
explanat ion  
Dan and Leah give frequent  feedback to  each other  about  
the accuracy of  each other ’s  understanding of  their  
intent ions.  They also expend effort  in  ref lect ing on their  
discussion and dialogue.  For  example,  she is  l ikely to  be 
accurate  that  her  phobic behaviour  wil l  be diff icul t  to  
change,  and she says:  To me i t  doesn’t  feel  l ike  i t ’s  
something that’s  easy to  just  be l ike  cool ,  I ’ l l  just  do that .  
Whereas,  to  you,  as  as  I  said,  you l ike  take the viewpoint  
of ,  ‘wel l  i f  Leah just  gets  over her fear then she can decide 
to  just  do i t ’ .  So,  you,  you’re seeing i t  as  me not  wanting 
to  do something [rather than me being too scared of  
something to  do i t] .  (Cp3,  Cp4) (2)  
Evidence for  the 
use of  intui t ion 
1.  Assumptions Brandon when asked to  account  for  his  view of  Brigid’s  
intent ions gives  an account  that  suggests  he bel ieves she is  
naïve.  These assumptions appear  to  have originated prior  
to  the current  incident  with the male fr iend and on the 
basis  of  general isat ions about  other  males .  [The discussion 
had a  ser ious and not  joking tone]   
Brigid:  the same thing happened at  home before we came 
to England l ike .   
Brandon: with a guy with the same name.  Brigid:  but  with 
a guy with the same name but  i t  was a smaller  incident .  
But  anyway,  Brandon was l ike ,  'You got ta  s top talking to  
people named,  you know l ike '   
Later  she says:   
Brigid:  Can we s top i t ,  I ’m sorry? At  that  point  he did not  
make i t  c lear that  he was trying to  go on dates  with me 
(L) .  And l ike ,  but ,  the idea,  l ike  at  that  t ime.  Base 
basical ly  I  expected him to be mad,  and he was more mad 
than I  was even expect ing and so.  
Interviewer:  who was?  
Brigid:  You,  you,  l ike  when I  got  back.  I t  was l ike  a  
di f ferent  idea in  his  head of  what  had happened.  And I  
was,  I  was,  in  the back of  my mind I  was l ike  ok well  this  
seems sketchy and so he’s  probably not  gonna l ike  i t  but  I  
didn’t  understand the ent ire  l ike  /  everything that  he’d 
bui l t  up in  his  mind /  he had bui l t  up in  his  mind about  
what  I  was doing with this  fr iend (All)  (5)  
 2 .Contradictory/ambig
uous information  
The evidence that  Jenny gives does not  seem consis tent  to  
Peter,  and this  means that  he does not  bel ieve her.   
Peter:  I t  er. . .  i t  s t i l l  confuses  me about  the whole;  I f  




Category Themes & Illustration 
see the di f ference in  noise.  Some noise that  you’ve your 
making.  So therefore your podcast’s  on.  That  that ,  that’s  
what  I  can’t  get  my head round.  That  i f . . .  er  i f  you were 
going to  s leep with ut ter  s i lence  then I  could get  my head 
round i t .  But more of ten than not ,  you’re text ing me when 
you. . .  ( laughing)  of f  a  phone which is  making noise,  te l l ing 
me not  to  make noise.   
Later  he says,  point ing to  the inconsis tencies  in  what  she 
says and her  behaviour  (control l ing noise )  so yeah er  I  
think from my perspect ive though i t ’s  more a case of . . .  er  
of  the fact  that  i t ’s  always i t  only  ever applies  to  other 
people’s  noise.  (Al l)  (5)   
 3 .  Body 
language/voice 
tone/non-verbal  
communicat ions  
Here we can see that  Hope al though she is  ini t ia l ly  
unaware of  using non-verbal  cues,  when chal lenged,  
reasons that  her  intui t ion about  Jed’s  intent ions was based 
on non-verbal  cues.   
Hope: when I  was talking to  you the f irs t  t ime I  didn’t  pick 
up that  you weren’t  l ike ,  you didn’t  agree with me but  i t  
was real ly  obvious then,  l ike  when I  was just  watching you.  
Hope:  Um I  don’t  know, I  just  feel  l ike .  You didn’t  say 
anything through that ,  you didn’t  even l ike  have a facial  
expression.  Which is  k inda what  we were talking about  
l ike .  When we argue I  feel  l ike  you don’t  care,  and you 
didn’t  even look l ike  you cared then (All)  (5)  
 4 .  Intui t ion and 
Negative Emotion  
We see that  Hope in  this  s i tuat ion assumes that  Jed does 
not  care  because in  the confl ic t  s i tuat ion she has a  high 
level  of  emotion that  he does not  share,  and she feels  
upset .  [ I t  appears  l ikely from his  otherwise responsive 
dialogue,  a t tempts  to  reassure Hope,  and prosocial  
behaviours  both on the tape,  and those reported by Hope 
that  Jed does care]  
Jed:  No,  I  don’ t  th ink I’ve ever  shouted at  you.   
Hope:  No,  I  don’t  think you have ei ther.  I ’ve shouted at  
you,  but  that . . .  when we argue I  get  qui te  upset .  And you… 
he doesn’t  real ly  care.  (Sad voice tone)  ( laughing) And I  
think that  makes i t  worse for  me.   
Interviewer:  Ok,  so he’s  not  bothered about  i t?  So how 
come you don’t  think he’s  bothered about  you what  happens 
then?  
Hope:  (s ighs)   
Interviewer:  Cos you said he doesn’t  real ly  care.  Hope:  He 
probably does,  but  erm I  a  get  I  get  qui te  obviously  upset  
when we argue.  Whereas you try  and l ike  almost  act  l ike  
there’s  not  an argument  though.  Do you know what  I  mean? 
(Cp1,  Cp2,  Cp5) (3)  
c)  Experience of  
partner ’s  
behaviour  over  
t ime  
 Dan’s  response to  Leah’s  account  of  her  food phobia.  ‘I  
think that’s  what  i t  is  i t ’s  l ike .  I  love i t  i t ’s  great ,  but  you 
always take that  scient i f ic  point  of  v iew l ike you’ve just  
done with behavioural  psychology and to  me.  I  just ,  I  i t ’s  
as  s imple as  ‘I  don’t  l ike  i t ,  p lease can you do this  for  me’ 
kind of .  I t ’s  not  in  terms of ,  ‘well  i f  I  expose mysel f  
gradually  l ike  they do in  s tudies  i t  wi l l  be f ine’ you know 
what  I  mean.  Dan: No,  i t ,  I  do understand l ike  I  don’t  want  
you to  be in  uncomfortable  s i tuat ions that’s  not  what  I  l ike  
to  do.  But  l ike .  I ts’ just  that  i f  we never,  i f  you,  i f  you 
never get  over that .  Then i t ’s  a  problem for  your whole 
l i fe .  Hannah: Mm Dan: Like where you just  have to  do l ike  
i t  a  nasty  thing once.  And then you’l l  never have that  nasty  
feel ing again,  every t ime you’re near mouldy food.  
Hannah: But  what  you just  said.  I t ’s  not  just  gonna take 
one t ime.  Dan: Well  you don’t .  Hannah: To go ful ly.  Dan: 
No,  you don’t  know do you.  But  i t  could be that  you just… 
Hannah: What i f  I  just  never do? And then I’m just  always 
in  an uncomfortable  s tate .  Dan: Ok so,  but  l ike  I ,  but  we 
could at  least  try,  couldn’t  we?’ (All)  (5)  
d)  References to   Peter:  I  can say why.  Your your parents  are l ike  quiet .   
Jenny:  Yeah,  I  get  this  from my Dad and we l i teral ly. . .  my 




Category Themes & Illustration 
behaviours  that  
ar ise  in  their  
Family of  or igin  
growing up my dad.  I f  you l ike  had the TV on 1 he’d be 
l ike ,  'Turn that  down.  I  can hear,  I ’m trying to  s leep' .  So I  
think that’s  made me a bi t  more a bi t  hypersensi t ive  to  
noise around and things l ike  that .   
Peter:  Whereas 8 or  9  o’clock in  the  morning my Mum’d be 
up just  put t ing her music  on.  
Jenny:  Yeah.   
Peter:  Sort  of  thing.  So I’ve always grown up with that .  
Like they always have the TV on ’t i l  whatever t ime as well .  
So,  I  don’t  think there’s  any problem with with noise levels  
in  our house at  al l .   
Jenny:  Well  I  grew up in  a  bungalow as well .  So,  I ’ve 
never had that  experience of  sound travel ing up through a 
f loor as  well .  So,  i f  I  went  to  bed at  the back of  the house 
the TV in the l iv ing room wouldn’t  real ly  af fect  me.  (Cp3,  
Cp5) (2)  
e)  Context  & 
Behaviour  
  Here Brigid uses  her  understanding of  the context  in  which 
she and the other  male meet:  they met  in  a  col legiate  
context  and i t  seems that  she assumes that  the context  in  
which they met  guides the relat ionship.  
‘So,  I  made a fr iend here in  one of  my classes  and he 
invi ted me out  to  have a drink’  
Jed ini t ia l ly  understood Hope’s  repeated asking as  
‘badgering’ ,  due to  the repeated nature of  the behaviour  
and the frequent  requests  about  his  wellbeing.  (Cp1,  Cp2) 
(2)  
Note:  CP**couple number,  ( )  *  number of  part ic ipants  with the theme.   
Process 2: Revising understanding of the other’s intentions. Both change and 
maintenance processes begin similarly, with both a rigid viewpoint, and the desire to 
resolve repeated challenges and discomfort associated with relationship conflict. Unlike 
maintenance however, revision involves genuine dialogue with the partner and 
incorporation of partner’s feedback on intuitive guesses. This suggests that changes in 
viewpoint are effortful, requiring the person’s deliberate motivation to listen accurately 
and to change and are not a passive process. Changes appeared to occur as a result of 





Table 25. Description of each case in relation to the phases of changing beliefs about partner’s intentions. 
 Phase 1 
(Challenge and 
Clarif ication)  
Phase 2:  (Turning point)  Phase 3 






Rigidi ty  Doubt/Period of  Uncertainty  Downgrading of  
l ikel ihood/grain of  
t ruth 
Belief  Revised 
Couple 4 
(Leah) 




Belief  Revised 
Couple 2 
(Jed)  
Rigidi ty  Awareness  of  Partner ’s  
Emotional  State  
Motivat ion 
understood 
Belief  Revised 
Couple 3 
(Uzma) 
Rigidi ty  Seeing his  behaviour  and 
hearing his  account  in  the 
Recal l  video.   
Reflect ion during 
Recal l  Task 
Belief  Revised 
Couple 5 
(Jenny) 
Rigidi ty  Seeing his  behaviour  and 
hearing his  account  in  the 
Recal l  video.  
Reflect ion during 
Recal l  Task 
Belief  Revised 
Couple 1 
(Brigid)  
Rigidi ty  Doubt/Period of  Uncertainty  Accommodation 
Orientat ion 
Belief  Revised 
Couple 4 
(Dan) 




Belief  Flexed 
 
2.1. First Phase: Rigidity. Like maintenance, detailed below (Process 3), each 
partner initially held differing viewpoints which they tried to maintain regardless of 
their partner’s viewpoint (rigidity). However, many partners later became more flexible 
allowing the other to influence their view, again suggesting a motivated process. A 
typical example of a switch from initial rigidity to flexibility is, when Uzma says:  
At first, I could only see why my viewpoint was correct and I was feeling 
determined to get my point across. I felt like my partner made some really good points 
and that they are very sophisticated with the way they argue their points. 
2.2. Second Phase: Turning Point. The difference between situations of 




views are changed. These are sometimes sudden and frequently triggered by body 
language (or voice tone) that contradicts a ‘strongly held’ interpretation of the other’s 
intentions. Triggers for ‘turning points’ are often visual cues which are apparently 
prioritised over a partner’s verbal message. At least one person in each couple 
experienced this. For example, Hope notices that Jed rolls his eyes when she is talking 
about her being able to correctly predict his illnesses. Jenny’s intuition that led to her 
seeing that Peter cared, arose when she saw his body language and heard his voice tone 
on the recording. More detailed descriptions of turning points are given in Table 26.  
Table 26. Quotes and detail: Turning points 
Couple Turning Point  i l lustrat ion 
Couple 1:  
Brigid 
She speaks f i rs t  about  an argument  with Brandon concerning his  suspicions about  
the male fr iend,  
‘But  when I  presented i t ,  i t  d idn’t  l ike I  was t ryin’ to  see l ike. . .  how i t  l ike actual ly  
went ,  instead of  jumping to  conclusions’ .  The more sal ient  information,  based on the 
cer tainty of  her  s ta tement  about  i t ,  is  that  she feels  uncomfortable  around the male 
fr iend.  ‘ there’s  other  aspects  of  the conversat ion that  are  making me uncomfortable ,  
total ly  unrelated to  the rela t ionship.  I ’m l ike this  is  not  a  good fr iend for  me to 
have’ .  At  this  point  i t  seems that  she has largely revised her  bel ief  about ,  not  just  
her  behaviour  towards,  the male fr iend.  
 A further  s i tuat ion then corroborates  and f inal ly  changes view of  the other  male’s  
intent ions:  the male fr iend appears  during the la te  evening at  their  home and asks to  
speak to  her  because he has a  problem, ‘ i t  was very s talkery’ .   
When he requests  they go to  ta lk  in  pr ivate ,  ‘ I  was l ike aghhh,  i t  was just  and I  was 
kind mad also because I  had i t  fe l t  l ike what ,  you know this  whole,  this ,  imagine 
this  whole process  that  we’ve just  condensed into nine minutes…we had gotten al l  
of  that  resolved and I  was l ike successful ly  dis tancing myself  f rom [male fr iend]’ .   
The evidence used here is  her  feel ings (anger) ,  and also her  discomfort  with the 
l ikely argument  that  i t  wil l  cause between her  and Brandon.  The male fr iend then 
suggests  direct ly  that  they should have a  romantic  relat ionship.  This  is  where we see 
the f inal  revis ion of  her  view of  the other  male’s  intent ions based on her  experience 
with the other  male in  the l ight  of  comments  from Brandon.  
Couple 2:  Jed Jed uses  Hope’s  behaviour  as  evidence of  her  intent ions.   
Jed:  Well  when when we were away a few years  ago,  i t  was sort  of  again,  l ike  the 
mentioning thing.  I t  was the conversat ion of  um, you’re not  doing i t  to  sort  of  
badger me i ts  cause you’re actual ly  scared.  And I  think from that ,  cause we’ve been 
around people that  have been i l l  and I’ve seen how scared i t  makes you.  Sort  of  
makes i t  a  l i t t le  bi t  c learer  for  me,  that  i t ’s  not  me i ts  everyone.   
Hope:  yeah i t  is  everyone  
Interviewer:  So,  you real ised that  i t  wasn’t  personal?  




Couple Turning Point  i l lustrat ion 
Couple 2:  Hope We see a period of  uncertainty  that  fol lows from Hope’s  earl ier  quotat ion in  Table 
24 above.   
Hope:  What were you trying to  say there? I  feel  l ike  I  was s topping you talking.   
Jed:  I  think I  was just  reposi t ioning that’s  al l .  I  don’t .   
Hope:  I  don’t  think you were.  Like you looked l ike  you were trying,  gonna say 
something.   
Jed:  Um  
Hope:  You thought  of  something? 
Jed:  I  don’t  think so,  I  I  think I  was just  shi f t ing mysel f .  I  can’t  think of  what  I  
would say in  that  s i tuat ion.   
Interviewer to  Hope: Right  so you looked l ike  you fe l t  uncomfortable .  You look l ike  
you feel .  So,  what’s  going on for  you now?  
Hope:  Um I  don’t  know; I  just  feel  l ike .  You didn’t  say anything through that ,  you 
didn’t  even l ike  have a facial  expression (L) .  Which is  k inda what  we were talking 
about  l ike .  When we argue I  feel  l ike  you don’t  care,  and you didn’t  even look l ike  
you cared then (L) .   
Jed:  Well ,  I  do care.  (Strong voice tone )  
Hope:  No,  I  know.  
Couple 4:  Dan  Dan: Well  I  would be l ike in  my ideal  s i tuat ion.  I  would l ike female respondent  to  
be confident  enough to  be able  to  take the that  s tuff  out  of  the bin on her  own.  Yeah 
out  the fr idge.  I f  we are  both just  l ike,  i f  we both decided we don’t  want  i t  any 
more.  Whoever ’s  the next  person to  the fr idge can then chuck i t  away.   
And  
‘ i t ’s  not  real ly  l ike my responsibi l i ty;  i t ’s  l ike an equal  responsibi l i ty.  But  I  do 
understand that  i f  i t ’s  l ike something l ike that  t ruly terr i f ies  female respondent  to  
the bone,  I  don’t  want  to  cause female respondent  to  be terr i f ied to  the bone.  That  is  
obviously not  what  I  want  so i f  female respondent  is  l ike I  wil l  never  change my 
feel ing on this  I  wil l  never ’ .  
Couple 5:  Jenny  Jenny :  His  admit tance he already makes an effort  to  keep volumes low and wear  
headphones.  Firs t  t ime today I  properly bel ieved he makes those efforts .  (Because of  
being able  to  see him on the video tape)  
 
2.3. Third phase: Reflection. Following the previous stage, partners entered a 
reflective stage focussed on the conflict and aspects of their own or their partner’s 
behaviour or expressed point of view. Often aspects of behaviour or views that 
contradicted an initial intuitive inference were the subject of reflection. During conflict 
discussions whilst being video recorded, partners frequently looked away from each 




information; this perhaps may be evident during naturally occurring disagreement 
situations and contribute to conflict escalation. Watching video playback however, 
increased participants’ awareness of their partner’s non-verbal behaviour, serving as an 
additional source of information upon which they could reflect. Video watching 
appeared to give partners the ability to see the conflict as a third-party. An example, in 
Table 27 describes how watching video feedback and viewing a partner’s non-verbal 





Table 27.Quotes and illustration of reflection. 
Peter frequently gives information about his 
intentions during the dialogue. 
Peter: So, I just, I just know you’ve got an 
active frustration. But I it,  I like, I’m I'd like to 
be able to resolve an issue, and I you know 
make it amicable for everybody. But and I’m 
trying to do the best I possibly can. Yet the next 
step is for me literally not having the TV on at 
all and I don’t think I really.  
The trigger for Jenny changing her mind here was 
watching Peter’s body-language and his evidence in 
the video that lead her to believe that Peter was 
making an effort to be considerate. 
Interviewer: So, has the discussion changed 
your mind on anything or did you notice 
anything that you hadn’t noticed before?  
Jenny: I think the only thing I’ve noticed is, 
Peter kind of more earnestly trying to say, I do 
try and make things as quiet as possible.  
Interviewer: Mmhuh.  
Jenny: Whereas, I probably always sat upstairs 
just going, 'He just doesn’t think about me. He 
just comes in, does whatever he wants'.   
Interviewer: Mmmhuh.  
Jenny: Then kind of seeing male respondent 
face-to-face, but it genuinely is on low. Just 
please come down one time and see how low the 
TV.  
Interviewer: Yeah  
Jenny: That’s made me... made me think that 
you do make...  you do at least make an effort to 
keep things quiet.  
 
2.4 The final phase: Accommodation. During the final phase the partner’s view 
was accommodated, that is to say, acknowledged and incorporated into the partner’s 
understanding of the situation. People often emerged from this interactive process with 
a different view of their partner’s behaviour to that previously held, suggesting that this 





For example, Jenny writes in the written section after the interview process.  
Jenny: His admittance he already makes an effort to keep volumes low and wear 
headphones. First time today I properly believed he makes those efforts. 
2.4.1. Feeling Cared About. In addition to triggers that facilitated awareness 
(e.g., watching video playback of their disagreement), one aspect of context that 
appeared important to the willingness to accommodate a partner’s way of viewing the 
situation and their behaviours, was feeling cared about. Frequently, partners who 
changed their view had recently commented that their partner cared about them or was 
considerate prior to revising their understanding of the other’s intentions. For example, 
Uzma reported feeling ‘they tried to put themselves into my shoes’ and that Ali had 
pointed out the benefits to her of changing her behaviour. Of the 10 participants, eight 
reported (during in the solo written exercise) that they knew the partner cared about 
them.  
Leah: He's quite cooperative and I feel that he was willing to leave the 
answering to me, hoping I knew him well enough to know what he was thinking/feeling. 
I think he tried to ensure I didn't get upset at what he was saying.  
Process 3: Maintaining the original understanding of the other’s intentions. 
Those who changed their initial understanding differed from those who maintained their 
initial understanding in the type of information they incorporated into these 
understandings. Those whose understandings of the other’s intentions changed, tended 
to use external information (e.g., the situational context), whilst those who maintained 
their understandings either continued to use their initial understanding (intuition) or 




confirmed their initial understanding of the partner’s intentions.  
3.1.1. The Difficulty in Dismissing Intuition. Once an intuitive belief about the 
partner’s motives and views was formed, it appeared very persistent and difficult to 
dismiss. Individuals’ initial decision about their partner’s motivation on the basis of 
intuition appeared to be much less likely to be updated with subsequent evidence; the 
initial intuitive information was more salient and partners dismissed contradictory 
evidence that arose, avoiding the search for evidence that would counter their 
assumptions and appearing to deliberately search for evidence that confirmed their 
initial intuition. A further analytic theme related to the understanding of another’s 
intentions is that each partner often did not believe the reasons that the other gave for 
their behaviour. There is a sense that their own initial intuitive belief about the other’s 
intentions was seen as more accurate than the partner’s account of their own intentions. 
This dynamic appeared to generate additional conflict.  
A factor that might have promoted a lack of accurate updating with external 
information is eye-gaze. Observations of the video play back showed partners during 
conflict discussions often lacked visual contact with the partner, with eye-gaze being 
directed away from the partner either downward to the floor or upward and to the left or 
right. This suggested a reliance on internal information, and it is very likely that 
contextual information and potential evidence from paralinguistic and non-verbal cues 
was not observed and may lead to maintenance of the erroneous (intuitive) viewpoint.  
3.1.2. Lying. In every interview at least one partner referenced (either covertly or 
overtly) their partner not telling the truth. For example, Brandon’s belief that Brigid was 




checked Jed’s wellbeing as she did not believe his responses. The common factor in 
believing that a partner was lying seems to be that the partner’s account contradicts a 
person’s own initial understandings of the situation and their partner’s motivations.  
Table 28. shows the continuation of one strongly held belief and how this belief 
subsequently changed. In this example, initially Jenny strongly believed Peter was 
inconsiderate and insensitive to her preference for a quiet environment when she goes to 
sleep. However, during the video playback section of the cued recall process, her beliefs 
changed. Jenny stated that the cued-recall process gave her the opportunity to see visual 
and non-verbal information as a third-party and hear Peter’s verbal account. Perhaps 
this was due to the convention of paying attention to video playback and therefore 
seeing additional visual information. Jenny was then able to change her mind as she saw 
evidence that Peter was, contrary to her initial assumption, making substantial efforts to 
be considerate (i.e., wearing headphones, turning down noise to a minimum, changing 
the type of programme he watched).  
Table 28. Quotes with detail about difficulty in dismissing intuition and lying.  
Theme Couple 5  Couple 2  
Diff icul ty  in  
Dismissing 
Intui t ion 
Jenny:  just  as  real ly  l ike  a  small  point  
in  that  what  was running through my 
head when Peter  was going well  I  just  
watch the ( incomprehensible)  he’s  
real ly  fai led to  mention al l  the t imes 
that  you played s tuf f  that  is  
legi t imately  noisy  so I  remember being 
mildly  kind of  mmmm this  is  a  good 
interest ing example that  you’ve chosen 
for  this  session but  there is  a  lot  of  
s tuf f  that  you do put  on your phone 
which is  k ind of  going (mimics phone 
noises)  and then I  go al l  the t ime cause 
i t ’s  always l ike  s i l ly  l i t t le  games and 
s tuf f  but  l ike  according to  that  v ideo 
you just  watch nice quiet  so  
Peter:  I  do play things with sound on 
but  I  don’t  think there is  any problem 
Jenny:  ( laughing)   
Peter:  Sometimes you aren’t  even going 
Hope: You l ike .   
Jed:  Yeah,  squinted um.  
Hope:  (Laughs)   
Jed:  I t ’s  because I  don’t  think that’s  true.   
Hope:  Do you not?  
Jed:  No.   
Hope:  Why? 
Jed:  Just  don’t .  I  don’t  think your 
predicaments ,  you have them before,  but  I  
don’t  think.   
Hope:  I  know. I’ve had them quite  a  few 
t imes.   




Theme Couple 5  Couple 2  
to  s leep.   
Jenny:  Well ,  I ’m watching.   
Peter:  You are s i t t ing there,  and you 
are playing a game yoursel f .  And I  just  
choose to  have the sound on,  because I  
qui te  l ike  to  have the sound on.  I  think 
I  don’t  see the problem with that .  I f  
you were s leeping,  then I  would be 
turning the sound of f .   
Jenny:  Yeah,  I  s t i l l  th ink i t ’s  
inconsiderate .  (Cp5) 
not  something wrong.   
Hope:  No,  no,  no,  I  know. But  l ike ,  i f  I  
actual ly  think you’re gonna l ike  have an 
i l lness  I  am, I  am right ,  and I  can sorta te l l .   
Jed:  Um yeah,  I  suppose.   
Hope:  I  could see then.  You were l ike ,  didn’t  
bel ieve me.   
Jed:  Yeah.  (Cp2) 
Lying  Peter:  ( laughing) You even think I’m 
lying about  that  though ( laughing).  I  
genuinely  can’t  put  headphones on to  
l is ten.  Jenny:  I f  I  had my way,  you’d 
wear headphones for  every act iv i ty.   
 We see a  number of  reports  f rom Hope about  
Jed’s  intent ions throughout  the interviews.  
Firs t ly,  she interrupts  the f low of  the s tory to  
suggest  that  he l ies  (about  being well  when 
he is  not  and about  not  being cross  or  
unhappy when he is) .  He automatical ly  
agrees  and then dismisses  this  twice and 
redirects  the conversat ion to  the s tory that  he 
was previously te l l ing.  Within the context  of  
the discussion i t  seems l ikely that  Jed is  not  
te l l ing del iberate  l ies  about  his  own heal th  
s tatus  and negat ive emotional  s ta tes  but  is  
just  report ing based on a  different  level  of  
tolerance for  what  is  important ,  which Hope 
then reinterprets  as  lying.  Like Brandon in  
Couple 1 her  reasoning in  this  s i tuat ion 
appears  to  suggest  some irrat ional i ty  and i t  
is  a lso persis tent ,  she comes back to  this  
bel ief  la ter  in  the dialogue.   
Jed:  Yeah,  but  then obviously  because i t ’s  
annoying me and i t ’s  annoying you cos,  I ’m 
not  te l l ing you i f  there’s  anything wrong cos 
there’s  not .  You. . .   
Hope:  You do l ie  sometimes though.   
Male respondent:  Well  yeah,  but  no.  (shakes 
head)  
Female respondent:  Yes you do ( laughing).  
You just  say,  'Yeah'   
Male respondent:  Erm.. .  no. . .yeah.  But  then 
we had a bi t  of  a  t i f f  d idn’t  we?  
 
3.1.3. The difference between inaccurate and accurate intuition. Whether 
erroneous understandings of their partner’s intentions are changed or maintained 
appears to be based on whether intuition or deliberative thought is used as the on-going 




accuracy appeared to result from an individual’s ability to engage in deliberative 
thought processes in addition to more rapid, experiential understandings, and to engage 
with the partner’s dialogue even where it differs from their initial understanding, 
incorporating information from the external environment and knowledge of the 
partner’s prior behaviour to revise their understanding. In contrast, those who maintain 
inaccurate beliefs about their partner’s motivations or intentions, draw inferences about 
the partner’s ‘life-world’ based on their own experiences, beliefs and current emotional 
state, and therefore draw erroneous conclusions about other’s intentions and viewpoint.  
It appeared that accurate inferences regarding the other’s intentions were 
important in understanding the partner’s subsequent behaviour and that feeling well-
understood tended to lead to de-escalation of the conflict, whereas feeling 
misunderstood tended to escalate conflict within the relationship. Given the 
impossibility of direct access to another’s ‘life-world’ and that for social affiliation, the 
accurate representation of other’s beliefs is important (Mercier & Sperber, 2011), it is 
possible that people have anxieties based on a perception of a deficit in the functioning 
of their ‘intuitive system’. For two of the participants, Hope (Cp1) and Brandon (Cp2), 
anxieties about their ability to form accurate, implicit understanding of their partner’s 
intentions, motivations and state, appeared to be a source of distress. This is evidenced 
by their frequent enquiry about their partner’s wellbeing or surveillance of their 
partner’s whereabouts.  
Question 2. How do Irrational Beliefs Arise, and how are they Maintained or 
Changed? 
This section focuses on irrational thought processes that evolve during conflict 




partner and, subsequently, the relationship. Three main processes emerged: the 
relationship between anxiety and difficulty in dismissing intuition-based irrational 
ideas; gendered differences in partner’s accommodation of irrationality; and some 
apparent functions of irrational thoughts, including the transfer of responsibility and 
deferential incorporation. 
Summary. The dialogue and written pieces have answered the first question 
about the process of development and change of each person’s understanding of other’s 
intentions. However, as there was no discussion by any of the couples about how their 
irrational ideas (e.g., about food contamination) arose, and also no revision of these 
irrational beliefs during the research process, couple discussions failed to generate 
answers to the first research question - How do irrational beliefs arise, and change?  
However, in all cases partners held some ideas that appeared to the partner, the 
research team, and often the belief-holder themselves as irrational. In each case, these 
beliefs were the focus of the conflict discussion that partners brought to the study. Belief 
holders differed in their awareness of the rationality of their belief, in general, women 
appeared to be more self-reflective and were more likely to feel that their belief was 
irrational even whilst continuing to believe it. Over time, partners had devised two basic 
ways of dealing with their partner’s irrational beliefs; either using behavioural or 
cognitive accommodation (discussed later in this section). Dealing with their partner’s 
irrational beliefs however, still appeared to be a source of frustration and anxiety. A 
notable difference was that females with irrational ideas seemed aware that their beliefs 
were not logical and were at least somewhat irrational. Whereas males either were not 




discussed below.  
Process 4. Difficulty in dismissing irrational intuition-based beliefs. 
Irrational beliefs appear to emerge from a combination of earlier intuitive 
understandings and negative emotion (e.g., anger or anxiety). Irrational beliefs were 
maintained by an inability to dismiss initial beliefs arising from intuitive understandings 
of the situation. Intuition that originated in social anxieties about being able to correctly 
infer other’s intentions, or where the person is experiencing negative emotions (e.g., 
frustration or anxiety) appeared to be more difficult to dismiss. Two of the cases 
demonstrate this dynamic clearly: Couple 1—Brandon’s exaggerated and therefore 
irrational ideas about the threat posed by his girlfriend’s male friend; and Couple 2—
Hope is anxious about her ability to understand Brad’s internal states. As mentioned 
above, some participants with irrational beliefs seem aware that these ideas are 
unsupported by reliable evidence, and reference this in their dialogue, whereas other 
participants appear to show no awareness. Upon further analysis, a pattern emerged 
regarding those who appeared aware or not aware of the irrationality of their beliefs (see 
Table 29). When a male held what seemed to be an irrational belief, e.g., about their 
partner’s motivations (i.e., unlikely given the presented evidence), he appeared to be 
overconfident in his belief, showing no awareness that his belief was likely to be untrue. 
However, females, in all cases, acknowledged that their beliefs might be erroneous, 
referencing the lack of evidence. Whilst I acknowledge that this is a very small sample, 
the pattern is nonetheless interesting. 
Process 5. Accommodation. 
5.1. Phase 1: Accommodation orientation and the focus of conflict. 




the apparent lack of evidence for a strongly held belief of one partner. In each case the 
partner with the belief that appears to fit the available evidence better (from here on 
called more rational) made attempts to change their behaviours, or the situation, in order 
to accommodate the partner with irrational beliefs. Whereas, the partner with more 
unfounded beliefs made fewer concessions to their partner. This suggests that irrational 
ideas may have a social function that involves influencing or persuading others. 
Accommodation manifests as changes in either behaviour or in cognition (where the 
partner’s beliefs are incorporated into and often supersede the other partner’s original 
belief). Table 29 summarises this process. Firstly, where one partner has a belief that is 
unlikely on the basis of the evidence presented (which from here on will be called 
irrational), it is the other partner, regardless of gender, who attempts to accommodate 
the partner with irrational beliefs. Secondly, the table shows males (without exception) 
are overconfident in their judgement, believing themselves to be right, even when their 
beliefs are wholly or partially ungrounded in the available evidence. Finally, in terms of 
accommodation within each relationship, male partners accommodate their partner by 
making behavioural changes on the basis of their partner’s opinion; however, they 
maintain awareness of the female partner’s beliefs as irrational. Whereas, female 
partners try and accommodate the beliefs of their partner; and their apparent under-
confidence in their judgment per se often leads to deferring to the male’s perspective 





Table 29. Patterns of partner accommodation, and awareness of irrationality. 
C o u p l e  F e m a l e  M a l e  W h o  
A c c o m m o d a t e s ?  
T h i n k s  t h e  p e r s o n  w h o  i s  
t h i n k i n g  i r r a t i o n a l l y  i s  
i r r a t i o n a l  
B e l i e v e s  t h e m s e l v e s  
t o  b e  r i g h t  
C o u p l e  1  R a t i o n a l  I r r a t i o n a l  F e m a l e  N o  M a l e  
C o u p l e  3  R a t i o n a l  I r r a t i o n a l  F e m a l e  N o  M a l e  
C o u p l e  2  I r r a t i o n a l  R a t i o n a l  M a l e  Ye s  M a l e  
C o u p l e  4  I r r a t i o n a l  R a t i o n a l  M a l e  Ye s  M a l e  
Coup le  5 :  I r r a t i ona l  Ra t i ona l  M a l e  Ye s  M a l e  
 
5.2. Phase 2: Safety behaviours and transfer of responsibility. Erroneous 
thinking appears to be maintained by two further linked processes that could constitute 
safety behaviours (Clark, 2001). The transfer of responsibility for dealing with a 
problem to the partner, and deferent incorporation.  
Transferring responsibility appears to function in a way that merits additional 
discussion as it arose frequently. Participants talked about behaviours that they engaged 
in or encouraged in their partner; these might be understood as ways to reduce the 
anxiety and distress which occurs as a result of their irrational beliefs (some of which 
have already been mentioned in this analysis). Brandon (Cp1) used frequent checking 
on Brigid in order to manage his anxiety. Similarly, Hope (Cp2) uses checking upon her 
partner’s well-being, in order to manage her anxiety about her partner. Hannah (Cp4) 
encouraged Dan to remove potentially out-of-date food in order to reduce her anxiety. 
Ali’s (Cp3) constraint of Uzma’s spending serves to reduce his anxiety about money. 
Each of these behaviours lead to a reduction in anxiety/distress for the individual who is 
perceived as holding the irrational belief. While reducing anxiety by altering the 




directly challenging what they believe to be irrational thinking (see Table 30). 
Accommodation of the other’s beliefs by one partner appears to enable partners with an 
irrational belief to transfer responsibility for managing either the source of fear or the 
feelings generated by the irrational belief to their partner.  
A second process, cognitive accommodation, is discussed in the following 
section. When a female partner accommodates her partner’s irrational belief, she 
changes not only her behaviour but also her beliefs to align with her partner’s irrational 
belief and thereby comes to believe that she is responsible for the problem. An example 
of cognitive accommodation is illustrated in Table 31. 
Table 30. Types of accommodation and the relationship to safety behaviours. 
Couple  Fear Behavioural 
accommodation 
Cognitive accommodation 
Couple 1  Fear that 
partner will be 
unfaithful 
Female partner stops 
seeing male friend to 
reduce males fear. 
Female comes to believe that male friend 
is a threat to the relationship and is not a 
good friend 
Couple 2 Fear that others 
are unhappy or 
unwell 
Male gives excessive 
reassurance to help 
manage her fear. 
Male understands that she is irrationally 
afraid.  
Couple 3 Fear about lack 
of money and 
spending 
Female curtails 
buying of items that 
partner thinks are 
excessive to reduce 
her partners fear.  
Female comes to believe that her (which 
on the basis of all aspects of the evidence 
presented by the couple. i.e., she lived 
separately from her boyfriend with her 
parents, had separate finances, her own 
adequate income, and spent on a few 
items such as an extra pencil-case in a 
way that if occasionally frivolous, 
appeared moderate and controlled) 
spending might be excessive or 
problematic.  
Couple 4 Fear of out-of-
date food.  
Male disposes of out-
of-date food from the 
fridge so that she 
doesn’t have to feel 
afraid.  
Understands that her fear is irrational.  
Couple 5 Sensitivity to 
noise. 
Male limits noise 
making by wearing 
headphones and 
turning down volume 
so that she does not 
feel annoyed.  
Believes her sensitivity to be excessive 





Table 31. Examples of Behavioural and Cognitive Accommodation.  
His Initial Position Her initial position Accommodation and Transfer 
of Responsibility  
He says ,  ‘She,  she spends 
reckless  amounts  of  money.  So,  
she’l l  see something er  she’l l  
want  i t  she’l l  see something 
that  she’s  wants .  I t  i t ' s  just  erm 
continuously  spending money.  
More and more money each 
day,  and I  don’t  think i t ’s  very 
good.  And she should,  s top 
spending so much,  so quickly’ .  
Furthermore,  he says :  she l ike  
without  thinking you were just  
gonna buy i t  s traight  away.  Ali  
appears  to  bel ieve that  she 
lacks self-discipl ine and 
control  with her  spending.  And 
I  think i t ’d  be l ike  a  good,  i t  
would be a discipl ine your 
spending as  well .  He mentions 
lack of  self-control  and 
discipl ine on s ix  other  
occasions during the 
interviews.   
She says :  But  I  don’t  buy things 
that  don’t  benef i t  me.  However,  
f rom the descript ion of  her  
spending in  the text  i t  appears  that  
she is  buying a  few non-essential  
i tems such as  penci l  cases ,  and 
some clothing,  and food treats  
with her  work money.  
Uzma’s ini t ia l  view of  Ali’s  
intent ions is  that :  what  was going 
through my head at  the moment 
l ike,  ‘Oh do you want  me to l ive 
l ike a  minimalis t?’  
And later  in  the t ranscript ,   
F: I  don’t  think he misunderstood.   
I :  Ok  
F:  I  just  I  just  think he can’t  think 
of  any other t imes that  I’ve spent  
recklessly.  Yeah.  
 M: She thinks that  I  was just  
pinpoint ing that  one occasion,  
rather than i t ’s  being. . .   
F:  Being general ly.  
First ly,  she says ,  I  try  not  to  be 
reckless .  Then she posi t ions 
herself  as  i r rat ional ,  and not  
thinking.  
M: She’s  l ike,  I  don’t  feel  l ike 
anything now but  i f  I  see i t  again,  
I  might  feel  something,  (L)  about  
the penci l  case.  
 F:  i f  I  see that  penci l  case again,  I  
think I  might  be l ike incl ined to  
buy i t .  I f  you don’t  s top me,  then 
I’ l l  just  be l ike ‘oh I  think the 
penci l  case is  cal l ing me.  I  need 
i t ’ .  
She s tar ts  to  agree with his  
assessment  of  her  af ter  having 
resis ted i t  before.  She here agrees  
that  she is  buying things without  
thinking.  Later  she says:  ‘ I  just  
buy i t  because I  think they look 
good but  then I  don’t  l ike  I  don’t  
think things through when I’m 
buying them, I  think in  the 
moment .  So,  yeah that’s  where I  
think I  am reckless ,  because I  buy 
i t  even though I  don’t  need i t  
necessary l ike  want  i t .  I  just  buy i t  
because i t  looks nice’ .   
There is  an extended sect ion of  
dialogue in  the interview that  
demonstrates  this  well .  I t  s tar ts  
with Brigid confronting 
Brandon about  his  use of   
‘ i t  was a long t ime ago’,  
 to  refer  to  the argument  that  
they had just  had which she 
disagrees with.  
Brandon: I  think so l ike…I 
don’t  know I  don’t  real ly  
remember i t  was a long t ime 
ago (Laughs)  
Brigid:  I  guess  
( incomprehensible)  we had 
l i t t le  arguments  
Brigid:  Ok sorry can we s top.  
I t ' s . . .  we legi t imately  did not  have 
l ike  the resolving conversat ion 
about  i t  unt i l  l ike  two nights  ago.  
Like i t . . .   
Here he agrees  with her  and then 
she works to  give him a reason.  
This  uses  her  intui t ive reasoning 
(hunch) about  what  his  ‘a  long 
t ime ago’ could have referred to ,  
but  i t  is  c lear  from the 
t ranscript ion that  they were 
ta lking about  the argument .   
Brandon: No.   
Brigid:  I t  was the the actual  end 
of  the,  my fr iendship with that  
person that  was l ike  a  month or  so 
ago l ike .  So,  i t  fe l t . . .   
Brandon: Yeah.   
Brigid:  A long t ime ago.  We’ve,  we 
had kept  talking about  i t  as ,  and 
s t i l l  trying to  kind of  f igure i t  out  
unt i l  l ike  super recent ly.  So,  I  
thought  i t  was funny that  he was 
just  l ike ,  (mimic)  'Oh that  was 
back in  the day' .  (L)   
Brandon: Well  i t  l ike  the main.  
Like that  issue of  i t  was. . .  uhm.. .  
because you know i t  was 
Here he changes the subject  f rom 
the t iming of  an event  to  his  
feel ings and understanding of  the 
s i tuat ion.  Brigid then works hard 
again to  intui t  and understand what  
he is  ta lking about  that  could 
explain his  voiced perception that  
the argument  ended a  long t ime 
ago.  
Brigid:  So,  you’re talking about  
l ike  the scene that  we were 
discussing?  
Brandon: Yeah.   
Brigid:  Oh ok s . . .  I  just  
misunderstood sorry.   
She apologises ,  taking 
responsibi l i ty  for  the s i tuat ion and 
the misunderstanding.  The 
conversat ion then changes to  
implici t ly  use a  pr inciple  known as  
s tate  dependent  memory,  which is  
l ikely that  the male partner  of  the 
couple has  encountered as  a  resul t  
of  the female partner ’s  s tudies ,  as  
evidence that  she would remember 
i t  accurately where she would not .  
In  this  s i tuat ion i t  appears  that  
Brigid’s  doing of  most  of  the 
relat ional  work ( to  understand 
Brandon,  ini t ia l ly  using intui t ion,  




His Initial Position Her initial position Accommodation and Transfer 
of Responsibility  
something that  I  was frustrated at ,  
but  l ike  once I  understood i t  
bet ter.  
style ,  and evidence gathering)  
evolves into a  s i tuat ion where she 
appears  to  be the one who is  
thinking irrat ional ly  and takes 
responsibi l i ty  for  
misunderstanding him.  
Brandon: Uhm but  l ike ,  I  feel  l ike  
you would remember i t  more 
because i t  was a more s tressful  
s i tuat ion because you know you 
uhm.. .conversat ions with your mom 
can l ike  end up real ly  at  polar 
ends of  the scale .   
Brigid:  Yeah so i t  l ike  there was 
already,  gonna in  my brain there 
and then.   
Brandon: Yeah.  
Brigid:  Add another factor  into i t .   
Brandon: So,  then there was the 
fact  that  I ’d cal led so many t imes.  
(F L)  And then. . .   
Brigid:  I t  was seven t imes (L)   
Brandon: Uhm and then you know 
there was the s i tuat ion that  you 
were. . .  and where you were at  his  
f lat  and.   
Brigid:  Yeah,  'cause  
Brandon: Your Mum was talking to  
him as well  and being super 
exci ted about  that .   
Brigid:  Yeah and the way that  I  
said i t  was l ike  (exaggerated 
voice,)  'Oh I’m in his  f lat ' ,  not  
'hey we’re in  a  group s tudy room 
i ts  part  of  the school ,  but  i t  just  
happens to  be in  the apartment  
bui lding' .  Like that  is  what  I  
should have said.  But  what  I  was 
l ike  was l ike  (exaggerated voice)  
'Oh I’m in my fr iends f lat  and 
we’re on Skype' ,  l ike  (L) .  I t  just  
was not  correct .   
Brandon: And so,  I  feel  l ike  you 
remember i t  more just  because you 
were under the higher s tress  of  the 
s i tuat ion.  
Brigid:  That 's  true I  mean l ike 
that . . .  the talking about  the . . .how, 
how in a certain s tate  you have 
di f ferent  l ike . . .  you remember 
something bet ter  i f  you’re in  the 
same state .  So,  i t . . .because I  was 
s tressed out  then and because i t  
was l ike  a more s tressful  s i tuat ion.  
Next  t ime that  we would get  into a 
f ight  or  a  confl ic t  about  something 




His Initial Position Her initial position Accommodation and Transfer 
of Responsibility  
well .  Or,  or  i f  we would try  and 
even just  talk  about  i t ,  I  would get  
real ly  l ike  f lustery and i t  made the 
s i tuat ion worse probably. . .  
Question 3: How are Partners ‘Positioned’ in Conflict Discussions, by Their 
Partner’s Irrational Thinking or Erroneous Beliefs Based on Intuition?  
In each dialogue partners disagree about the nature of the situation. This 
disagreement has two forms—firstly where one partner acknowledges the other has a 
perspective that contradicts their own, and in contrast, where the partner’s ability to 
reason and accurately derive meaning from other people’s behaviour is put into question 
and their testimony itself is seen to lack credibility. For example, in the dialogue in 
Table 31, it is not just her differing perspective but Brigid’s ability to reason itself is put 
into question by her partner.  
6.1 Phase 3. Deference incorporation, accommodation, and coercive belief 
reconstruction. In contrast to the behavioural accommodation process detailed above, a 
more covert accommodation process, which I named deference incorporation, evolved 
during the interviews. Most partners as illustrated above, after initial resistance to the 
partner’s position, try to accommodate their partner’s views and to consider how to 
accomplish an outcome that both partners consider satisfactory. How ‘accommodation’ 
is accomplished (i.e., either behaviourally or cognitively) determines whether both 
partners are seen by each other and themselves as capable of rational thought with 
regard to their own and other’s motives, and reality.  
Males’ consistent overconfidence in their judgement and belief that they were 
right despite the absence of sufficient evidence to corroborate this, in combination with 




belief was benevolent and grounded in reality. Where this overconfidence/empathy 
dynamic appeared to be problematic, however, was where a male partner erroneously 
asserted his insufficiently evidenced, negative attributions about his partner (i.e., 
interpretations of her behaviour, thoughts, or emotions which (in the opinion of the 
researcher) are likely to not be in the female partner’s best interests to agree with and 
cognitively accommodate. This process appears complete when the female partner has 
accommodated the (male) partner’s beliefs, by subsuming her own interpretation, and 
believes his interpretation of herself and the situation. This process appears to be a 
functional behaviour for the male, as it appears that responsibility for his distress has 
transferred to the female partner.  
Conversely, whilst the cognitive accommodation process of deference 
incorporation, described above, appears to be functional for the male, it seems 
potentially dysfunctional for the female partner. This is because cognitive 
accommodation means giving up one’s own beliefs about what is real (i.e., ability to 
have accurate insight into one’s own or another’s motivations and knowledge of one’s 
own identity) for one that is no longer grounded in this reality.  
6.1.1. Period of confusion. Where an individual tried to accommodate, what they 
felt to be, a partner’s irrational viewpoint, they reported confusion and an inability to 
think clearly. This was reported by couples one, three and five. It is conceivable that 
trying to reason with a partner’s irrational thoughts created a sense of doubt in their own 
ability to reason effectively. Confusion is a lived experience that was reported to 
accompany the transition between their partner’s lack of accurate understanding and the 




(to themselves or another). This experience is common to both types of accommodation, 
but only some partners appear to adopt a belief that what they are saying is 
incomprehensible. We see an example of this in Table 32. 
Table 32. Example of confusion. 
Peter: It er... it still confuses me about the whole; If you’ve got your if you’ve got your noise 
playing. I I don’t see the difference in noise. Some noise that you’ve your making. So therefore, your 
podcasts on. That that, that’s what I can’t get my head round. That if... er if you were going to sleep 
with utter silence then I could get my head round it. But more often than not, you’re texting me 
when you... (laughing) off a phone which is making noise, telling me not to make noise.  
 Process 6: Sense of not being able to make oneself understood.  
To some extent everybody apart from Uzma in couple 3, described not feeling 
understood by their partner. In three of those cases (Cp1, Brigid; Cp2, Hope; Cp5, 
Peter) participants comment that their experience or thinking differs from that of other 
people and is not normal. They have a sense of alienation from what they believe to be 
normal experience. After being misunderstood, participants describe lacking words with 
which to make themselves comprehensible to their partner and to the interviewer, and 
felt they weren’t thought of as providing credible information. This is reflected in their 
dialogue which appears to be less reliant on evidence as time goes on.  
Being credible and understood by their partner and the interviewer, was felt to 
be important to respondents; and it was apparent that being deemed untrustworthy and 
being misunderstood was a source of distress. Two ways in which participants described 
not being able to make themselves comprehensible emerged from the data. We see 
examples of this in the following quotes in Table 33:  
Table 33. Example of not being able to make oneself comprehensible. 
Hope: Like when I was like, ‘oh you understand now’. Whereas before I was just, you 
just thought I was annoying you. I didn’t know you were.  




Hope: Yeah, I know but like, it’s not something I under, expect other people to 
understand. Because I have never met anyone else that’s scared of other people being 
ill like. People are scared of like getting illnesses, themselves like germs and stuff. 
That doesn’t bother me. People are scared of like of sick. I’m scared of the person, 
like people being sick. But I’m not, like sick doesn’t bother me. So, I don’t, I don’t 
expect you to understand it. So, I wasn’t sure when I said that. Whether like…you 
did.  
Jed: Yeah, I get it.  
In the written section Jed says 
Jed: I don't think Hope believed what I was saying fully. I also felt as though I could 
not explain myself properly and (she) occasionally finished my answers for me. (Cp2) 
The dialogue suggests that the felt sense of being comprehensible in partner-
conflict has a social dynamic aspect. That being comprehensive is an interactive process 
that is not only intra-psychic but is preceded by a partner’s lack of understanding of 
one’s point of view. It is not that someone starts as incomprehensible, but that they 
come to believe that they are so, due to being misunderstood by their partner. This felt 
sense results from the partner failing to accurately acknowledge or respond sensitively 
to their point of view, or the imperative suggested by their point of view. It is this 
dynamic that leads to a sense of not being believable or comprehensible. 
Discussion 
Summary of Findings 
This study is the first using cued recall methodology to investigate how people 
in non-abusive relationships understand each other’s intentions, how irrational thinking 
is managed during conflict discussions, and what impact each process has on the 
relationship. 
Three main findings relate to how participants perceive and process social cues 
and mentalise in couple conflict situations. Differences in empathy processes appear to 




rationally; irrational ideas are more likely to form when people judge their partner’s 
intentions using unchecked intuition, their own negative affect, and their own 
unchecked assumptions about partner’s non-verbal cues. Participants who hold 
irrational ideas are also less inclined than partners with more, apparently better 
evidenced bases for their held beliefs, to revise these beliefs based on their partner’s 
behaviour. These findings are consistent with lack of belief revision in those with 
current psychotic ideation that are outlined in cognitive models of psychosis (Broome et 
al., 2005; Garety et al., 2005, 2007).  
Secondly, irrational thinking and belief rigidity was reported by at least one 
partner in each couple and was qualitatively similar to that found in individuals who 
experience delusions as a result of early psychosis (Broome et al., 2007). Finally, 
irrational beliefs appeared to function to enlist the partner’s assistance in avoiding 
anxiety-provoking situations, either by soliciting practical assistance from the partner or 
by minimising challenge to rigidly held beliefs. Varying strategies were employed in the 
management of irrational thoughts expressed by a partner. Such strategies could be seen 
as functional behaviours with the likelihood of immediate (in the discussion) and longer 
term (within the relationship) rewarding or punitive outcomes. In addition, some 
participants reported that upholding their own irrational ideas reduced their levels of 
anxiety. This research contributes towards knowledge by exploring how information is 
prioritised and integrated within a conflict situation in order for a partner’s intentions 
and motivations to be understood. In addition, it highlights the type of information that 
may be ignored by a partner when inaccurate social cognition occurs. 




conflict and that the social processes, outlined in detail above that arise and evolve 
during conflict, give rise to both rational and irrational beliefs. These alterations in 
belief appear to arise from alteration in social cognitive processes (e.g., empathy and 
intuition) that are important to social affiliation (Mercier & Sperber, 2011) and that 
therefore have a clear role in adaptive social functioning. Furthermore, the processes of 
strategic social influence (Kramer & Messick, 1995) that evolved during partner 
conflicts, have the potential to result, not just in behavioural changes, but in belief 
changes. This suggests that irrational beliefs may be functional behaviours (Carr, 1988) 
and when combined with negative (social) attributions about the partner, they may also 
be coercive or abusive.  
How and when do People come to Understand each Other’s Intentions During a 
Conflict Situation? 
Menenses and Larkin (2015) suggest three social cognitive processes involved 
in empathy: intuition (characterised by its reliance on nonverbal and unintentionally 
communicated experience); sharing (an experience of ‘we’ promoted by identification 
or sharing of something in common with the other person); and imagining, which draws 
on intellectual resources to represent the experience of the other person. Menenses and 
Larkin (2015), suggest empathy consists of a number of sub-processes, and accurate 
understanding of another depends on which of these empathy processes is used. 
Although all partners employ empathic processes, the choice of evidence on which to 
base assumptions about the other or cross-checking initial thoughts, determines those 
whose empathy and intuition are more or less accurate. Those who form more accurate 
initial understandings of their partner’s intentions and behaviours base these 




knowledge of their partner’s prior motivations, as opposed to relying upon body 
language and vocal tone information in the current situation. In order to revise their 
beliefs about their partner’s intentions, those with more accurate understandings are also 
able to listen to and incorporate the partner’s views about their own (the partner’s) 
motivations. These differences in evidence-base and the process used, lead to the 
dismissal of (implausible) suspicious thoughts rather than escalation of the conflict 
situation. It appears that empathic accuracy is impeded because those who form 
irrational ideas over-rely on intuition and internal cues for both initial understanding 
and review and they do not perform fact-checking reviews using new external 
information. These findings accord with previous research that suggests that the social 
cognitive processes central to social relationships are impaired in psychosis, in 
particular empathy (Blakemore & Frith, 2006; Brüne, 2005), and accurate inference of 
others’ thoughts and feelings (Bentall et al., 2009) commonly called empathic accuracy 
(Ickes & Tooke, 1988). 
1. The role of intuition. 
Previous findings suggest people over prioritise nonverbal information during 
empathic processes (Menenses & Larkin, 2015). The current study found this is not just 
due to focussing on nonverbal cues themselves, but to an over-reliance on initial, 
emotion-based interpretations of nonverbal cues. In addition, the failure to revise beliefs 
and integrate other contextual information, for example a partner’s prior behaviour and 
subsequent nonverbal cues. It appears that priority is given to nonverbal information 
experienced during concurrent negative emotional states and over prioritisation of 
intuitive beliefs under these conditions that results in persistent irrational beliefs about 




According to Ma-Kellams and Lerner (2016), folk understanding of intuition is 
that it helps to accurately infer the feelings of others. The results reported above 
however, show that a reliance on unchecked intuition was the main source of both 
unfounded assumptions about a partner’s intentions and of the maintenance of those 
assumptions. Two factors in this study, strong negative emotion and over-reliance on 
unchecked nonverbal cues, appeared to interact to reduce empathic accuracy. Prior 
research shows that negative emotion is partly causal in creating and maintaining 
erroneous assumptions (Thewissen et al., 2011), which suggests empathic accuracy may 
only be impaired when partners use intuitive thinking whilst experiencing strong 
negative emotions, which would account for previous mixed findings about whether 
intuition-use improves or worsens empathic accuracy reported by Ma-Kellams and 
Learner (2016) in their review of prior findings. 
What Factors Determine when Inaccurate Interpersonal Understandings are 
Revised and when they are not? 
Intuitive assumptions are often confidently held (Thompson et al., 2013; 
Topolinski & Reber, 2010), as processes giving rise to intuitions tend to be fast and 
fluent and this experience has been found to engender a sense of confidence. The 
current study suggests this confidence leads to a failure to review intuitive 
understandings of the partner’s intentions. Although all people are subject to erroneous 
beliefs at some point (Bortolotti & Broome, 2008), understanding the intellectual 
processes involved in fact-checking in social understanding is an important target for 
research (Freeman et al., 2012). Most partners in this study employed rational thinking 
in order to evidence-check intuitive insights. Fact-checking appeared to result in belief 




effort, and focus shifts in empathic process from imagining to understanding. Repeated 
challenge during conflict leading to questioning of the veracity of participants’ views, 
was a source of ambivalence and prompted evidence-checking and revision of 
inaccurate beliefs. Some partners then deliberately switched from a directive process 
(leading the discussion and assuming that the other’s experience was the same as their 
own) to an empathic one (clarification of their partner’s point of view or feelings about 
the relationship or situation). This deliberative change of focus enabled incorporation of 
previously unnoticed aspects of the other’s experience or emotion or nonverbal 
information about the context or the partner’s emotions.  
Consistent with Stein (1917/1989) who concludes that intellectual fact-checking 
is part of the process of empathy, and that accurate, intuitive, direct experience must be 
complemented by additional intellectual thought, this study suggests intuitive thoughts 
are revised when they result in inaccurate assumptions. This could occur when 
individuals acknowledge that their own past experiences have led them to draw 
inaccurate inferences about their partner’s behaviour, and they then go on to fact check 
their assumptions. As Stein’s is the only account that incorporates the idea of fact-
checking as an important component of empathic understanding, our findings suggest 
theoretical accounts should be revised to acknowledge the importance of this process.  
Failure to employ rational thinking partially accounts for belief inflexibility in 
psychosis (Garety et al., 2005). Not updating beliefs on the basis of subsequent, 
pertinent information, which might also be thought of as a confirmation bias (Wason, 
1960), appears to distinguish between those who hold merely erroneous beliefs from 




Further experimental research is needed to investigate the relationship between 
flexible views and motivated empathic effort. Furthermore, research on empathic effort 
with populations likely to be more severely impacted by inflexible views, should be 
conducted using the cued-recall methodology validated in the current study. 
2.1 Emotional information. 
The most important contributor to empathic accuracy emerged as the ability to 
notice and understand emotional information. Analysis of participants’ turning points in 
the current study showed that partners could more accurately understand the motivation 
and internal world of their partner when they integrated information about the partner’s 
emotional state; updating their initial intuitive response by observing non-verbal or 
vocal tone cues, or attending to information in the partner’s dialogue. Previous findings 
suggest people with higher scores on a number of measures of psychosis show a 
preference for experiential (emotion-based and intuitive) rather than rational thinking 
(Freeman, Evans, & Lister, 2012), and hold greater confidence in experiential-based 
beliefs once formed (Simmons & Nelson, 2006). However, ignoring pertinent emotional 
information both about the partner and oneself, particularly a lack of awareness of the 
adverse impact on interpersonal reasoning of their own anxiety (Garety et al., 2005), 
seems to lead to an inability to correctly infer a partner’s internal state, as well as 
rendering participants’ own experiences incomprehensible.  
Although irrational thinking may originate in intuitive processes, our findings 
suggest that misunderstanding and irrational social cognition is driven not just by 
prioritisation of imagination over sensory information (Freeman et al., 2012), but more 
specifically, by the lack of ability to reason about negative emotional states and the 




experience, followed by an unawareness of the impact of this on their ability to 
rationalise, and lastly, the inability or unwillingness to attend to the others person’s 
emotional cues. This finding supports those of Chapters 3 and 4 that intensification of 
emotional responses precedes irrational cognition and invasive and aggressive 
behavioural responses in the jealousy syndrome.  
How do Inaccurate and Irrational Thought Processes Influence Conflict?  
The results in each case showed that irrational beliefs appeared to be at the core 
of partner conflicts. Interestingly, the findings are congruent with both major theoretical 
accounts of belief inaccuracy, i.e., that conflict is due either to a lack of self-awareness 
of one’s own inaccuracies, or to an awareness of the discrepancy between one’s own 
belief and reality but failure to revise beliefs due to unconscious motivations 
(Thompson, Prowse-Turner, & Pennycook, 2011). Whilst partner challenges were a 
factor in belief change, they conversely resulted in a range of tactics designed to 
maintain an erroneous belief. Most partners in non-abusive couples sought to 
accommodate their partner’s irrational beliefs, including making personal (i.e., either 
behavioural or cognitive) changes to accommodate them. However, the forms of the 
partner’s changes, identified here, have different theoretical and practical implications. 
Where the male partner held an irrational belief the type of change that he made to 
accommodate his partner, suggested a lack of awareness. Furthermore, the role that 
these irrational beliefs play in stimulating change to a partner’s belief or behaviour, also 
suggests that they may function as safety behaviours, and consequently help to maintain 
irrational thinking. These processes do not appear linked as they function independently. 
In agreement with prior research, irrational beliefs may have perceived positive 




discussion) by encouraging partner responsibility-taking for the management of the 
other’s fears. 
3.1 Deference incorporation. 
The findings here suggest that social cognitive processes are involved in the 
formation and maintenance of some beliefs. In order to retain a sense of their own 
credibility, rationality, and social sense-making, people in this study appear to rely on 
their partner’s endorsement of their sense-making. Where their account is treated by the 
partner as incredible, after a preceding period of confusion, participants suffered a loss 
of certainty in their ability to accurately comprehend social situations, in particular in 
understanding their own and other’s motivations. This experience was accompanied by 
a reported sense that they were weird or abnormal. These experiences were reported as 
more intense by those who were more anxious. Accounts of psychosis frequently report 
a sense of alienation that accompanies psychosis (Vass et al., 2015). The current 
findings suggest a qualitative relationship between lack of social endorsement and 
feelings of social abnormality or alienation that warrants further exploration. 
Beliefs were revised to match a partner’s erroneous beliefs only in situations 
where the partner held an unjustified level of certainty in their unfounded interpersonal 
belief and in addition failed to reciprocate empathic effort. Accommodation might be 
generally thought of as an adaptive process (Simpson & Campbell, 2013). However, it 
appears here that in attempting to accommodate the partner, a person may lose sight of 
their own better-evidenced view and perceived ability to make sense of the world. It 
appears that, in certain circumstances, normally adaptive social processes, which relate 
to our ability to form social affiliations (Boyer et al., 2015), such as empathic effort and 




relationship between lack of empathic effort and unjustified levels of certainty in false 
beliefs is suggested that needs further exploration. Experimental research should aim to 
determine whether increased empathic effort reduces unfounded suspicions and other 
delusion-like beliefs and, furthermore, how empathic effort be encouraged in people 
with a rigid viewpoint. 
The ability to revise a partner’s belief appears to be functional and can be 
understood from a number of perspectives. One suggested purpose of false belief in 
mental health and psychosis has been that it helps people achieve goals or promote their 
well-being (Craigie & Bortolotti, 2018). In the current study, irrational beliefs appear to 
result in indirect safety behaviours (Clark, 2001) by inviting the partner to take 
responsibility for managing their (irrational) partner’s fear. As a form of safety 
behaviour, it prevents the processing of contradictory evidence and helps maintain an 
erroneous social belief. The process can be viewed also from a critical feminist 
perspective, in that ‘deference incorporation’ here enables the replication of structures 
of male dominance. In every case it was the female partner’s beliefs that were more 
malleable and therefore subject to revision. Also, females were positioned as being less 
credible or as irrational by their male partner. This power dynamic perpetuates a view of 
females as less rational and therefore unable to perceive ‘reality’ accurately, which 
replicates structures related to the social status of females. The belief-change process 
described here and involving empathic effort, appears coercive and has much in 
common with folk-psychological and psychotherapeutic ideas of gaslighting (e.g., Calef 
& Weinshel, 1981) and perspecticide (Stark, 2009) which describe the manipulation of 




However, the concepts of gaslighting and perspecticide cannot be seen to fully 
capture the current findings. Theories of gaslighting and perspecticide (Calef & 
Weinshel, 1981; Stark, 2009) suggest that self-doubt arises due to manipulation of the 
external environment. Instead the research here finds it is the female’s internal 
environment that is manipulated. Men’s greater (even if unjustified) certainty in their 
beliefs is used strategically to claim correctness for their viewpoint, and this results in 
change, not just in the woman’s behaviour, but in her belief about herself and the 
couple’s interpersonal reality in order to meet his social needs. The woman’s doubts 
about her own experience arise due to the manipulation of ideas (self-knowledge) 
internal to the female, over which she should be able to claim epistemic authority, as the 
direct knower. The woman’s need for affiliation appears to be prioritised by her and 
used strategically by the male. This in combination with the use of traditionally 
‘feminine’ skills, empathy and intuition, appears to result in the strategic use of these 
skills against the woman. Therefore, it is possible that these skills, important to social 
affiliation, have the potential to become dysfunctional in some situations. For example, 
in conflict where another person uses strategic attacks (negative attributions about the 
partner’s motivations or behaviour) to promote their own beliefs and agenda. We saw in 
the case of Brandon and Brigit the strategic use of this process resulted in the 
termination of Brigit’s friendship with the perceived rival. Thus, this type of influence 
has more in common with a Foucauldian sense of power than the direct manipulation 
suggested in gaslighting and psychological coercion accounts.  
Furthermore, from a traditional psychological perspective, belief rigidity has 
negative connotations. However, taking a critical feminist perspective, the rigidity of 




protective function in couple arguments. Whilst behavioural accommodation is 
adaptively flexible, their lack of cognitive flexibility appears to make males less 
susceptible to the belief revision processes outlined here.  
The phenomenon described here further differs from gaslighting and coercion; 
manipulation is more subtle, at no point is there a direct threat, or obviously intentional 
manipulative/coercive act. The strategic process is solely aimed at the subtle, strategic 
alteration of belief. The process nonetheless achieves the result of maintaining an 
unequal balance of power and privilege, with the male partner maintaining his epistemic 
privilege regardless of the actual credibility of his claim. Also, in all cases, the female 
partner is positioned as irrational or mistaken, and her credibility as a ‘knower’ is 
dismissed. The process goes beyond the feeling of doubt and uncertainty outlined above 
(i.e., where the partner believes themselves to be abnormal), as the female partner 
appears to no longer question the credibility of the erroneous belief incorporated from 
her partner. This might be read as a form of testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2009), in that 
the account of the female partner is not held as credible and is dismissed. However, it 
appears to go beyond this as the female also comes to be portrayed as irrational. A 
useful concept is Rae Langton’s (1993) idea of silencing, like Fricker’s epistemic 
injustice, silencing functions to remove resistance and perpetuate power injustices. 
Whilst it is no longer acceptable in many societies to ignore someone’s view just 
because they are a woman, Langton (1993) suggests in identifying any individual as 
oversensitive or crazy, the perpetrator7 of silencing destroys the credibility of the victim 
by holding the role that they inhabit as one that is not considered a legitimate voice, and 
 




which therefore can be ignored.  
I suggest that the dynamic described here goes beyond silencing or testimonial 
injustice and causes a person to doubt their ability to understand the world, what might 
be understood as a definition of madness. It seems a person’s (here the woman’s) views 
are revised so that her understanding of the situation, her behaviour and motives, and 
her partner’s behaviour and motives are destabilised. By deferring to another’s view 
(she) comes to view them in the same way that the other person (here the male) does, 
even when it is probable that the other’s (males) views are erroneous. This process 
changes the way that the situation, the other and the self are seen. Yet, in this process a 
person also sacrifices their sense of being able to correctly perceive the world. As such 
the person’s (here the woman’s) view is more than opposed; it is erased. Fricker fails to 
give us a way to understand the way power is used as described here. While preceded 
with contests to credibility, as Fricker’s theory explains, what then arises is an 
untheorised interplay between testimonial and hermeneutic injustice whereby the female 
is no longer able to explain her view, as she has in her own mind lost her ability to 
accurately perceive the situation. In the current study, belief revision appeared to be 
gender-related, however, it is possible that in any situation where one partner has less 
power due to prejudice, this process may arise. Further research should explore this 
dynamic in situations where a partner could be considered otherwise disadvantaged. In 
addition, it is suggested that research should explore the manipulative partner dynamic 
within a sample who are known to be partner abusive.  
Finally, and most importantly, the processes described in the current research 




not included in most theories of delusion, which focus on domain-general impairment to 
rationality (e.g., Freeman & Garety) even whilst suggesting that delusion involves 
social cognition (e.g., Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002 ). Whilst suggesting that 
irrational thought is focussed on other people, these theories do not suggest that 
inherently social processes can influence the formation of false beliefs, irrational 
thoughts and delusions. Contrary to the majority of theory on irrational thought and 
delusion formation, Bell, Raihani, and Wilkinson (2019) suggest that social cognitive 
processes may be involved in the construction and maintenance of delusion-like beliefs. 
Like other beliefs that are not evidence based (e.g., religious beliefs, conspiracy theories 
and folie à deux) delusions may result from a dysfunction in adaptive social cognitive 
processes (Bortolotti, 2005) that ordinarily serve to create and maintain social 
affiliations and enlist social support. The exploration of social processes involved in the 
formation of both accurate and inaccurate understanding of other’s intentions described 
in this chapter has used both a method suited to exploring social processes and provided 
evidence for three social cognitive processes: empathy, intuitive understanding of 
others, and strategic social influence involved in the formation and maintenance of 
irrational delusion-like beliefs about a partner’s motivations.  
However, whilst agreeing with Bell et al. (2019) that delusion-like beliefs arise 
from social cognitive processes related to social affiliation, the results here seem to 
indicate that the dysfunction appears to be located partially in the social interaction 
itself, not just as a dysfunctional social cognitive process located inside the person. The 
ability of participants to process social information appears to be intact but the strategy 
used by a partner to influence the other person in order to further their own needs (i.e., 




This suggests that the need for affiliation is prioritised over autonomous needs, such as 
positive self-concept or rationality. The partner adopts a delusion-like belief in order to 
maintain the relationship at the cost of ‘rationality’. It might be considered that, in some 
situations, the need for self-esteem and affiliation are at odds, and that the need for 
affiliation appears to be prioritised so that internalising a false belief is considered a 
better option than the potential loss of an important relationship.  
This research provides preliminary evidence that false beliefs can be transmitted 
between partners using a social influence strategy where reasoning is strategically used 
to meet one partner’s perceived need. It includes the following features: the need for 
affiliation is threatened; a fault-finding attribution-style where negative intentions or 
personality traits are attributed to the partner during conflict; and the unilateral use of 
empathy. 
Clinical Implications 
Traditional couple therapy relies on each individual’s ability to reflect on their 
own thoughts and actions as well as on those of their partner. The cued recall process 
outlined above appears to enhance the ability of individuals to reflect on interactions 
with their partner as well as their own behaviour. Couples reported that they found it 
useful as a method of becoming aware of erroneous assumptions about their partner, 
their self, or the situation. Partner’s responses were uniformly positive indicating the 
methods acceptability for use with couples. As such, it has potential clinical utility in 
therapeutic environments with couples. It is suggested that it could serve to enhance 
both reflection and the ability to integrate insights into potentially irrational 
interpersonal beliefs. A target for reflection might be to encourage revisions of intuitive 




The current research also suggests additional consideration should be given 
during clinical formulation to the maintenance and reinforcement potential of the dyad 
in safety behaviours where a partner is involved, i.e., that of partner responsibility-
taking, and also deference incorporation.  
In addition, it is suggested that research into the generalisability of the processes 
outlined above to clinical, at-risk, and forensic settings (where it is known that there is 
greater conviction, distress and preoccupation (Peters, Joseph, & Garety, 1999; Peters et 
al., 2012) needs to be conducted. The current findings suggest that practitioners should 
be mindful of viewing empathic understanding as an unmitigated target of all 
therapeutic situations, especially where one partner does not display an accommodation 
orientation and is lacking empathic effort. Furthermore, in situations where the partner 
is reporting suspicious thoughts about the other’s motives, it might be reasonable in 
some cases to actively discourage empathic effort and flexibility. The current findings 
suggest accurate empathy is motivated and not an entirely automatic process and 
therefore that partners must expend effort in order to understand the other person. What 
is not clear is whether or not some relationship problems in clinical and forensic 
samples result from a lack of empathic effort, or why this issue may arise. This could be 
the subject of further research.  
Although this study has confirmed the usefulness of the cued-recall process for 
exploring social cognition in context and how suspicious thinking influences interaction 
and conflict in dyads, it is necessary to reflect on the methodology used. Firstly, 
although the discussion is focussed on a disagreement that evolved naturally within the 




spontaneous conflict situation. Furthermore, although each conflict theme is typical of 
those within normal relationships, the cued recall process itself is not completely natural 
as it is being recorded in the presence of a researcher; this may have implications for the 
content and form of the conversation that the couples chose.  
Methodological Reflections.  
In addition, although the findings are detailed and likely to be indicative of 
processes in more severe delusional and ideational states, due to methodological 
concerns (e.g., small sample size) any implications that can be made are tentative. 
Additionally, although irrational thought processes were present in this sample and 
findings are consistent with the notion that psychosis is on a continuum (Verdoux & van 
Os, 2012), the cognitive and affective processes detailed above may differ qualitatively 
(i.e., be different types of process from those found in at-risk, clinical or forensic 
populations), rather than being attenuated forms of the same processes. Therefore, it is 
suggested that research is conducted with populations with more severe psychotic 
symptoms in order to further explore these processes. Furthermore, the consistency in 
irrationality attributions to females when deferring to males’ views may not be 
replicated in a larger sample so additional research is necessary using a larger sample 
group. Finally, the lack of experimental control of extraneous variables means that, 
although there is clear indication of directionality and temporality within the data for the 
proposed mechanistic link, this may be confounded by other factors, such as interviewer 
direction giving, dominance rather than gender, or relative mental health. This would 





CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION CHAPTER  
This thesis aimed to contribute to research by tracing one particular feature of 
psychotic syndromes — interpersonal suspicious thinking —to help understand 
jealousy, its structure and its relationship to suspicious thought. There are many 
variables related to this focal symptom, and this thesis takes the approach of 
disentangling these individual variables into antecedents, correlates and symptoms 
associated with this single phenomenon in jealousy and exploring the evidence for what 
might cause this symptom. This analysis is then used to draw conclusions about 
underlying mechanisms and processes related to suspicious jealousy.  
Summary of Thesis Findings 
Chapter 1 provided an overview of how each chapter in this thesis is organised. 
It also provided an overview of jealousy, and its proposed effect on behaviour. In 
addition, it explored what allows us to count jealousy as a different phenomenon, i.e., 
what, if anything, distinguishes it from other kinds of suspicious, interpersonal thought, 
and whether it describes a distinct phenomenon or is simply a thematic variation of a 
common latent, delusional thought process. Jealousy appeared only to be distinguished 
from other kinds of delusion by the content of the ideas held, and an individual’s 
situational context, e.g., whether they were in a current relationship or still directing 
interest toward a previous partner. The following chapters developed and empirically 
investigated these themes starting with Chapter 2 which outlined and evaluated current 
jealousy theory.  




jealousy by providing the first comprehensive review of the academic research related 
to suspicious jealousy across clinical and nonclinical populations. Several themes were 
identified in the empirical literature that substantiate a link to another form of 
suspiciousness — paranoia—in terms of shared phenomenology, antecedents and 
outcomes. This chapter found a substantial overlap between jealousy and other forms of 
suspicious interpersonal thought, in particular paranoia. It also identified gaps in the 
existing research, e.g., a lack of research into cognitive bias, and how jealousy comes to 
be irrational. The findings suggested that co-morbidity with other psychotic conditions, 
corresponding antecedents and related variables, and parallels between jealousy risk 
factors and known psychosis risk factors, link jealousy with other kinds of suspicious 
thought. This suggested that additional research, addressing these gaps might help to 
clarify the relationship between jealousy and other forms of suspiciousness. 
Chapter 3 looked at theories that describe and explain how and why jealousy 
occurs. Focussing on how jealous people think during jealous episodes in relation to 
themselves, their relationship, and their partner. It explored in-depth, mechanistic links 
and processes suggested to generate and maintain jealousy. It outlined inconsistencies in 
jealousy definitions and evaluated jealousy theories. Chapter 3 suggests that many 
contemporary theories describe what comprises jealousy. Typically, normal jealousy has 
been viewed as an evolutionary process (Buss, 1988). Whereas, pathological jealousy 
has been viewed as a psychiatric disorder (Kingham & Gordon, 2004). As such, normal 
and dysfunctional jealousy have rarely been considered in the same research or model. 
However, explanatory theory is quite abstract and general in scope and gives less detail 
about how the proposed mechanistic links result in a particular jealousy outcome. This 




processes by which suspicious thoughts may arise. Furthermore, to detail which thought 
processes are involved, how these come to be suspicious, how they evolve over time, 
and how they are maintained. In addition, to attempt to understand their apparent 
comorbidity with other kinds of suspicious thought and delusion. Additionally, as no 
theory seemed to accommodate an understanding of jealousy as a cumulative structure 
(as might be predicted by a causal relationship with psychosis), this suggested that 
further theoretical development may be required to explain this relationship and provide 
an etiological framework for research and interventions continued evolution. This 
chapter found indications of a cumulative jealousy dimension related to suspicious 
thought, which may indicate an underlying psychotic-like trait. Further evidence was 
sought in the rest of this thesis, for a latent psychosis-like trait common to both. 
Chapter Four explored jealousy’s latent structure using multiple questionnaire 
data. It explored the interrelationship of its dimensions, and its relationship to paranoia. 
Five measurement scales were used to explore the dimensions of jealousy suggested by 
the theory review. Indications are that jealousy has a dimensional, cumulative structure, 
and that suspicious jealousy is closely related to paranoid ideation. The process 
indicated by the MDS ‘horseshoe’ (Guttman, 1957) structure suggests that pathological 
jealousy evolves from normal jealousy, in a sequential process related to negative affect 
and suspicious thought and that jealousy forms a hierarchy, whereby anxiety rather than 
anger produces suspicious jealous thought. Anxiety both precedes and is more proximal 
to suspiciousness, invasive and interrogative behaviours. Moreover, increases in anxiety 
intensity also relate to increases in the severity of jealous thought and behaviour. On this 
basis, it appears that jealousy is not a special case, and that its structure replicates that of 




Chapter 5 built on the results of Chapter 4 which indicated that jealousy has a 
potentially cumulative structure, whereby, anxiety is directly involved in both jealousy 
and paranoid thought escalation. The chapter also evaluated the psychometric properties 
of the included jealousy and paranoia scales. The results confirmed that jealousy has no 
distinct factors but forms a dimensional continuum. It also found considerable overlap 
between types of irrational thought (i.e., jealous, self-referential, and persecutory). 
These results indicate that jealousy, paranoid ideation and suspicious thoughts are scalar 
with persecutory rather than self-referent thinking related to more severe jealous 
behaviours. Therefore, paranoid ideation might usefully predict escalated, severe 
jealousy, and precede invasive and interrogative behaviours.  
Chapter 6 reported findings from a novel application of the cued recall 
methodology to determine how romantic partners understand each other’s intentions, 
and how irrational thought arises during conflict discussions. It explored: processes that 
influence how partners form and change (or maintain) understandings of another’s 
intentions; how suspicious and delusion-like thoughts are approached and managed by 
couples; how these thoughts form and change (or not) during a couple’s interactions; 
and how this, in turn, affects both conflict processes and the couple’s relationship. There 
were three main findings. Firstly, that empathy processes appear to be connected to 
accuracy when understanding the partner’s intentions. Secondly, that irrational ideas 
seemed to form when a partner’s intentions were judged using unchecked intuitive cues, 
or their own current negative affect. Thirdly, partners appeared not to revise erroneous 
beliefs about their partner when unchecked intuition is used to form a judgement. 
Although a small sample was used for the study, the findings suggest that erroneous 




Interestingly, partner’s thoughts and beliefs were substantially altered during the 
conflict process, therefore social-cognitive and affiliative processes may play a 
significant role in delusion formation and maintenance. Furthermore, in certain 
situations, this process may form a mechanism, deferent incorporation, by which 
coercion could be enacted. These results have implications for the clinical support of 
couples and for forensic examination by partner abuse researchers.  
The next section of this final chapter draws together the ideas presented in the 
thesis and presents an initial outline of an integrated model of jealousy that is informed 
by the current findings.  
Model of Jealousy  
A detailed overview of current models of jealousy suggested that no one model 
comprehensively accounts for the accumulated evidence discussed in Chapter 2. The 
review in Chapter 3 indicated that, although many theories describe suspicious thinking 
as a feature of jealousy, to our knowledge, there was no existing theory of jealousy that 
explained why or how more pathological forms of jealousy are accompanied by more 
suspicious thinking. The following paragraphs will: begin to outline a model that 
integrates theory from Chapter 3 that fits the empirical findings; introduce theory from 
other areas of research that might explain how the processes found in Chapters 3–6 
relate to jealousy escalation; and give further detail about how these cognitive and 
affective processes might evolve over time. Specifically, it will suggest how affect and 
cognition may act as motivators, to result or not in hostile, aggressive and controlling 
behaviours toward a romantic partner. Additionally, the model describes processes that 




Previous attempts to measure and conceptualise the structure of jealousy have 
used factor analytic techniques, an approach which is useful, but has a number of flaws, 
i.e., that it proceeds by classifying only those items that were put into the analysis, 
without first defining the full range of items that should be included. This limitation is 
important because factor analysis reproduces structures based only on the items 
included. Therefore, it inadvertently reproduces the researcher’s (implicit) theoretical 
model from which they derive the items. Facet theory (Guttman, 1971), on which MDS 
analytic techniques are based, is a potential remedy to problems where, like jealousy, 
diverse conceptualisations have been a major difficulty. This approach has proven 
useful in the development of comprehensive theory in other areas of psychology, e.g., in 
organisational development (White & Mitchell, 1976). Furthermore, it has been used to 
define and develop theory about other subclinical psychotic processes (Kidd, 
Hammond, & Bishopp, 1998). This approach therefore might be usefully applied to 
jealousy. Facet theory is both a systematic procedure for defining concepts, objects and 
events into a multi-property classification system and a way of exploring and 
understanding that concepts structure (Canter, 1985). Therefore, by defining an 
exhaustive range of relevant properties, prior to structural analysis, it ensures that the 
whole domain is exhaustively mapped, rather than a reproducing the researcher’s 
particular theoretical stance (McGrath, 1967).  
The facet approach iterates between theory and data (Canter, 1985). The findings 
reported here suggests that the facets: anxiety, increased suspiciousness, and psychosis, 
identified in Chapters 2 and 3, might require further explanation, as does their link to 
jealousy. Furthermore, the dimensions — normal jealousy, unease, 




The relationship of these dimensions to anger and anxious affect, and the apparent 
escalation of interpersonal suspicious thinking identified in Chapters 4 and 5, require 
additional theoretical integration. 
A useful starting point for theory development is to have a clear description of 
the phenomena and each characteristic or process that you hope to explain (Ward & 
Seigert, 2002). The model outlined here will explain jealousy processes in romantic 
relationships, not in children or between siblings and across community, clinical and 
forensic populations. It will explain the distinctions between jealousy that results in 
either benign or positive relationship outcomes, or alternatively, aggression or control of 
a partner. Furthermore, a model is sought that can explain the differing severity and 
frequency of behaviours that result from jealousy across adult populations. Therefore, a 
multifactorial explanation is outlined that combines both static and dynamic factors. In 
addition, it provides detail about the proposed mechanistic link (e.g., between jealousy 
and anxiety or mental ill-health) which explains how each jealousy 
symptom/phenomenon arises and how each mechanism interacts to result in the 
different phenomena proposed to be generated by jealousy. 
The following section summarises the results of Chapters 2 and 3. Then presents 
an account of prior research and contemporary jealousy theory that integrates the 
escalation process demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, by drawing upon theory from a 
related area of research. 
Overview of the Proposed Theoretical Model 
In this section, a jealousy model is proposed and summarised in schematic form 




the suggested outcome behaviours. In addition, it will clarify psychological mechanisms 
that result in normal jealousy and suspicious forms of jealousy. The model integrates 
cumulative dimensions of jealousy, explains how risk factors that have good evidence 
for a causal link with jealousy (outlined in Chapter 2 and summarised in Figure 13) 
result in jealousy and interact with each other, and explains how jealous thinking is 
maintained—so that sufferers cannot easily dismiss thoughts. The details of the model’s 




Table 34. Outline of theoretical development commitments.  
(Based on the gaps identified in the literature and theory reviews, Chapters 2 & 3). 
1. Integrate Bringle’s (1991) ideas that certain aspects of a person’s socio-
cultural background influence the frequency and severity of jealousy. 
Furthermore, that it is the focus on endogenous or exogenous factors 
that determines the type of jealousy experienced and enacted. Also, that 
commitment, insecurity and arousability influence jealousy.  
2. Include all potentially causal risk factors that current research suggests 
are associated with jealousy into a single, comprehensive model. 
3. Integrate empirically substantiated developmental risk factors into the 
model.  
4. Create a model of jealousy that is testable empirically, with clearly 
detailed processes. 
5. Integrate explanations for the relationship of jealousy to psychosis. 
6. Explain how affect and cognition, specifically anxiety and irrational 
thinking interact. 
7. Detail specific, testable cognitive mechanisms that may be involved in 
onset and maintenance of suspicious forms of jealousy.  
8. Incorporate elements from models of positive symptoms. of psychosis 
(Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington., 2001) and 
persecutory delusions (Freeman et al., 2002) which better detail the 
interaction between anxiety and suspicious thinking (paranoid ideation) 
than previous models of jealousy.  
Currently it is not clear how suspicious jealousy arises, is maintained, and 
results in the hypothesised outcome behaviours. Theory and research suggest that four 
problems or symptom clusters are associated with jealousy: cognitive distortions, 
emotional regulation problems, hostility toward the partner or rival, and attempts to 
control the partner (summarised in Chapters 2 & 3). However, despite most people 
sometimes experiencing jealousy (White, 1989), most people neither express jealousy in 
dysfunctional ways, nor have the problems of dysfunction described above and are more 
likely to attempt functional strategies to maintain the relationship, e.g., discussing their 
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fears, increasing their attractiveness or increasing the relationship rewards to the partner. 
Theories of jealousy attempt to explain why this is the case and how the types or 
dimensions of jealousy, and the behavioural outcomes differ. The theories integrated in 
the proposed model have been selected to be consistent with the accumulated evidence 
(described in Chapter 2), and according to the logic of their explanation and the strength 
of ideas (Kalmar & Sternberg, 1988) and are mapped below in Figures 13 –16. 
The findings from Chapter 3, details the factors that relate to prior theory. These 
are summarised in Figure 13. Evidence suggests that jealousy responses are composed 
of both person and situational aspects and that both constitute main effects (Argyle & 
Little, 1976; Bringle, Renner, Terry, & Davis, 1983). Furthermore, a number of factors 
(denoted by asterisks) found in the review of research were not well accounted for by 
current jealousy theories. The following section details the relationship between 
jealousy and paranoid ideation further and gives detail of how a model of a parallel 
process might help to explain the process by which anxiety leads to jealousy escalation. 
 
Figure 13. Summary of factors which have good research evidence that suggests they contribute to 
jealousy. 
N.B. References to the evidence are provided for each factor. Where study numbers are given these refer 
to studies in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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The Formation of Paranoid Beliefs 
Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated a clear relationship between interpersonal 
suspiciousness in jealousy and self-referent and persecutory ideation. Ideas of 
interpersonal threat in jealousy might therefore have much in common with other ideas 
about threat-beliefs. The current model focusses on this symptom — interpersonal 
suspiciousness —which is related to beliefs about interpersonal threat. Two models 
(Freeman et al., 2002; Garety et al., 2001) describe the threat-belief process well and 
have had good heuristic value; having proven fertile for both researchers and clinicians, 
by producing confirmatory research evidence and improvements to paranoia 
interventions. The phenomena described by both models share many common features 
with suspicious jealousy and, as outlined above, they share a focus on threat-beliefs, 
despite differing content. Furthermore, as Chapter 2 indicated, much like other kinds of 
threat belief (Freeman et al., 2002), suspicious jealousy is strongly related to distress 
and anxiety (see Chapter 2). Therefore, the current model applies models of positive 
symptom (Garety et al., 2001) and persecutory ideation (Freeman et al., 2002) onset, 
escalation and maintenance process to jealous ideation.  
Symptom emergence in other kinds of ideation arises due to the interaction 
between prior vulnerability (from biological, social, genetic and psychological factors) 
and stress (which can also be biological, social or psychological) (Freeman et al., 2002). 
Freeman et al.’s (2002) model suggests that: delusion formation is precipitated by a 
stressful life-event or intoxication, and delusion proneness arises due to prior 
vulnerabilities, in what is termed stress-vulnerability; it results from two primary 
mechanisms, an externalising attribution bias (similar to that found in couples’ 
erroneous attribution of intentions in Chapter 5) and the individual’s emotional state; 
 
 273 
and that delusions are a direct reflection of the individual’s emotional state and are 
therefore consistent with existing ideas about the self, others and the world. This section 
outlined the relationships between paranoia and jealousy and how these relate to 
contemporary jealousy theory. The following section will outline in more detail how 
paranoid beliefs form, establish the similarities of these beliefs with jealous ideation, 
and relate these ideas to the outlined model.  
Paranoia is a way of dealing with threats to the self in social situations (Trower 
& Chadwick, 1995), which affects interpersonal relationships. Paranoid people make 
abnormal attributions about social situations due to misinterpreting the motives of 
others in social situations (Hewstone & Jaspars, 1987). They also have inflexible beliefs 
(i.e., a strong level of certainty about these attributions) which are resistant to change 
(Freeman, 2007). People with paranoia seem to misattribute emotional experiences and 
feelings to external situations (Grèzes, Frith, & Passingham, 2004) and have difficulty 
in weighing the evidence when making decisions (Hemsley & Garety, 1986). Research 
reviews suggest that psychotic illness tends to be cyclical or episodic (Harrison et al., 
2001), and therefore cognitive deficits may only be present during an acute phase of the 
illness.  
 
2.1  Emotions, delusion and distress. The empirical literature reviewed in 
Chapter 2 suggested that jealousy is associated with distress and anxiety. The proposal 
that emotional distress is related to delusion or ideation mirrors ideas about persecutory 
thinking. However, these ideas suggest that distress and anxiety arise from and are 
directly related to both delusional content, and the sufferer’s appraisal of a delusion and 
its associated experiences (Freeman et al., 2002).  
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Like jealousy, paranoia comprises both cognitive and affective elements 
(Freeman & Garety, 2004). Freeman and Garety’s (2004) threat anticipation model, 
presented in Figure 14, suggests multiple factors are responsible for the formation of 
delusional beliefs and ideation (i.e., cognitive biases, the misattribution of arousal and 
anomalous experiences and heightened affect), with persistence being strongly tied to 
reasoning processes (Figure 15). They conceptualise delusions as strongly held but 
misattributed beliefs that are the person’s attempts to make sense of internal 
experiences, such as alcohol or illicit drug intoxication (Frith, 1992; Hemsley, 1994). 
Like paranoia (Freeman, 2007) Bringle’s (1991) cognitive model of jealousy suggests 
that pathological jealousy experiences include heightened affect, and misinterpretation 
of ambiguous social information. Figure 14 summarises Freeman and Garety’s (2004) 
threat anticipation model describes delusion formation; showing paranoia’s relationship 
to psychotic reasoning biases, affect regulation difficulties, and negative self-esteem. 
2.2. How cognition and affect interact to form and maintain false beliefs. 
Freeman and Garety’s (2004) conceptualisation might be used to extend Bringle’s 
(1991), ideas that heightened affect, ambiguous information, and contextual factors are 
important to jealousy escalation (see Chapter 3), to map a process which could result in 
the onset and escalation of irrational thinking. Freeman and Garety (2004) postulate that 
persecutory thinking contains threat beliefs about social, psychological or physical 
harm, which occur in the context of emotional distress, often directly after stressful 
events (e.g., bullying, or interpersonal conflict), and are strongly linked to low 
(negative) self-esteem (for a review see Freeman, 2007). They suggest that those 
vulnerable to suspicious thoughts externalise emotion related to stressful events, 
drawing on negative or ambiguous information as evidence in trying to make sense of 
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unusual internal experience, e.g., when anxious they may infer from others’ facial 
expressions or loud voices that other people are behaving in ways to deliberately 
antagonise or harm them.  
According to the model, illustrated in Figure 14, persecutory ideas are most 
likely to occur when: there are reasoning biases (especially a ‘jumping to conclusions’ 
bias in data gathering, a likelihood of using a small amount of information to make a 
firm decision); a failure to consider alternative explanations (Freeman et al., 2004); 
disconfirmatory evidence is not sought, i.e., there is confirmation bias (Allen et al., 
2005) and/or negative interpretation biases (Savulich et al., 2015).  
 
Figure 14. Summary of the formation of a persecutory delusion (Freeman & Garety, 2004) 
 
What Might an Understanding of the Processes Related to the Formation of a 
Persecutory Delusion add to our Understanding of Irrational Jealousy?  
Reports from clinicians and research (e.g., Musalek et al., 1989) suggest that the 
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paranoiac content themes vary in each individual. However, both delusional and 
ideational thought appear to follow a similar onset and maintenance process (in that 
others are seen as persecutors, the person has little control over the situation, and they 
deserve harm). Both Bringle (1991) and Freeman and Garety (2004) suggest that 
suspicious thinking is due to drawing erroneous conclusions from ambiguous social, 
and in the case of Freeman and Garety, affective information. Whilst Bringle (1991) 
alludes to the importance of cognitive distortions and biases in illusory belief formation, 
Freeman and Garety (2004) suggest this relationship is directly causal. Construing this 
relationship as causal might help to better explore and explain: (a) jealousy processes, 
(b) how affective, cognitive, and situational variables interact, and (c) how irrational 
jealousy arises and persists. Paranoid beliefs are said to result from internal experiences 
(e.g., anxiety or emotions that the person is not aware of) which are misattributed to 
external events (Freeman & Garety, 2004). Adopting this approach adds further detail 
regarding how these features may interact and elaborates upon the processes by which 
irrational jealous thoughts might arise and be maintained.  
Cognitive bias which Bringle (1991) suggested may be important in jealousy 
formation and escalation, has proven important to the development and maintenance of 
persecutory thought (Freeman et al., 2002). Freeman and Garety provide suggestions 
about how these are involved in belief maintenance. Figure 15 illustrates that belief 
maintenance process. Applied to jealousy this would suggest that, like paranoid 
individuals (Freeman et al., 2004), jealous individuals will jump-to-conclusions and 
look for evidence consistent with their belief (Maher, 1988). This proposal is consistent 
with the findings in Chapter 5. The advantage of extrapolating Freeman et al.’s (2002) 
model to jealousy maintenance is that it suggests both the role of bias in belief 
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maintenance and specific biases involved in this process. They suggest that 
disconfirmatory evidence is discarded in two main ways: by the use of safety 
behaviours, which also maintain negative emotional states (see Clark, 1999), and by 
incorporating the failure of predicted harm events to the deviousness of their 
persecutors, i.e., to their lying or otherwise concealing their true actions. Thus, it 
provides an explanation as to why beliefs might persist when the predicted harm has not 
occurred. In summary, cognitive biases, affective processes, poor emotional regulation, 
and low self-esteem are persistently linked to paranoid ideation (see Chapter 2). What 
appear to be safety behaviours, which may maintain suspicious beliefs, were also 
evident in the dialogues of participants in Chapter 5. Furthermore, it appears this type of 




Figure 15. Maintenance of a threat belief (Freeman et al., 2002). 
 
Relationship to Other Theories of Jealousy  
Chapter 3 suggested that evolutionary biology (Buss, 1988) provides an 
effective explanation for normal jealousy’s function. Bringle’s (1991) theory 
incorporates multiple levels of explanation and both distal and proximal factors to link 
predisposing factors with differentiated aetiologies for differing types of jealousy and 
specifies how particular patterns of thought lead differing types of jealousy. Mathes and 
Severa’s (1981) model addresses how different types of relationship threat might result 
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in different levels of jealous pathology. This model has been integrated in this chapter 
with other developmental and cognitive explanations. However, the model still does not 
provide a concrete process by which these precursors evolve. This suggests that 
adopting ideas from research related to false-beliefs, into the current jealousy theory, 
might add to our understanding of the mechanism detailed for other forms of psychosis 
escalation (e.g., jumping-to-conclusions bias and thought inflexibility) (Freeman, 2007).  
Cognitive bias and emotional distress are central to delusional and ideational 
processes (Freeman et al., 2004) and are the main mechanisms which result in the onset 
and maintenance of delusional or ideational beliefs. The new model proposes, on the 
basis of evidence provided in Chapters 3–5 which outlines the close relationship 
between suspicious jealousy, paranoia and anxiety, that current anxiety may trigger a 
psychosis-like state. Further to this, it suggests that jealousy levels will be determined 
by the intensity of current anxiety. These state variables thus provide the mechanism 
that initiates and maintains jealous ideation.  
Processes involved in the onset, escalation and maintenance of suspicious 
jealousy are given further detail by drawing on a cognitive model of the positive 
symptoms of psychosis (Garety et al., 2001). The approach of applying this model to 
other kinds of delusional thought has a precedent, having been previously applied to 
persecutory ideation (Freeman et al., 2002). As is the case with other positive symptoms 
of psychosis (Garety et al., 2001) and persecutory ideation (Freeman et al., 2002), it is 
hypothesised that in jealous ideation, both anxiety and suspiciousness have a reciprocal 




Figure 16. Integrated model of jealousy.  
N.B. red text refers to concepts from Mathes' theory, green text to concepts from Bringle's theory, amber 
text relates to novel ideas (details in the text). The arrows present major links 
 
Figure 16 shows three distinct pathways to jealousy. Each pathway in the model 
results from different mechanisms and follows a distinct process. The first is shown 
towards the bottom of Figure 16 and results in normal (mate-guarding) jealousy, which 
evolves from a biological imperative (Buss, 1988), and which leads to jealousy when 
combined with triggering events, e.g., an argument with a romantic partner. This 
jealousy is focussed on exogenous factors. The second pathway leads to varying levels 
of jealous pathology via general increases in psychosis-like ideation/suspiciousness, 
which are likely due to prior historical and psychological vulnerabilities (detailed in 
Figure 13).This type of jealousy has a focus on endogenous factors. The model 
speculates that one endogenous factor that contributes to escalation may be an 
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individual’s lack of awareness of anxiety that they experience but do not recognise and 
thus which they erroneously attribute to external events (i.e., it is externalised as a 
feature of the relationship). These prior vulnerabilities in the presence of a triggering 
event are proposed as a likely cause of increased jealous suspiciousness. The final 
pathway is pathological and arises due to organic degeneration, e.g., drugs for 
Parkinsonism or alcoholic decline.  
Evaluation of this Model 
The theory knitting approach (Kalmar & Sternberg, 1988) suggests that to 
further understanding of any phenomenon, the consistent explanations between theories, 
the strongest ideas (on the basis of data and logic) from multiple theories, and the 
researchers’ own ideas about a phenomenon, should be integrated in a way that best 
explains accumulated knowledge about that phenomenon. It should focus on explaining 
how it arises and how it works (mechanisms) over time (processes). Mechanisms are 
links between a psychological process or process and its’ outcomes or effects. They are 
what makes things work, either in a functional or, where the mechanism doesn’t work as 
it was intended, in a dysfunctional manner (Ward & Seigert, 2008). Examples of 
dysfunctional mechanisms are excessive clinging to a partner or irrational beliefs about 
their fidelity. Bradford-Hill’s (1973), criteria which were outlined in the introduction to 
this thesis are generally accepted to be indicators with which to evaluate causality. The 
main principles embodied are that a theory or explanation should explain the body of 
empirical data, that cause should precede effect, that experimental data should carry a 
stronger weight, and that theory be sufficiently comprehensive in scope and explanatory 
depth, yet be simple, prudent, consistent, and coherent. Table 35 details how and where 
in this thesis and chapter the commitments made in Table 34 are addressed.  
 
 282 
Whilst the current model is speculative, it explains the factors highlighted in the 
systematic review as important in suspicious jealousy. By proposing that jealousy is a 
dimensional continuum, both anxiety and psychosis-like symptoms can be tested as 
indicators of escalation.  
It is hoped that by incorporating biological (organic deterioration, detailed in 
Chapter 2) and evolutionary imperatives (outlined by Buss, 1988) and giving greater 
detail to the potential role of anxiety that Chapter 2’s findings suggest has a central role 
in suspicious jealousy; and by incorporating established ideas about the relationship 
between anxiety and positive psychosis symptoms (Garety et al., 2001) and other forms 
of suspicious ideation (Freeman et al., 2002) to make a novel contribution to knowledge 
about jealousy.  
Furthermore, it is hoped that the work here may better explain the established 
relationship between anxiety, jealousy and partner aggressive (intrusive) behaviours 
(Priolo-Filho, Padovani, & Williams, 2019; Wigman, Graham-Kevan, & Archer, 2008), 
and specifically why paranoia and jealousy might frequently co-occur in partner 
aggression perpetrators (Capaldi et al., 2012; Stith et al., 2004). Additionally, it is hoped 
that the proposed reciprocal role of anxiety and psychotic-like symptoms may model the 
boundary between normal jealousy and jealous pathology. 
Table 35. How the integrated model and this thesis maps to the commitments made in Table 33 of this 
chapter and incorporates the evaluative principles outlined. 
Commitment Where in this thesis? 
1. Explain jealousy processes in romantic relationship, not in 
children/siblings and across community clinical and forensic 
populations. 
Chapters 2, 3 & 7 
2. Distinguish between jealous outcomes. 
Chapters 4, 5 & 7 
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Commitment Where in this thesis? 
3. Explain severity and frequency of behaviours across adult 
populations. 
Chapters 2, 4, 5 & 7 
4. Incorporate empirically established static and dynamic; distal 
and proximal risk (psychological, biological, cultural and 
situational) factors into a single model  
Chapters 2 & 7: 
(Chapter 7, Figures 13 
& 16) 
5. Detail distinct mechanisms to explain how each jealousy 
symptom arises (esp. interpersonal suspicion) and how these 
interact to result in the varied outcomes. 
Chapters 2 & 4–7  
6. Integrate aspects of socio-cultural background (Bringle, 1991) 
and explain how these result in different jealousy frequency, 
severity or outcome. 
Chapters 3 & 7 
7. Incorporate notion of endogenous/exogenous focus determining 
jealousy severity (Bringle, 1991) (Chapter 7) and explain the 
interpersonal suspicion dynamic functions within couple 
relationships (Chapter 6).  
Chapter 6 & 7 
8. Create an empirically testable model, with detailed processes. Chapter 7 
9. Integrate explanation for the relationship between jealousy and 
psychosis.  
Chapter 4–7 
10. Explain interactions between affect and cognition, specifically 
anxiety and irrational thinking.  
Chapter 7 
11. Detail specific, testable cognitive mechanisms involved in 
jealous suspicion onset and maintenance.  
Chapter 7 
12. Incorporate elements from related theory (positive 
symptoms/persecutory ideation models) to better explain the 
empirically observed relationship between anxiety and 
interpersonal suspicious thought (including jealousy).  
Chapters 2– 7, (Chapter 





 Theoretical Implications  
 Overall, the findings of this thesis suggest that suspicious interpersonal thoughts 
may be useful as a tracer symptom for an underlying psychosis-like experience that 
appears to accompany escalating jealousy. The novel contribution of this thesis is a 
model which proposes that suspicious (pathological) jealousy results from a general 
escalation of suspicious/psychosis-like thinking, as a result of escalating anxiety, in the 
presence of externalising biases and relationship triggers, and that it is not a special 
case. The suggested model provides a new direction for research and further theory 
development.  
Practical and Clinical Implications  
The model and the findings of this thesis may provide improved indicators for 
risk assessment. It appears that increases in suspicious thought, rather than anger 
towards a partner, is related to the likelihood of coercive or intrusive behaviours. These 
findings suggest that anxiety management should be the target for clinical and forensic 
management. As is the case for persecutory delusions (Freeman et al., 2002), 
conceptualising jealous ideation as a threat belief leads to the objective of therapy being 
reduction of emotional distress via change in the degree of conviction in the threat 
beliefs, which might be achieved by co-constructing with the sufferer an alternative 
explanations for the belief. Furthermore, as Freeman et al. (2002) suggest, developing 
individualised models which identify and then aim to reduce the identified maintenance 
factors (e.g., specific safety behaviours, reasoning and attentional biases) would seem to 
be likely to lead to productive outcomes.  
Furthermore, in relation to the measurement of jealousy. The results reported in 
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this thesis suggest that current jealousy scales would benefit from revision in order to 
provide both effective scalar measurement and also to include items related to facets 
that were missing in the current scales (e.g., behaviours associated with normal 
jealousy). Furthermore, additional scale development should include the establishment 
of both subclinical and clinical cut-offs using the onset and intensity of particular 
ideational states, and test these using relevant outcome variables.  
Limitations  
The following paragraphs will outline limitations, open questions and suggest 
future research directions.  
One limitation of the research in this thesis is that the sample used for the 
analysis was, for the type of analysis, a relatively small student sample. Student samples 
have frequently been criticised as unrepresentative. Whilst this may previously have 
been the case, 49% of the U.K. population now undertake undergraduate study (HEIPR; 
Department of Education, 2019). This means that critiques directed towards sampling 
issues in the past, when only small percentage of the population undertook 
undergraduate studies [e.g., in 1989 only 13.7% of the population studied at degree 
level, (Department of Education, 1989)] may now be less meaningful. A further 
limitation of the sample in Chapters 4 and 5, was its gender-bias due to the recruitment 
method, as social science students are predominantly female. Whilst this thesis 
attempted to address this (i.e., using methods that create population invariant solutions, 
and using an adequate sample size), the model estimations may be only applicable to 
this and similar samples. A further limitation was the scope of the jealousy instruments 
used in Chapters 4 and 5, as this may have presented a narrow theoretical view of 
 
 286 
jealousy. However, through comprehensively reviewing the jealousy literature and 
theory, it was hoped that the ‘universe’ (Guttman, 1944) of jealousy was adequately 
mapped.  
One further limitation is that by focussing on interpersonal suspicious thought, 
although many other features of jealousy were included within this focus, other 
processes that contribute to jealousy may have been ignored. What is positive about the 
research in this thesis, is that the process employed to explore the specifics of this single 
symptom, may be used to explore other symptoms, and to enable comparison of the 
process outlined here and other processes which have not yet been subject to this kind 
of analysis.  
Future directions 
The research and model in this thesis suggest a number of potential avenues for 
research detailed in Table 36, Part 1.  
That jealous thought and nervous affect follow similar patterns to those found in 
paranoid ideation (Freeman et al., 2002), suggests that similar to that conducted for 
persecutory ideation using experimental designs in virtual environments (Fornells-
Ambrojo et al., 2015) could be used to test if this assumption holds for jealous ideation 
and whether levels of jealous ideation can be influenced by provoking anxiety. 
Furthermore, the relationship established here between different forms of interpersonal, 
suspicious thought, is indicative of a latent psychotic-like trait. Therefore, problematic 
jealousy in the general population might be a positive symptom of underlying 
subclinical, psychosis-like trait.  
Psychosis is known to alter cognition (Bentall et al., 2009), and has an 
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established link to prior trauma (Morrison, Frame, & Larkin, 2003). One practical 
implication of a latent psychosis-like trait underlying jealousy is that it may offer a 
potential mechanism with which to explain comorbidity between jealousy and partner 
abuse (Capaldi et al., 2002: Stith et al., 2004). The intergenerational continuation 
hypothesis of domestic abuse (Widom, 1989) suggests that childhood abuse 
victimisation begets adult abusiveness. Findings here suggest that this process may be 
mediated by subclinical psychosis. Therefore, further research should determine if the 
increased risk of partner violence perpetration in people who have suffered prior 
childhood abuse/trauma (Dutton, 1994; Dutton et al., 1996) might be explained by the 
presence of clinical or subclinical levels of psychosis in perpetrators. This would 
require, preferably longitudinal research on large samples to be conducted in order to 
ascertain if trauma, subclinical or clinical levels of PTSD are related to jealousy in 
normal and clinical populations. In addition, determining if trauma events are related to 
jealous ideation, specific mechanisms or symptoms within the PTSD symptom pattern 
should be explored in order to see if they might provide corroboration for the cognitive 
or affective mechanisms outlined here.  
A number of questions that were highlighted in Chapter 2 have not been 
addressed by this thesis. These are shown in Part 2 of Table 36. These questions require 




 Table 36. Directions for future research. 
Part 1  
1. Experimental evidence should be collected to further understand the 
cumulative structure/escalation process indicated in Chapters 4 & 5. 
2. The relationship found here between paranoia and jealousy should be the 
subject of future investigations that explore romantic jealousy as a form of 
psychosis and that subsequently test if the same production and maintenance 
conditions as those suggested for other persecutory ideas (e.g., safety 
behaviours) and in Chapter 6, are found. This exploration would be possible 
using techniques that have previously used for paranoid ideation, such as 
virtual reality. 
3. Further tests should be made between more severe jealousy behaviours and 
persecutory ideation, that include measures of state ideation to determine if 
fluctuation in jealousy influences severity.  
4. As the current research suggests that psychosis-like ideational symptoms will 
predict IPV perpetration. Further exploration is needed regarding the 
relationship between psychosis-like beliefs, emotion and jealous behaviours. 
This research pathway should seek to isolate whether suspicious jealousy is 
based in childhood attachment difficulties (e.g., Dutton, 1999) or whether it is 
more likely, as outlined here, a form of subclinical psychosis where the likely 
aetiology results from trauma experience (Garety & Freeman, 2001)  
Part 2.  Further research should also explore: 
5. How do jealous people with reasonable evidence for their suspicions and 
those who are irrationally suspicious evaluate evidence, particularly in 
ambiguous social situations? 
6. The role of cognitive rigidity in jealous ideation, what accounts for 
variability in levels of rigidity, and how do suspicions become rigid? 
7. Are fluctuations in anxiety levels related to the irrationality and intensity of 
jealous suspicions? 
8. Can it be shown experimentally that the psychological factors outlined here 
are causal in jealous, suspicious thinking? 
9. Which factors distinguish between those who are irrationally suspicious and 
those whose partner suspicions are evidence-based? 
10. Do fluctuations in the levels of psychosis and other variables related to it 




The previous paragraphs summarised the limitations of this thesis and avenues 
for future research. The following paragraph provides a summary of this chapter and 
highlights the main contributions of this thesis.  
Conclusions  
This chapter has summarised the findings of previous chapters and reported an 
integrated model of jealousy. This model builds on previous jealousy models by better 
explaining prior empirical findings and offers a new process that is consistent with that 
body of research and the current findings. This model may give crucial insights into 
how jealousy and perceived distortions of other’s intentions may arise, escalate and 
deescalate. Furthermore, it suggests a promising approach to the problems of 
disentangling the boundaries between what constitutes normal and clinically significant 
jealousy and suggests future developments for both research into problematic jealousy 
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APPENDIX A. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria for Systematic Review 
 
Articles were inspected for the following criteria: they were empirical; available 
in English; peer-reviewed; referred to human participants; were from community, 
clinical and forensic samples; included mental or psychological processes; referred to 
cognitive or affective mechanisms; addressed irrational or excessive jealousy and 
suspicious thinking, delusion, ideation or paranoia; referred to antecedents, causes, 
processes or mechanisms; or reported a relationship to other variables likely to cause 
impaired functioning in a person or romantic relationship; involved a community sample, 
or a forensic sample, or a clinical sample where delusion was present but was not the 
subject of a single case study, as these were thought to be weak designs that involved 
rare cases. Also, cognitive dysfunction or bias needed to be adequately described to 
provide adequate definition and operationalisation of suspicious cognition. In line with 
other symptom-specific research (e.g. Cloninger, 2002; Demjaha et al., 2009) a 
definition of irrational jealousy was used that included schizophrenic, drug or alcohol 
dependent participants and those with other psychiatric diagnoses even though these are 
excluded from DSM III & IV jealousy classifications. Studies were excluded if they 
were psychoanalytic, evolutionary biological, reporting drug trials, referred to envy, did 
not refer to cognition, failed to report complete data on sample or operationalisation of 
variables, or involved data from participants where jealousy was substantiated by 
evidence of infidelity. The ideal studies for examining the association of jealousy to 
other kinds of suspicious delusional or ideational cognition would have used 
experimental or longitudinal designs. However, cross-sectional designs were included as 
experimental or longitudinal studies were rare. This review is not concerned with 
situational, psychobiological, environmental and partner variables that contribute to the 
situation except where they influence cognition, as other authors have dealt these with 
adequately (e.g. Buss, Larsen, Westen, & Semmelroth, 1992; White, 1981; and they are 




Appendix 1: NICE criteria (2012) for quality assessment of Correlational and quantitative studies, 
Appendix G. 
 
Appendix G Quality appraisal checklist – quantitative studies reporting 
correlations and associations (pages 200-205) 
A correlates review (see section 3.3.4) attempts to establish the factors that are associated or 
correlated with positive or negative health behaviours or outcomes. Evidence for correlate 
reviews will come both from specifically designed correlation studies and other study designs 
that also report on correlations.This checklist[15] has been developed for assessing the validity of 
studies reporting correlations. It is based on the appraisal step of the 'Graphical appraisal tool for 
epidemiological studies (GATE)', developed by Jackson et al. (2006). 
This checklist enables a reviewer to appraise a study's internal and external validity after 
addressing the following key aspects of study design: characteristics of study participants; 
definition of independent variables; outcomes assessed and methods of analyses. 
Like GATE, this checklist is intended to be used in an electronic (Excel) format that will 
facilitate both the sharing and storage of data, and through linkage with other documents, the 
compilation of research reports. Much of the guidance to support the completion of the critical 
appraisal form that is reproduced below also appears in 'pop-up' windows in the electronic 
version[16]. There are 5 sections of the revised GATE. Section 1 seeks to assess the key population 
criteria for determining the study's external validity – that is, the extent to which the findings of a 
study are generalisable beyond the confines of the study to the study's source population. 
Sections 2 to 4 assess the key criteria for determining the study's internal validity – that is, 
making sure that the study has been carried out carefully, and that the identified associations are 
valid and are not due to some other (often unidentified) factor. 
 
Checklist items are worded so that 1 of 5 responses is possible: 
++ Indicates that for that particular aspect of study design, the study has been designed or 
conducted in such a way as to minimise the risk of bias. 
+ Indicates that either the answer to the checklist question is not clear from the way the study is 
reported, or that the study may not have addressed all potential sources of bias for that particular 
aspect of study design. 
− Should be reserved for those aspects of the study design in which significant 
sources of bias may persist. 
Not reported 
(NR) Should be reserved for those aspects in which the study under review fails to report how 
they have (or might have) been considered. 
Not applicable 
(NA) Should be reserved for those study design aspects that are not applicable given the study 
design under review (for example, allocation concealment would not be applicable for case–
control studies). 
In addition, the reviewer is requested to complete in detail the comments section of the quality 
appraisal form so that the grade awarded for each study aspect is as transparent as possible. 
Each study is then awarded an overall study quality grading for internal validity (IV) and a 
separate one for external validity (EV): 
Appendix B Quality Appraisal Checklist for quantitative studies (NICE, 2012) 
++ All or most of the checklist criteria have been fulfilled, where they have not been fulfilled the 
conclusions are very unlikely to alter. 
+ Some of the checklist criteria have been fulfilled, where they have not been fulfilled, or not 
adequately described, the conclusions are unlikely to alter. 




Study identification: Include full citation details 
Study design: 
Refer to the glossary of study designs (appendix D) and the algorithm for classifying 
experimental and observational study designs (appendix E) to best describe the paper's 
underpinning study design 
 
Section 1: Population 
1.1 Is the source population or source area well described? 
Was the country (e.g. developed or non-developed, type of health care system), setting (primary 







Comments: ALL SAME GRADING CRITERIA 
 
1.2 Is the eligible population or area representative of the source population or area? 
Was the recruitment of individuals, clusters or areas well defined (e.g. advertisement, birth 
register)? 
Was the eligible population representative of the source? Were important groups 
underrepresented? 
 
1.3 Do the selected participants or areas represent the eligible population or area? 
Was the method of selection of participants from the eligible population well described? 
What % of selected individuals or clusters agreed to participate? Were 
there any sources of bias? 
Were the inclusion or exclusion criteria explicit and appropriate? 
 
Section 2: Method of selection of exposure (or comparison) group 
2.1 Selection of exposure (and comparison) group. How was selection bias minimised? 
How was selection bias minimised? 
 
2.2 Was the selection of explanatory variables based on a sound theoretical basis? 
How sound was the theoretical basis for selecting the explanatory variables? 
 
2.3 Was the contamination acceptably low? 
Appendix A 
 
Did any in the comparison group receive the exposure? 
If so, was it sufficient to cause important bias? 
 
2.4 How well were likely confounding factors identified and controlled? 
Were there likely to be other confounding factors not considered or appropriately adjusted for? 
Was this sufficient to cause important bias? 
 
Section 3: Outcomes 
 
3.1 Were the outcome measures and procedures reliable? 
Were outcome measures subjective or objective (e.g. biochemically validated nicotine levels ++ 
vs self-reported smoking −)? 
How reliable were outcome measures (e.g. inter- or intra-rater reliability scores)? 
Was there any indication that measures had been validated (e.g. validated against a gold standard 
measure or assessed for content validity)? 
 
3.2 Were the outcome measurements complete? 
Were all or most of the study participants who met the defined study outcome definitions likely 
to have been identified? 
 
3.3 Were all the important outcomes assessed? 
Were all the important benefits and harms assessed? 
Was it possible to determine the overall balance of benefits and harms of the intervention versus 
comparison? 
 
3.4 Was there a similar follow-up time in exposure and comparison groups? 
If groups are followed for different lengths of time, then more events are likely to occur in the 
group followed-up for longer distorting the comparison. 
Analyses can be adjusted to allow for differences in length of follow-up 
(e.g. using person-years). 
 
3.5 Was follow-up time meaningful? 
Was follow-up long enough to assess long-term benefits and harms? 
Was it too long, e.g. participants lost to follow-up? 
 
Section 4: Analyses 
4.1 Was the study sufficiently powered to detect an intervention effect (if one exists)? 
A power of 0.8 (i.e. it is likely to see an effect of a given size if one exists, 80% of the time) is 
the conventionally accepted standard. 
Is a power calculation presented? If not, what is the expected effect size? 
Is the sample size adequate? 
 
4.2 Were multiple explanatory variables considered in the analyses? 
Were there sufficient explanatory variables considered in the analysis? 
 
4.3 Were the analytical methods appropriate? 
Were important differences in follow-up time and likely confounders adjusted for? 
 
4.6 Was the precision of association given or calculable? Is association meaningful? 
Were confidence intervals or p values for effect estimates given or possible to calculate? 
Were CIs wide or were they sufficiently precise to aid decision-making? If precision is lacking, 
is this because the study is under-powered? 
 
Section 5: Summary 
5.1 Are the study results internally valid (i.e. unbiased)? 
How well did the study minimise sources of bias (i.e. adjusting for potential confounders)? 
Were there significant flaws in the study design? 
 
5.2 Are the findings generalisable to the source population (i.e. externally valid)? 
Are there sufficient details given about the study to determine if the findings are generalisable to 
the source population? 
Consider: participants, interventions and comparisons, outcomes, resource and policy 
implications. 
 
 [15]Appraisal form derived from: Jackson R, Ameratunga S, Broad J et al. (2006) The GATE 
frame: 
critical appraisal with pictures. Evidence Based Medicine 11: 35–8. 
[16]Available from CPHE on request. 
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Appendix D. Means, Standard Deviations, Range, Sample Size and comparison t test results for Questionnaire Data (Chapter 4 5)
Scale/Study Subscale Norm scores Sample
IJS Mathes Mean SD Range N Mean SD Range N
t -test (comparing 
sample and norm 
group)
Males 139 35.69 not reported 42 145.42 37.45 67-201 26 t(66) =0.71 n/s
Females 127.04 36.02 not reported 48 132.25 33.51 43-224 224 t(270) = 0.9646 n/s
Total Not reported - 90 133.71 34.31 43-224 250
MJS (Pfeiffer & Wong, 1989) tested by  Elphinson et al., 2011; AUS Sample, Radev & Hedrih (2017) SERBIAN SAMPLE; Tani & Ponti (2016) ITALIAN SAMPLE
Males Emo (AUS) 26.89 6.38 8-39 118 39.69 4.3 34-50 26 t(142) = 9.74***
Emo(IT) 29.88 8.64 168 t(192) = 5.67***
Females Emo (AUS) 30.3 6.03 13-42 208 42.35 6.88 10-99 224 t(430) = 19.30***
Emo(IT) 33.79 5.97 193 t(415) = 13.46***
Total Emotional Emo (AUS) 29.06 6.37 8-42 326 42.08 6.7 10-99 250 t(574) = 23.77***
Emo(SERB) 30.73 4.52 500 t(748) = 27.41***
Males Cog(AUS) 8.4 4.5 5-27 118 21.19 10.36 8-43 26 t(142) = 9.90***
Cog(IT) 8.71 4.9 168 t(192)=10.03***
Females Cog(AUS) 8.32 3.98 5-26 208 20.57 10.44 8-56 224 t(430) = 15.88***
Cog(IT) 9.22 4.49 193 t(415) = 14.03***
Total Cognitive Cog(AUS) 8.35 4.17 5-27 326 20.63 10.42 8-56 250 t(574) = 19.36***
Cog(SERB) 16.81 6.26 500 t(748)=  6.2487***
Males Beh(AUS) 12.52 4.94 6-28 118 13.05 4.92 8-27 26 t(142) =0.50 n/s
Beh(IT) 12.47 5.73 168 t(192) = 0.50 n/s
Females Beh(AUS) 14.59 5.76 6-32 208 17.61 8.55 8-99 224 t(430) = 4.27***
Beh(IT) 15.97 6.39 193 t(415 = 2.19*
Total Behavioural Beh(AUS) 13.84 5.56 6-32 326 17.18 6.52 8-99 250 t(574) = 5.75***
Beh(SERB) 14.24 5 500 t(748) =  6.8358***
PS Fenigstein & Vanables (scale range 20-100)
Males 43.3 Not reported Not reported 214 39.65 14.72 20-64 26
Females 42.3 Not reported Not reported 367 44.51 16.52 20-100 224
Total (no significant diff in norm between m & f) 42.7 10.2 20-100 581 44 16.38 20-100 250 t(829) = 1.39 n/s
G_PTS (Green et al., 2008)
GPTSREF
Non-Clinical 26.8 10.4 16-72 353 Total: 32.66 12.25 16-67 250
t(601) = 6.33*** 
(sample from non-
clinical group)





Non-Clinical 22.1 9.2 16-77 353 Total: 23.55 11.23 16-82 250 t(601) =1.74 n/s
Clinical 55.4 15.5 16-80 50
* independent t test was calculated as insufficient data was to calculate a Mann-Witney U. Therefore equal variance was assumed.
Appendix D. The Jealousy and Paranoia Scales and Analysis Labels 
 
Paranoia Scale 
Item # Narrative  Abbreviation 
TP 1  Someone has it in for me  Soneinfor 
TP 2  I sometimes feel that I am being followed  SomeFollow 
TP 3  I believe that I have often been punished without 
cause.  
Punish 
TP 4  Some people have tried to steal my ideas and take 
credit for them 
 StealCred 
TP 5  My parents and family find more fault with me 
than they should 
ParentFault 
TP 6  No one really cares what happens to you NoneCare 
TP 7  I am sure I get a raw deal from life  RawDeal 
TP 8  Most people will use somewhat unfair means to 
gain profit or an advantage  
UnfairMeans 
TP 9   I often wonder what hidden reason another person 
may have for doing something  
HiddenReas 
TP 10  It is safer to trust no one  NotTrust 
TP 11  I have often felt that strangers were looking at me 
critically  
Strangers 
TP 12  Most people make friends because friends are 
likely to be useful to them  
Useful 
TP 13  Someone has been trying to influence my mind  Infmind 
TP 14  I am sure that I have been talked about behind my 
back  
Behindback 
TP 15  Most people inwardly dislike putting themselves 
out to help other people  
Dislikehelp 
TP 16  I tend to be on my guard with people who are 
somewhat more friendly than I expected.  
GuardFriend 
TP 17  People have often said insulting and unkind things 
about me.  
Insult 
TP 18  People often disappoint me  Disappoint 
TP 19  I am bothered by people outside, in cars, in stores, 
etc. watching me.  
PeopleWatch 
TP 20  I have often found people jealous of my good ideas 





Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale 
Persecution Subscale 
Item # Narrative  Abbreviation 
GPTS P1  Certain individuals have it in for me CertInfor 
GPTS P2  I have definitely been persecuted  DefPers 
GPTS P3  People have intended me harm  HaveIntend 
GPTS P4  People wanted me to feel threatened, so they stared at me  ThrtStare 
GPTS P5  I was sure certain people did things in order to annoy me CertAnnoy 
GPTS P 6  I was convinced there was a conspiracy against me  ConvConsp 
GPTS P7  I was sure someone wanted to hurt me  SureHarm 
GPTS P 8  I was distressed by people wanting to harm me in some way  DistHarm 
GPTS P9  I was preoccupied with thoughts of people trying to upset me 
deliberately  
PreoccUp 
GPTS P10  I couldn’t stop thinking about people wanting to confuse me  PreConfuse 
GPTS P11  I was distressed by being persecuted  DistPers 
GPTS P12  I was annoyed because others wanted to deliberately upset 
me  
AnnoyUpset 
GPTS P13  The thought that people were persecuting me played on my 
mind 
PersePlay 
GPTS P14  It was difficult to stop thinking about people wanting to make 
me feel bad  
FeelBad 
GPTS P15  People have been hostile towards me on purpose HostPurp 
GPTS P16  I was angry that someone wanted to hurt me AngHurt 
Self-Reference Subscale 
GPTS SR1  I spent time thinking about friends gossiping about me  ThinkGoss 
GPTS SR2  I often heard people referring to me  HeardRef 
GPTS SR3  I have been upset by friends and colleagues judging me 
critically  
DisFrndJdge 
GPTS SR4  People definitely laughed at me behind my back  CertLaughBehind 
GPTS SR5  I have been thinking a lot about people avoiding me.  ThinkAvoid 
GPTS SR6  People have been dropping hints for me  DroppingHints 
GPTS SR7  I believed that certain people were not what they seemed  NotSeemed 
GPTS SR8 People talking about me behind my back upset me UpsetBehind 
GPTS SR9  I was convinced that people were singling me out SingleOut 
GPTS SR10 I was certain that people have followed me CertFollowed 
GPTS SR 11 Certain people were hostile towards me personally CertHost 
GPTS SR 12 People have been checking up on me Checkup 
GPTS SR 13 I was stressed out by people watching me  StressWatch 
GPTS SR 14 I was frustrated by people laughing at me FrustLaugh 
GPTS SR15 I was worried by people’s undue interest in me  WorryIntrst 
GPTS SR 16 It was hard to stop thinking about people talking about me 




Interpersonal Jealousy Scale 
Item # Narrative  Abbreviation 
IJS 1.  If X were to see an old friend of the opposite sex and respond 
with a great deal of happiness, I would be annoyed  
OldFriAnnoy 
IJS 2.  If X went out with same sex friends, I would feel compelled to 
know what he/she did.  
KnowDid 
IJS 3.  If X admired someone of the opposite sex I would feel irritated.  Admires 
IJS 4.  If X were to help someone of the opposite sex with their 
work/homework, I would feel suspicious.  
WorkSuspic 
IJS 5.R   When X likes one of my friends I am pleased.  PleaseFriend 
IJS 6.R   If X were to go away for the weekend without me, my only 
concern would be with whether he/she had a good time.  
WendGood 
IJS 7.  If X were helpful to someone of the opposite sex, I would feel 
jealous.  
HelpJeal 
IJS 8.  When X talks of happy experiences of his/her past, I feel sad that 
I wasn’t part of it.  
PastSad 
IJS 9.  If X were to become displeased about the time I spend with 
others, I would be flattered.  
TimeFlat 
IJS 10.  If X and I went to a party and I lost sight of him/her, I would 
become uncomfortable.  
PartySight 
IJS11.R  I want X to remain good friends with the people he/she used to 
date.  
FriendEx 
IJS 12.  If X were to date others, I would feel unhappy.  UnhapDate 
IJS 13  When I notice that and a person of the opposite sex have 
something in common, I am envious.  
CmmonEnv 
IJS 14. I If X were to become very close to someone of the opposite sex, I 
would feel very unhappy and/or angry.  
CloseAngry 
IJS 15. I  would like X to be faithful to me.  Faithful 
IJS 16. R  I don't think it would bother me if X flirted with someone of the 
opposite sex.  
NocareFlirt 
IJS 17.  If someone of the opposite sex were to compliment, I would feel 
that the person was trying to take X away from me.  
Tkenway 
IJS18. R  I feel good when X makes a new friend.  NewFriend 
IJS19. R  If X were to spend the night comforting a friend of the opposite 
sex who had just had a tragic experience, X ’s compassion would 
please me.  
TragCompass 
IJS 20.  If someone of the opposite sex were to pay attention to X , I 
would become possessive of him/her.  
OhtrPossess 
IJS 21. R  If X were to become exuberant and hug someone of the opposite 
sex, it would make me feel good that he/she was expressing 
his/her feelings openly.  
GoodExpress 
IJS 22  The thought of X kissing someone else drives me up the wall.  Kissing 
IJS 23.  If someone of the opposite sex lit up at the sight of X , I would 
become uneasy.  
LitupUnease 
IJS 24.  I like to find fault with X ’s old dates.  Faultfind 
IJS 25.  I feel possessive toward X.  Possessto 
IJS 26.  If X had previously been married, I would feel resentment 
towards the ex wife/husband.  
Resentex 
IJS 27.  If I saw a picture of X and an old date I would feel unhappy.  UnhapPic 
IJS 28.  If X were to accidentally call me by the wrong name, I would 
become furious.  
WrongName 




Multidimensional Jealousy Scale 
Item # Narrative  Abbreviation 
Emotional Subscale 
MJSEmo 1  X comments to you on how great looking a member of the 
opposite sex is  
GrtLookg 
MJSEmo 2  X shows a great deal of interest or excitement in talking to 
someone of theopposite sex.  
ExciteTalk 
MJSEmo 3  X smiles in a very friendly manner to someone of the 
opposite sex  
SmileFriendly 
MJSEmo 4  A member of the opposite sex is trying to get close to X all 
the time  
OthrTryCl 
MJSEmo 5  X is flirting with someone of the opposite sex  Flirting 
MJSEmo 6  Someone of the opposite sex is dating X  OtherDate 
MJSEmo7  X hugs and kisses someone of the opposite sex  HugKiss 
MJSEmo8  X works very closely with a member of the opposite sex (In 
university or at work)  
CloseWork 
Cognitive Subscale 
MJS Cog1  I suspect that X is secretly seeing someone of the opposite 
sex  
SusptSee 
MJS Cog2  I am worried that some member of the opposite sex may 
be chasing after X  
WorryOthrChase 
MJS Cog3  I suspect that X may be attracted to someone else  SusptAttract 
MJS Cog4  I suspect that X may be physically intimate with another 
member of the opposite sex behind my back  
PhyIntimate 
MJS Cog5  I think that some member of if the opposite sex may be 
romantically interested in X  
OthrIntst 
MJS Cog6  I am worried that someone of the opposite sex is trying to 
seduce X  
SmeSedce 
MJS Cog7  I think that X is secretly developing and intimate 
relationship with someone of the opposite sex  
SecrtDev 




MJS Beh1  I look through X’s drawers, handbag or pockets.  HndbgPoc 
MJS Beh2  I call X unexpectedly, just to see if he or she is there  UnexptCall 
MJS Beh3  I question X about previous or present romantic 
relationships  
QstnPast 
MJS Beh4  I say something nasty about someone of the opposite sex, 
if X shows an interest in that person.  
SmthgNast 
MJS Beh 5  I question X about his or her telephone calls  QstnPhone 
MJS Beh 6  I question X about his or her whereabouts  QstnWhere 
MJS Beh7  I join in whenever I see X talking to a member of the 
opposite sex  
Joinin 
MJS Beh 8  I pay X a surprise visit just to see who is with him or her.  Surprise 
 









F1. Interpersonal Jealousy Scale (IJS) 
Item Name Short Label   Chisq   
p-
value  Outfit MSQ  Infit MSQ Outfit t Infit t 
IJS_14_1* CloseAngry 164.867 1 0.654 0.668 -4.24 -4.47 
IJS_23_1** LitupUnease 180.632 1 0.717 0.747 -3.15 -3 
IJS_3_1** AdmireIrr 185.052 1 0.734 0.697 -2.89 -3.73 
IJS_20_1** OhtrPossess 190.378 1 0.755 0.747 -3.1 -3.36 
IJS_17_1** Tkenway 191.895 1 0.761 0.791 -2.92 -2.67 
IJS_22 Kissing 203.31 1 0.807 0.944 -1.26 -0.41 
IJS_1_1** OldFriAnnoy 207.666 1 0.824 0.835 -2.13 -2.14 
IJS_27** UnhapPi 208.62 1 0.828 0.792 -1.96 -2.76 
IJS_7 HelpJeal 215.74 0.9 0.856 0.835 -1.71 -2.1 
IJS_13 InCmmonEnv 226.311 0.9 0.898 0.864 -1.16 -1.78 
IJS_4 WorkSuspic 232.866 0.8 0.924 0.922 -0.85 -0.95 
IJS_26 Resentex 255.482 0.4 1.014 0.969 0.19 -0.36 
IJS_25 Possessto 259.596 0.3 1.03 1.052 0.36 0.65 
IJS_2 KnowDid 297.163 0 1.179 1.038 1.94 0.5 
IJS_15 Faithful 321.838 0 1.277 0.947 0.86 -0.09 
IJS_11R FriendEx 330.732 0 1.312 1.25 2.88 2.53 
IJS_24 Faultfind 352.588 0 1.399 1.251 4.02 2.93 
IJS_28 WrongName 374.375 0 1.486 1.251 3.92 2.64 
IJS_16R NocareFlirt 451.528 0 1.792 1.427 4.5 3.41 
IJS_12 UnhapDate 650.678 0 2.582 1.664 5.71 4.19 











F2. Multidimensional Jealousy Scale (MJS) 
Itemfit statistics for MJS  
Variable Name Short Label Chisq p-value Outfit MSQ Infit MSQ Outfit t Infit t 
MJS_Cog1 SusptSee 143.942 1 0.576 0.717 -2.67 -2.78 
MJS_Cog7 ThnkSecrtDev 149.247 1 0.597 0.734 -2.46 -2.61 
MJS_Cog4 SuspPhys 160.709 1 0.643 0.776 -2.05 -2.17 
MJS_Cog6 WorrySmeSedce 179.798 1 0.719 0.739 -2.82 -3.66 
MJS_Cog3** SusptAttract 208.198 0.972 0.833 0.844 -1.95 -2.1 
MJS_Beh5 QstnPhone 216.509 0.932 0.866 1.053 -0.76 0.54 
MJS_Cog2 WorryOthrChase 219.663 0.91 0.879 0.906 -1.42 -1.27 
MJS_Beh8 SurpriseWho 220.735 0.901 0.883 1.177 -0.21 0.94 
MJS_Emo2 ExciteTalk 222.109 0.889 0.888 0.877 -1.08 -1.23 
MJS_Emo8 CloseWork 229.67 0.805 0.919 0.925 -0.96 -0.87 
MJS_Cog5 ThnkOthrIntst 232.13 0.771 0.929 0.952 -0.86 -0.61 
MJS_Emo4 OthrTryCl 234.529 0.736 0.938 0.931 -0.48 -0.51 
MJS_Beh4 SmthgNast 240.029 0.647 0.96 1.062 -0.22 0.64 
MJS_Beh2 UnexptCall 245.16 0.557 0.981 1.012 -0.04 0.14 
MJS_Emo1 CommentLook 248.939 0.489 0.996 0.957 -0.01 -0.43 
MJS_Emo3 SmileFriendly 255.012 0.383 1.02 1.02 0.24 0.25 
MJS_Beh6 QstnWhere 255.291 0.379 1.021 1.054 0.25 0.75 
MJS_Emo5 Flirting 261.804 0.276 1.047 0.915 0.38 -0.48 
MJS_Emo7 HugKiss 266.86 0.208 1.067 1.003 0.6 0.06 
MJS_Beh3 QstnPast 276.513 0.111 1.106 1.092 1.33 1.31 
MJS_Beh1 HndbgPoc 305.206 0.009 1.221 1.087 0.8 0.51 
MJS_Emo6 OtherDate 306.673 0.007 1.227 0.966 1.32 -0.14 
MJS_Beh7* Joinin 314.162 0.003 1.257 1.24 2.66 2.76 





F3. Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale (G-PTS) 
Itemfit Statistic for G-PTS 
Variable 
Number 




Outfit t Infit t 
GPTSP_8* DistHarm 112.196 1 0.462 0.882 -2.34 -0.62 
GPTSP_6* ConvConsp 114.303 1 0.47 0.894 -2.35 -0.57 
GPTSP_13* PersePlay 114.757 1 0.472 0.688 -2.53 -2.1 
GPTSP_7* SureHarm 119.315 1 0.491 0.834 -2.06 -0.88 
GPTSP_9* PreoccUp 130.563 1 0.537 0.783 -2.73 -1.73 
GTPSP_12* AnnoyUpset 166.089 1 0.683 0.752 -1.98 -2.26 
GPTSP_4 ThrtStare 191.232 0.993 0.787 0.923 -0.8 -0.42 
GPTSP_15 HostPurp 191.993 0.992 0.79 0.918 -1.41 -0.74 
GPTSP_10 Confuse 193.002 0.991 0.794 1.003 -0.89 0.07 
GPTSP_14 FeelBad 193.217 0.991 0.795 0.865 -1.14 -1.1 
GPTSP_11 DistPers 195.616 0.987 0.805 0.864 -0.65 -0.73 
GPTSSR_16 HardThkBehind 201.138 0.974 0.828 0.93 -1.27 -0.68 
GPTSSR_9 SingleOut 208.235 0.943 0.857 0.926 -0.98 -0.7 
GPTSSR_4 DefLaugh 225.475 0.77 0.928 0.958 -0.53 -0.42 
GPTSSR_1 ThinkGoss 229.72 0.705 0.945 0.818 -0.5 -2.26 
GPTSSR_5 ThkAvoid 231.331 0.678 0.952 0.999 -0.33 0.02 
GPTSSR_14 FrustLaugh 231.381 0.677 0.952 1.041 -0.29 0.44 
GPTSSR_2 HeardRef 242.16 0.485 0.997 0.844 0.02 -1.69 
GPTSSR_13 StressWatch 248.863 0.367 1.024 1.204 0.21 1.9 
GPTSSR_3 UpsetFrndJdge 252.416 0.31 1.039 0.922 0.39 -0.9 
GPTSSR_6 DroppingHints 256.942 0.243 1.057 1.038 0.37 0.35 
GPTSSR_11 CertHost 256.742 0.246 1.057 1.004 0.43 0.08 
GPTSP_1 CertInfor 260.954 0.192 1.074 1.145 0.5 1.27 
GPTSP_5 CertAnnoy 263.623 0.162 1.085 1.009 0.73 0.13 
GPTSP_2 DefPers 266.073 0.138 1.095 1.006 0.49 0.09 
GPTSP_16 AngHurt 278.29 0.054 1.145 1.097 0.73 0.72 
GPTSSR_8 UpsetBehind 279.934 0.047 1.152 1.144 1.5 1.68 
GPTSSR_7** NotSeemed 302.208 0.005 1.244 1.161 2.36 1.87 
GPTSSR_15* WorryIntrst 316.266 0.001 1.302 1.023 1.53 0.22 
GPTSP_3* HaveIntend 323.821 0 1.333 1.119 1.38 0.82 
GPTSSR_10* CertFollowed 439.898 0 1.81 1.271 2.38 1.42 




Appendix G.  Script for instructions to participants before joint discussion recording 
 
Before I switch on the video what I would like you to do is to think about a time that you’ve had a minor disagreement 
between you that you are happy to discuss and to have recorded during this session. I will give you about 15 minutes 
now in order to agree between you upon an occasion that you are happy to discuss today and I’ll come back at the end 
of the time, is that ok? 
 
AFTER THE AGREEMENT HAS TAKEN PLACE 
 
So, have you agreed on a situation where you disagreed that you are happy to discuss today? (WAIT FOR 
RESPONSE). If yes, then go to section b) if No, Ok, so I can give you 5 more minutes if you like, any incident you 
think is suitable will be fine for today. So, now I will switch on the recording equipment, is that ok? (Get verbal 
consent)(Switch on equipment). Would you mind both stating that you are happy to go ahead with recording for the 
recording? (Get verbal consent)  
 
Section b) So, maybe you can both take a couple of minutes to think about what happened from your point of view. 
(Pause for 2 minutes) 
Then if you both tell me how it started and then developed and how you resolved or didn’t resolve it. Who would like 
to go first? 
(STOP AFTER 20 MINS OF RECORDING)  
Thank you both very much. So, now I would like do go onto the separate response part of the study. Would you like a 





Appendix H. Couple Interview Script and Schedule 
 
 (Bring both partners back into the interview room) So, we recorded a video earlier and also you have no both 
responded to a series of questions about your discussion. What I would like to do now is to have a joint discussion, but 
first I would like us to watch the video recording from earlier. Can either of you please ask for the video to be stopped 
at any point when you think that the discussion is getting worse or more heated or that you notice that you are starting 
to feel upset, angry or anxious, or where you feel that you have been misunderstood or have misunderstood your 
partner, so that we can talk about that situation? Is it ok for me to switch that on now?  
 
(Start the video. Stop where appropriate) 
 
1) Please can you briefly describe in 2 or 3 sentences what you think was going on during the discussion.  
2) At any point that you did feel anxious or upset can you tell us what was going on? 
3) What did you think that your partner was thinking about you or intending during the discussion or at that moment? 
4)  How do you think your partner feels about the discussion that you have just had? 
 (As the participants explanation is exhausted) 
Is it ok if we move on now? 
Concluding questions at the end of the discussion section of the study: 
1) What do you think should be done to resolve any disagreement that you had? 






Appendix I. Cued Recall Study Individual Written Question Sheet 
 
PARTICIPANT No:  
Couple No: 
 
Information before you start.  
It is known that people frequently think and feel things during conflict situations with intimate partners about the 
other’s intentions and feelings that are both positive and negative. What I would like you to comment on are your own 
thoughts and feelings/emotions and also your insights into your partner’s motives or intentions towards you or their 
feelings/emotions or alternatively to report your insights about your own motives and feelings/emotions.  
 
Remember that if there are any thoughts or feelings that you would rather not discuss there is no need for you to do 
that.  However, all your comments will be completely confidential and will not be discussed with anyone else including 
your partner. However, you should note that your partner may be able to identify your responses in the final report or 
research papers even though identifiers such as your name, age and locations will be changed, by reference to the 
discussion content.  
 
What I would like you to do now is to answer a few written questions. If you could read through the following list of 
questions, I know that these are quite long but they are there to jog your memory. Please just write as much as you are 
happy with in response to the questions but try to answer them as fully as possible. Remember that the focus is on how 
you thought and felt, what you thought that the other person was thinking and the evidence that you used. 
 




Question 1a) What did you think about the conflict experience? 
Specifically: What thoughts ran through your mind? 
















Specifically: Can you tell me what evidence leads you to that conclusion? 
 Did you consider that might have been due to something else, and if so what? 




















Specifically: Can you tell me what evidence leads you to that conclusion? 
  Did you think that might have been due to something else? 



















Question 2b) Did you feel anything else? (This deals with the full range of emotions) 
Did you have mixed feelings about that?  (This deals with the full range of emotions) 











So, this section of the discussion I would like to ask you some questions about how you manage the situation when you 
disagree with your partners 
Question 3a) What was it about the situation and the events that lead up to it that meant that you felt and behaved in 










Question 3b) Did you do anything or think anything inside to make that feeling more manageable? (Dampening down) 
In relation to the original conflict what did you do to make sure that the situation didn’t happen 
again? (Antecedent focus) 














What I want to ask you now is if there are any actions or behaviours that you do or have tried to do since the 
 
 4 
disagreement that you intended to reduce the chance of the difficulties that you talked about above from occurring 
again? All of my questions will relate to the situation that you were talking about with your partner. 
Question 4a) In relation to the event you discussed, have you done anything to try and minimise, reduce, or prevent the 
threat from occurring? YES/NO If yes, please describe the actions and frequencies.  

























(The elements in blue on the response sheet refer to the theoretical basis of the 
question and will not be included in the final schedule as presented to the participants)  
APPENDIX I: THE SAFETY BEHAVIOURS QUESTIONNAIRE – PERSECUTORY BELIEFS (SBQ) 
 
‘I would now like to ask you, in some detail, about any actions or behaviours that you may do to try to minimize or 
stop the threat from occurring; often we find that individuals who feel threatened do things that they think will 
provide some protection. All my questions will relate to the past month.’  
Initial probe: ‘In the last month, have you done anything to try to minimise, reduce, or prevent the threat from 
occurring ? ’ YES NO If Yes, please note actions and frequencies  
.......................................................................................................................................................................... ...................... 
For scoring purposes, behaviours reported above should be classified into one of the categories below (i.e. Avoidance, In-
Situation, Escape, Compliance, Help, Aggression, or Delusional)  
Note : If at any stage of the interview it is unclear how a behaviour reduces threat, then the individual should be asked : ‘ 
How does that reduce or prevent the threat from occurring?’  
‘That was a very general question. I’d now like to ask some more specific questions.’  
1. Avoidance: ‘Sometimes, people who feel threatened avoid situations or activities in order to reduce the chances of 
the threat occurring. In the last month, have you avoided anything in order to reduce the threat?’ YES NO If Yes, 
please note actions and frequencies 
....................................................................................................................................................................................................  
‘Just to be sure we haven’t missed anything, I’m going to read a list of situations out loud to you. Do you avoid any of 





Meeting people or social gatherings Open spaces 
Enclosed spaces 
Staying at home alone 
Staying at home with others 
Being far from home 
Walking on the street 
Eating or drinking certain items  
2b. This question is to be asked if threat is reported as actually happening : ‘ When harm is happening to you, are there 
any things that you do to try to lessen the impact ? ’ YES NO  
If Yes, please note actions and frequencies ................................................................................... 
................................................................................... 3. Escape : ‘ Another thing that people do is to leave a situation if 
they think that threat is very imminent or about to occur, for example, they might rapidly leave a shopping centre if 
they see someone they think is about to harm them. In the last month, have you quickly left a situation to avoid the 
threat ? ’ YES NO  
If Yes, please note actions and frequencies ................................................................................... 
................................................................................... If a response is given then ask about cues : ‘ What made you think 
that threat was about to occur then?’ ................................................................................... 
................................................................................... 4. Compliance with persecutor’s demands wishes: ‘To reduce the 
chances of threat occurring, people may sometimes comply with, or give in to, the demands or wishes of the person 
who is trying to harm them. Do you do things to satisfy the person who is trying to harm you, in order to reduce the 
threat?’ YES NO If Yes, please note actions and frequencies ................................................................................... 
................................................................................... 5. Getting help from others : ‘ Occasionally, a person may try to get 
the help of others in reducing the threat, for example, asking friends to help or contacting the police or solicitors. In 
the last month, have you tried to enlist the help of anyone in reducing the threat?’ YES NO If Yes, please note actions 
and frequencies ................................................................................... ................................................................................... 6. 
Aggression: ‘Lastly, people sometimes have tried to confront, or go up to, the person they think is trying to harm 
them – have you done that in the last month?’ YES NO If Yes, please note actions and frequencies 
................................................................................... ................................................................................... 7. Delusional 
actions (no question to be asked) Interviewer to list here any behaviours that are regarded by the person as reducing the 
likelihood of the threat, but that do not fit into any of the above categories and seem not to reduce threat in any 
understandable way ................................................................................... ................................................................................... 
Perceived effectiveness of safety behaviours, control of the situation, and rescue factors :  
A. ‘Overall, how successful do you believe are these actions in reducing the threat? Please choose a number  
2a. In-Situation Safety Behaviours : ‘ There may times when a person can’t avoid being in the very threatening 
situation. However, they may still try to do small, or subtle things, to try to minimize the threat. For example, if 
outside, they might try to be with someone, or keep near an exit, and, if inside, they might not answer the front door, 
or keep the curtains drawn or check the locks. They may also try to be very vigilant for threat. When you are in a 
situation in which you think that threat is about to occur, do you do anything to reduce the threat?’ YES NO 
If Yes, please note actions and frequencies ................................................................................... 
...................................................................................  
Yes No …….Yes No ........ Yes No ........ Yes No ........  
Yes No 
Yes No ........ Yes No ........ Yes No ........ Yes No ........  
Yes No 
Yes No ........ Yes No ........  
Frequency ........ ..............  
be between 0 (not at all successful) and 10 (extremely successful). ’ ................................................................................... 
...................................................................................  
B. ‘Overall, how much control do you have over the situation? Please choose a number between 0 (no control) and 10 
(total control).’ ................................................................................... ................................................................................... C. 
‘Are there any factors that are beyond your control that may rescue you from the harm? – for example, something to 
do with the person trying to harm you or something to do with other people that may result in the threat not 
occurring’ YES NO If Yes, please note details ...................................................................................  
 
D. ‘Overall, how successful do you think these rescue factors may be ?  
Please choose a number between 0 (not successful) and 10 (totally successful). ’....................... Note It must be 
remembered to obtain frequency ratings of the safety-behaviours. A card listing the frequency categories can be placed in 
front of the person :  
Frequency of action. Please choose a number for how often the action occurred in the last month. (1, definitely occurred on 
at least one occasion; 2, occurred more than once but not frequently (e.g. not more than five times); 3, occurred frequently 
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